Travis Roberts v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedSeptember 10, 2024
DocketDA-0752-20-0530-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Travis Roberts v. Department of the Air Force (Travis Roberts v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Travis Roberts v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TRAVIS ROBERTS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-20-0530-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: September 10, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Trey Hopkins , Esquire, Fort Smith, Arkansas, for the appellant.

Daniel L. McFadden , Esquire, Jeffrey Douglas Wood , Esquire, and Kevin S. Burton , North Little Rock, Arkansas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his removal appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that he did not meet the definition of an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). In an effort to meet the statutory definition of an employee in the excepted service, the appellant, who is not a preference eligible, argues that the administrative judge erroneously relied on “antiquated” precedent to preclude him from tacking on over 6 months of temporary service with the agency to subsequent service in an indefinite appointment. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-9. Specifically, the appellant cites Youngs v. Department of the Army, 73 M.S.P.R. 551 (1997), and Martinez v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 154 (2012), to support the proposition that a non-preference eligible in the excepted service can count his prior temporary service to meet the 2 year “current, continuous service” requirement under subsection (C)(ii). PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8. However, neither of these cases provides a basis for disturbing the initial decision. As an initial matter, the Board in Ellefson v. Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 191 (2005), recognized that Youngs was overruled by the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, Youngs dealt with an individual in the competitive service and, thus, interprets a 3

different statutory provision than the relevant provision in this appeal. Youngs, 73 M.S.P.R. at 557-59. The issue in Martinez, on the other hand, was not whether a temporary appointment can be tacked onto a subsequent appointment, but whether the different positions the appellant held with the agency in his two appointments were the same or similar for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). Martinez, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶¶ 8-12. It is well settled that service under temporary appointments is excluded from the calculation of 2 years of current continuous service under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). See, e.g., Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 47 F.3d 409, 411 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that tacking periods of prior service under temporary appointments to service under a permanent appointment is prohibited by the plain language of section 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii)); Roy v. Department of Justice, 115 M.S.P.R. 669, ¶ 7 (2011) (finding that the language of section 7511(a)(1)(C) (ii) is clear that time spent in a temporary position in the excepted service does not qualify for tacking to a permanent position), aff’d sub nom. Roy v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 672 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we discern no reason to disturb the initial decision. 2

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

2 It is undisputed that the appellant was a dual status military technician as defined in 32 U.S.C. § 709. As a dual status technician, the appellant’s Board appeal rights are limited under 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(4). Although that issue has not been fully developed by the parties, in light of our finding that the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant did not meet the statutory definition of an employee, the Board need not decide that issue. 3 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 4

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case.

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Related

Roy v. Merit Systems Protection Board
672 F.3d 1378 (Federal Circuit, 2012)
Warren S. Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board
47 F.3d 409 (Federal Circuit, 1995)
Ann M. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force
307 F.3d 1339 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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