FANNING, Justice.
Appellee, Carzie Adams, brought suit against appellant insurance company, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to recover monies spent for surgical treatment, medicines and hospital services incident to such treatment.
Trial was to the court without a jury. The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:
“FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. On or about the 29th day of August, 1958, the Plaintiff, Carzie Adams, received a compensable injury while in the course and scope of his employment for Yates Construction Company and Yates Construction Company had Workmen’s Compensation insurance with the Defendant.
“2. That as a result of such accidental injury the Defendant paid the Plaintiff Workmen’s Compensation benefits, settled its claim with the Plaintiff, and left all future medical payments open to future determination of the accrual of benefits.
“3. That as a result of the injury of 1958, Plaintiff’s condition became critical during the first half of 1965, and further medical and surgical treatment was necessary.
“4. That Plaintiff first demanded of Defendant that it furnish him medical and surgical treatment, and that Defendant refused to do so.
“5. That after so demanding, and after having filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Texas for surgical benefits and medical treatment, Plaintiff’s condition, as a result of his previous compensable injury, became so grave that emergency surgery was necessary.
“6. That at all material times the Defendant refused to furnish any medical treatment of any nature whatsoever to the Plaintiff.
“7. That the Plaintiff obtained medical services and treatment at his own expense, all of which were necessary as a result of his previous injury, and that the charges for such medical and surgical treatment were in the aggregate amount of $1,318.30, and that all such charges were necessary, and the amounts charged were reasonable for the time and place where such services were rendered.
“8. That all jurisdictional prerequisites to confer jurisdiction upon this Court have been complied with by the Plaintiff.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. That the Defendant is liable to Plaintiff in the sum of $1318.30 under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Texas.”
Additional findings and conclusions were requested, some were given, the others were refused; they are not set out here as they do not materially affect the main findings and conclusions set out above.
It is appellant’s position under its points 1 through 4, that appellant was not legally required to provide all necessary surgical treatment, medicines and hospital services incident to the performance of such surgical treatment after the original claim for compensation (for injury received on Aug. 29, 1958) had been terminated by compromise settlement agreement made on April 20th, 1961.
This appears to be a case of first impression in Texas and we have found no authorities in point on the questions posed by appellant’s contentions under its points 1 through 4. Sections 12e and 7 of Art. 8306, and Sec. 5 of Art. 8307, are the pertinent statutes to be considered.
Sec. 12e of Art. 8306, enacted in 1917, is found below.
Sec. 7 of Art. 8306, as
amended in 1957, reads in part as found below.
Section 5 of Art. 8307, as amended in 1957, reads as found below.
The term “medical aid” in its broad sense includes “surgical aid”. The practice of medicine includes many branches and is a
broad term. It of course includes surgery. “And as used in the Medical Practice Act, the terms ‘physician’ and ‘surgeon’ are also synonymous, and the terms ‘practitioners’, ‘practitioners of medicine’, and ‘practice of medicine’ are construed to refer to and include physicians and surgeons.” 45 Tex.Jur.2d, p. 118.
In Words and Phrases, Vol. 40A, p. 468, Surgery, it is stated:
“Webster’s Dictionary describes ‘surgery’ as a branch of medical science. It cannot be denied that practical surgery is ordinarily thus spoken of. U. S. v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 100 F. 932, 938, 41 C.C.A. 114.”
In Words and Phrases, Vol. 26A, p. 616, Medical Treatment, it is stated:
“In construing a contract of a physician to furnish medical treatment, the court said: ‘It appears from the evidence that medical treatment in its enlarged sense includes surgery, and in a restricted sense, as used in medical parlance, may mean a division of the curative art exclusive of surgery.’ And the court held that the term in the contract, which was made with the officers of a county, was used in its broadest sense, and included services in surgical cases. County of Clinton v. Ramsey, 20 Ill.App. 577, 579, 20 Bradw. 577, 579.”
In Truck Insurance Exchange v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521, it was stated in part as follows:
“The term ‘surgery’ is not defined in the statute though technically it has a broad meaning. It does comprehend as suggested in Bellah some slight and simple procedures. It has been described as ‘that branch of medical science which treats of mechanical or operative measures for healing diseases, deformities or injuries.’ Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 205 Ark. 566, 169 S.W.2d 651, 654; State v. Eustace, 117 Kan. 746, 233 P. 109. Yet we are constrained to the opinion that as the term is used in the statute it refers to the common ordinary understanding of that word and as the art is practiced by a skilled surgeon. We think it would not be held generally to include mechanical application of weights and traction and other remedial devices, but embrace only cutting operations. * * *
“Finally, the insurer claims that the 1957 amendments have worked far-reaching changes in the compensation law and would render the testimony admissible from the effective date of these amendments though it was not admissible theretofore. Section 7 of Art. 8306 formerly had a specific limitation of 90 days from the date of the injury for ‘medical attention, nursing or chiropractic services,’ and a specific limitation of 180 days from the date of injury for hospital services. Effective September 1, 1957, as amended, this section now reads in part as follows:
“Section 5 of Art. 8307 as amended now provides in part: * * *
“We are of the opinion that these two amendments in no way affect the question before us or operate to relax the rule.
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FANNING, Justice.
Appellee, Carzie Adams, brought suit against appellant insurance company, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to recover monies spent for surgical treatment, medicines and hospital services incident to such treatment.
Trial was to the court without a jury. The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:
“FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. On or about the 29th day of August, 1958, the Plaintiff, Carzie Adams, received a compensable injury while in the course and scope of his employment for Yates Construction Company and Yates Construction Company had Workmen’s Compensation insurance with the Defendant.
“2. That as a result of such accidental injury the Defendant paid the Plaintiff Workmen’s Compensation benefits, settled its claim with the Plaintiff, and left all future medical payments open to future determination of the accrual of benefits.
“3. That as a result of the injury of 1958, Plaintiff’s condition became critical during the first half of 1965, and further medical and surgical treatment was necessary.
“4. That Plaintiff first demanded of Defendant that it furnish him medical and surgical treatment, and that Defendant refused to do so.
“5. That after so demanding, and after having filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Texas for surgical benefits and medical treatment, Plaintiff’s condition, as a result of his previous compensable injury, became so grave that emergency surgery was necessary.
“6. That at all material times the Defendant refused to furnish any medical treatment of any nature whatsoever to the Plaintiff.
“7. That the Plaintiff obtained medical services and treatment at his own expense, all of which were necessary as a result of his previous injury, and that the charges for such medical and surgical treatment were in the aggregate amount of $1,318.30, and that all such charges were necessary, and the amounts charged were reasonable for the time and place where such services were rendered.
“8. That all jurisdictional prerequisites to confer jurisdiction upon this Court have been complied with by the Plaintiff.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. That the Defendant is liable to Plaintiff in the sum of $1318.30 under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Texas.”
Additional findings and conclusions were requested, some were given, the others were refused; they are not set out here as they do not materially affect the main findings and conclusions set out above.
It is appellant’s position under its points 1 through 4, that appellant was not legally required to provide all necessary surgical treatment, medicines and hospital services incident to the performance of such surgical treatment after the original claim for compensation (for injury received on Aug. 29, 1958) had been terminated by compromise settlement agreement made on April 20th, 1961.
This appears to be a case of first impression in Texas and we have found no authorities in point on the questions posed by appellant’s contentions under its points 1 through 4. Sections 12e and 7 of Art. 8306, and Sec. 5 of Art. 8307, are the pertinent statutes to be considered.
Sec. 12e of Art. 8306, enacted in 1917, is found below.
Sec. 7 of Art. 8306, as
amended in 1957, reads in part as found below.
Section 5 of Art. 8307, as amended in 1957, reads as found below.
The term “medical aid” in its broad sense includes “surgical aid”. The practice of medicine includes many branches and is a
broad term. It of course includes surgery. “And as used in the Medical Practice Act, the terms ‘physician’ and ‘surgeon’ are also synonymous, and the terms ‘practitioners’, ‘practitioners of medicine’, and ‘practice of medicine’ are construed to refer to and include physicians and surgeons.” 45 Tex.Jur.2d, p. 118.
In Words and Phrases, Vol. 40A, p. 468, Surgery, it is stated:
“Webster’s Dictionary describes ‘surgery’ as a branch of medical science. It cannot be denied that practical surgery is ordinarily thus spoken of. U. S. v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 100 F. 932, 938, 41 C.C.A. 114.”
In Words and Phrases, Vol. 26A, p. 616, Medical Treatment, it is stated:
“In construing a contract of a physician to furnish medical treatment, the court said: ‘It appears from the evidence that medical treatment in its enlarged sense includes surgery, and in a restricted sense, as used in medical parlance, may mean a division of the curative art exclusive of surgery.’ And the court held that the term in the contract, which was made with the officers of a county, was used in its broadest sense, and included services in surgical cases. County of Clinton v. Ramsey, 20 Ill.App. 577, 579, 20 Bradw. 577, 579.”
In Truck Insurance Exchange v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521, it was stated in part as follows:
“The term ‘surgery’ is not defined in the statute though technically it has a broad meaning. It does comprehend as suggested in Bellah some slight and simple procedures. It has been described as ‘that branch of medical science which treats of mechanical or operative measures for healing diseases, deformities or injuries.’ Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 205 Ark. 566, 169 S.W.2d 651, 654; State v. Eustace, 117 Kan. 746, 233 P. 109. Yet we are constrained to the opinion that as the term is used in the statute it refers to the common ordinary understanding of that word and as the art is practiced by a skilled surgeon. We think it would not be held generally to include mechanical application of weights and traction and other remedial devices, but embrace only cutting operations. * * *
“Finally, the insurer claims that the 1957 amendments have worked far-reaching changes in the compensation law and would render the testimony admissible from the effective date of these amendments though it was not admissible theretofore. Section 7 of Art. 8306 formerly had a specific limitation of 90 days from the date of the injury for ‘medical attention, nursing or chiropractic services,’ and a specific limitation of 180 days from the date of injury for hospital services. Effective September 1, 1957, as amended, this section now reads in part as follows:
“Section 5 of Art. 8307 as amended now provides in part: * * *
“We are of the opinion that these two amendments in no way affect the question before us or operate to relax the rule. The Legislature has the power to expand the benefits of this Act in any way and to any extent that it may deem appropriate. That is what the Legislature has attempted to do by providing that even after a final award or judgment the Board has continuing jurisdiction to render successive awards against the Association for the cost of
medical aid
and
hospital services.
This may increase the
carrier’s liability and as claimed by it even result in payment of compensation for total and permanent disability when that condition has been remedied at the expense of the insurer and no longer exists. But even to avoid the latter result we are not at liberty to disregard the terms of the law as it is written by the Legislature and the necessary implications therefrom.
“It is to be understood that we are not called upon here to interpret or construe these two 1957 amendments or to define the resp.eefive duties and obligations of the parties thereunder. All such questions are expressly reserved for consideration when and if they arise.”
(Emphasis added.)
Should the term “medical aid” as used in Sec.
7
of Art. 8306, V.A.C.S., and in Sec. 5 of Art. 8307, V.A.C.S., be given a broad and liberal meaning so as to include “surgical aid” or should it be given a restricted meaning so as not to include cutting operations? There are of course many kinds of cutting operations, some of very minor nature and some of very serious nature, but all of them are designed for the purpose of curing or attempting to cure or heal the patient. We think some guidance on this question is furnished by the general rule that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to effectuate the beneficent purposes for which it was enacted. Travelers Insurance Company v. Hernandez, 5 Cir., 267 F.2d 267; Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Andrews, 130 Tex. 502, 110 S.W.2d 49.
After carefully considering the questions raised by appellant’s points 1 through 4, it is our best judgment that the three statutes above referred to (Art. 8306, Sec. 7, Art. 8306, Sec. 12e and Art. 8307, Sec. 5) should be harmonized and should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to effectuate the beneficent purposes for which the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act was enacted, and it should be held that the term “medical aid” includes “surgical aid” as well, and that appellant was liable for the expenses of the operation under the record in this cause. Appellant’s points 1 through 4 are overruled.
We further hold that the trial court properly held that appellee took all reasonable steps necessary to comply with Section 12e of Art. 8306, V.A.C.S., especially in view that under the circumstances appel-lee was justified in having the surgery performed on his own volition since it was an emergency operation.
On March 31, 1965, appellee wrote the Board demanding medical and surgical benefits. In this letter a report of Dr. By-waters was enclosed indicating that surgery would materially improve appellee’s condition. Nothing was done by the Board until April 6, and the Board instead of ordering a physical examination, after acknowledging receipt of appellant’s letter and demand, stated to the effect that the Board did not have authority at that point to order surgery and suggested that appellee file a request with appellant insurance company for surgery, which request was refused by appellant. Being unable to get any affirmative action on his request to the Board and his request being denied by appellant and with appellee’s condition becoming much worse, and with the pain “running him crazy” or words to that effect, on June 14, 1965, ap-pellee had disc and back surgery on his own volition and upon the strong recommendation of his doctor. Appellee submitted the-bills incurred in the surgical treatment and other expenses incident thereto, to the Industrial Accident Board of Texas and such Board held appellant not responsible for their payment. The jurisdictional requirements for bringing this suit were followed.
It has been held that in cases of emergency, compliance with the provisions of Section 12e of Art. 8306, V.A.C.S., is not a condition precedent to the employee’s right to recover expenses of a surgical operation. Great American Indemnity Company v. Beaupre, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 883, wr. ref., n. r. e.; Ocean Accident & Guaranty
Corp. v. Nance, Tex.Civ.App., 25 S.W.2d 665, no writ.
Appellant’s points 5 through 10 are overruled.
We further hold that there was evidence of probative force, and that the same was sufficient, to support the trial court’s findings that the original injury was a producing cause of the difficulty which necessitated the operation sued upon, and that such operation was emergency in nature. Appellant’s points 11 through 18 are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.