Traverse Therapy Services PLLC v. Sadler-Bridges Wellness Group PLLC, et al.
Opinion
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 TRAVERSE THERAPY SERVICES PLLC, CASE NO. C23-1239-KKE 8
Plaintiff(s), ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND DENYING 10 SADLER-BRIDGES WELLNESS GROUP DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLLC, et al., 11
Defendant(s). 12
13 The Court previously granted partial summary judgment, sua sponte, for Defendants on 14 two of three claims brought by Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 86. The claim that survived summary judgment 15 is a state-law tort claim, and the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss it for lack of subject- 16 matter jurisdiction, preferring to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claim 17 because of “how far along the case is and its proximity to trial.” Id. at 8. 18 Plaintiff then requested that the Court either certify the partial summary judgment order 19 for interlocutory appeal, or enter a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that 20 would permit it to seek immediate appeal. Dkt. No. 87. Plaintiff contended that it was inefficient 21 to proceed to trial on the state-law tort claim, because that claim overlapped with the two claims 22 dismissed via summary judgment, and thus argued that the District Court case should be stayed 23 while it pursued an appeal of the summary judgment order. Id. The Court denied that motion, 24 finding that it “runs counter to judicial efficiency to stay every case after the dismissal of a cause 1 of action and send cases up piece meal to the Ninth Circuit. Just because Plaintiff is unhappy with 2 the outcome of its summary judgment motion does not create grounds for it to immediately appeal 3 the dismissal of its claims.” Dkt. No. 93 at 3.
4 Rather than try the state-law tort claim, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed it under Federal 5 Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A) to streamline its subsequent appeal of the Court’s partial 6 summary judgment order. Dkt. No. 97 (indicating that Plaintiff “desir[ed] to avoid the expense 7 of a trial solely on the third cause of action for intentional interference” and that “Plaintiff intends 8 to seek review of the existing rulings in this case through its motion for reconsideration, and/or 9 appeal to the Ninth Circuit”). Defendants stipulated to that dismissal, and the Court accepted the 10 stipulation. Dkt. Nos. 97, 98. The Court entered final judgment for Defendants as to the two trade 11 secrets claims, noting that the third claim had been voluntarily dismissed. Dkt. No. 105. 12 Plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal. Dkt. No. 106. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Court’s
13 grant of partial summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. See Dkt. Nos. 86, 108. The case was 14 then remanded back to this Court, which held a scheduling conference with the parties and set a 15 case schedule. See Dkt. Nos. 111, 116, 117. 16 On the post-remand deadline set for amending the pleadings, Plaintiff filed a motion for 17 leave to amend the pleadings to restore the state-law tort claim that was previously dismissed. Dkt. 18 No. 118. Shortly thereafter, on the same day, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 19 subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff’s one federal claim fails and therefore the case 20 should be dismissed. Dkt. No. 120. 21 Defendants had previously filed a similar motion to dismiss, which was denied. See Dkt. 22 Nos. 16, 45. Defendants did not seek reconsideration of the order denying its prior motion to
23 dismiss, nor did Defendants provide any reason why the Court should reconsider an issue 24 previously decided in this litigation. The Court declines to do so now, under the law of the case 1 doctrine. See Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The law of the case doctrine 2 generally prohibits a court from considering an issue that has already been decided by that same 3 court or a higher court in the same case.” (citing Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067
4 (9th Cir. 2012)). Although Defendants attempt to distinguish the present motion to dismiss from 5 its previous iteration, Defendants made a similar “interstate commerce” argument previously and 6 the Court rejected it. See Dkt. No. 16 at 5, Dkt. No. 45 at 5–7. And in so ruling, the Court 7 considered evidence outside the pleadings (Dkt. No. 45 at 6 (citing Dkt. Nos. 29, 30)), which is 8 inconsistent with Defendants’ characterization of the prior motion as purely facial as opposed to 9 factual. Dkt. No. 128 at 1. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 10 No. 120). 11 The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to reinstate 12 the tort claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its
13 pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should 14 freely give leave when justice so requires.” Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion does not 15 serve the ends of justice. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its tort claim only after the Court declined 16 to bless Plaintiff’s attempts to immediately appeal the partial summary judgment order. Plaintiff’s 17 motion to reinstate the dismissed tort claim post-remand reveals that the prior dismissal was a 18 sham. See James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (warning that 19 where a party dismisses “some claims without prejudice always presents a possibility that the 20 dismissing party would attempt to resurrect them in the event of reversal[,]” but accepting the 21 dismissal where there is no evidence that the dismissal was intended to manipulate the appellate 22 process). Plaintiff’s conduct is inconsistent with the final judgment rule, which requires parties to
23 “raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits” and “forbids 24 1 piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy.” 2 Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation modified). 3 Although Plaintiff emphasizes that its voluntary dismissal of the tort claim was without
4 prejudice, and that Defendants stipulated to such a dismissal, that designation does not control 5 here. That the dismissal preserved Plaintiff’s ability to re-file does not necessarily mean that it 6 will be permitted to re-file the claim whenever and wherever it chooses. See, e.g., James, 283 F.3d 7 at 1066 (explaining that when dismissing a claim without prejudice and then pursuing an appeal 8 as to other claims, “plaintiff assumes the risk that, by the time the case returns to district court, the 9 claim will be barred by the statute of limitations or laches”). Plaintiff’s litigation conduct reveals 10 its intent to manipulate appellate jurisdiction via a dismissal to keep the tort claim “on ice while 11 appeal was taken from” what was in actuality “a partial judgment, circumventing the final 12 judgment rule[.]” Id.; see also Great Rivers Co-op. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d
13 685, 688 (8th Cir. 1999) (“A plaintiff whose strongest claims have been dismissed in an 14 interlocutory order may expedite appeal by dismissing its remaining claims with prejudice.
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Traverse Therapy Services PLLC v. Sadler-Bridges Wellness Group PLLC, et al. (Traverse Therapy Services PLLC v. Sadler-Bridges Wellness Group PLLC, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.