Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bearden

373 S.W.2d 300, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 1839
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 18, 1963
DocketNo. 16227
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 373 S.W.2d 300 (Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bearden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bearden, 373 S.W.2d 300, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 1839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

BATEMAN, Justice.

Our former opinion is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor.

Workmen’s Compensation case. The employee, Michael L. Bearden, will be spoken of herein as the appellee even though, being a minor, he was represented in the litigation by his father as next friend. In his suit to set aside the award of the Industrial [302]*302Accident Board he alleged a total and permanent specific injury to his right arm, claiming the maximum weekly benefits for the statutory period of two hundred weeks. Art. 8306, Sec. 12, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ. St. Appellant specifically pled that the injury was limited to the hand and did not extend to the arm.

In answer to the first two special issues the jury found (1) that the injury to the plaintiff’s arm resulted in a total loss of the use of said arm, and (2) that such total loss of use was permanent. Appellant’s first complaint, expressed in its first four points of error, is that the trial court deprived it of its affirmative defense that the injury was limited to the hand by refusing to submit certain special issues and instructions requested by it. This contention is without merit and will be overruled.

The first of the said requested special issues was as follows: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the injury to plaintiff Michael L. Bearden’s arm on the 17th day of March, 1961, has resulted in a loss of use of the hand of Michael Bearden as defined in this charge?” (Italics ours) The other requested issues inquired as to whether the loss of use was permanent or temporary and, if temporary, the period thereof, as to whether the loss will be partial, and if so whether such partial loss will be permanent or temporary and, if temporary, the period and percentage thereof. Appellant also requested the court to instruct the jury that the term “arm” included all of the arm commencing at or about the elbow and extending to the end of the extremity, including the hand and fingers; that the word “hand” meant all that portion of the arm below the elbow, including the hand and fingers; and “that loss of use to the ‘arm’ as defined, shall include loss of use to the hand, but that loss of use to the ‘hand’ as defined would be exclusive of any loss of use at or above the elbow.”

The evidence was undisputed that all of the skin and all of the flesh down to the muscles had been peeled off from appellee’s right arm from a point about three inches above the elbow to a point near the wrist. This was undoubtedly an injury to the arm, as defined in the Act, and though the incapacity or disability resulting from such injury may have been restricted or limited to the hand, it cannot properly be said that the injury was so restricted or limited. Sec. 12 of Art. 8306, V.A.T.S., under which the claim is made, authorizes awards for “the injuries enumerated in the following schedule * * (Italics ours). In a case like the present, where it is undisputed that the injtiry itself is to the arm rather than being limited to the hand, a showing that the resulting loss of use may be found only in the hand will not have the result of reducing the number of weeks of benefits from 200 to ISO, but will at most only suggest a finding that the injury resulted in a partial rather than total loss of use. Therefore, we hold that, even though appellant did plead that the injury was limited to the hand, it is undisputed that the injury was not so limited, from which it follows that the requested issues were not raised by the evidence and were properly refused. Likewise, the requested instructions were immaterial and properly refused. “Injury” and “incapacity” are not synonymous. Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Simpson, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 132, no wr. hist.; Superior Ins. Co. v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W.2d 517, err. dis.; Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, 141 Tex. 78, 170 S.W.2d 463.

Appellant’s second contention, embodied in its fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth points of error, is that the court erred in submitting Special Issue No. 2, in answer to which the jury found that the total loss of the use of the arm was permanent, and in rendering judgment on said verdict because, it is asserted, there was no evidence to support same, the evidence was insufficient, and the finding was so contrary to’ the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. [303]*303These points we also find to be without merit and they are overruled.

The appellee testified that he was a high school graduate, was nineteen years old at the time of his injury, being strong enough to lift his father, (a paraplegic weighing 200 pounds) to the bathroom; that when his hand got caught between the rotating steel dough rollers the thickness of his wrist stopped the arm from going on through, but that the rollers continued to rotate and tore his skin and flesh loose from a point about three inches above the elbow, the bone itself being exposed. He was taken to the hospital where Dr. Clayton, called by the employer, cleaned up the arm and repositioned the flesh and skin back on the arm, bandaged it heavily, and put him to bed. Approximately eight days later the doctor found that the skin had died and removed it and replaced it with a graft taken from appellee’s right thigh, which graft goes completely around the arm between the limits mentioned, and covers it completely. The skin graft has no feeling whatsoever on the exterior and since his injury he cannot participate in competitive contact sports. He tried working for a wood preservation plant loading poles on trolley cars but after one day he had to quit because he got creosote on his injured arm which made it burn and hurt a great deal, and he just couldn’t do that manual type of labor. He didn’t find a job for some time but was later employed as a brick mason’s helper at $1.30 per hour (which was 20 cents per hour less than was paid to the other bricklayers’ helpers and 65 cents per hour less than he was earning when injured), filling wheelbarrows and pushing them around and also driving a pickup truck, but he usually overturned the wheelbarrows because his right hand would “give out.” He worked for the brick mason only a week as the employer used the other men who were better qualified. The extended use of his arm in that work caused him a great deal of pain, and the chemicals in the cement caused his arm to burn. He earned only approximately $300.-00 during the period from mid-July, 1962 until mid-September, 1962.

He further testified that he had lost a great deal of strength in his arm, that the reflex therein isn’t perhaps as speedy as in the left arm, that he cannot muster enough strength to push the pushbutton to open the door on a modern car, that his right arm is of no use to him in opening a large or heavy door, that he can’t hold objects in his right hand for a long time, that the arm weakens and the muscles often lock and he will have to pry them open with the other hand, that oftentimes when he uses the arm for any extended length of time a great deal of pain accompanies the use and for perhaps a day or two thereafter the arm aches a great deal and hurts. He cannot cut his food effectively at the dinner table and cannot help his father any more. The skin that was grafted on his arm does not perspire or grow any hairs and has no feeling whatsoever.

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Related

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Arnold
378 S.W.2d 78 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
373 S.W.2d 300, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 1839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/travelers-insurance-co-v-bearden-texapp-1963.