Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (f/k/a Aetna Casualty and Surety Company) v. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 88, 2026
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND § SURETY COMPANY (f/k/a Aetna § No. 88, 2026 Casualty and Surety Company), § § Court Below–Superior Court Defendant Below, § of the State of Delaware Appellant, § § C.A. No. N21C-05-143 v. § § SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, § LLC, § § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: February 27, 2026 Decided: April 20, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order and the

exhibits attached thereto, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Plaintiff below/appellee, Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC (“Syngenta”),

sought insurance coverage from defendant below/appellant, Travelers Casualty and

Surety Company (“Travelers”), to defend over 10,000 personal injury lawsuits

brought by plaintiffs alleging that they had suffered bodily harm because of their

exposure to paraquat, Syngenta’s herbicide product (the “Paraquat Actions”).

Travelers denied coverage, prompting Syngenta to file suit in the Superior Court. (2) Relevant to this appeal, Travelers issued two groups of insurance

policies to Syngenta.1 The first group includes three policies (“Policy Nos. 1–3”)

that were in effect from September 1974 to 1977 and contain a clause limiting

Travelers’ liability for bodily injuries caused by pollution (the “Pollution

Exclusion”). The second group of policies (“Policy Nos. 4–6” and together with

Policy Nos. 1–3, the “Policies”) were in effect from September 1977 to September

1980 and do not contain the Pollution Exclusion. However, Policy Nos. 4–6 contain

language that Travelers argued requires the payment of defense costs to erode the

limits of liability. Syngenta moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a

determination that Travelers has a duty to defend six specific Paraquat Actions that

are broadly representative of the Paraquat Actions (the “Exemplar Actions”) under

the Policies. Travelers cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking a determination

that (i) it has no duty to defend or indemnify Syngenta for the Paraquat Actions under

Policy Nos. 1–3 because of the Pollution Exclusion, and (ii) the payment of defense

costs under Policy Nos. 4–6 must reduce the overall policy limits.

(3) On January 30, 2026, the Superior Court granted Syngenta’s motion

and granted in part and denied in part Travelers’ motion (the “Opinion”). 2 The

1 The parties have stipulated for purposes of the insurance policies at issue that Syngenta is the successor-in-interest to ICI Americas Inc. (f/k/a ICI United States Inc., f/k/a ICI America Inc., f/k/a Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc.). 2 Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co., 2026 WL 461297 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2026). 2 Superior Court held that the Pollution Exclusion did not relieve Travelers of its duty

to defend under Policy Nos. 1–3. But the court agreed with Travelers that “its

reimbursement of Syngenta’s defense costs reduces the total funds [available] under

[Policy Nos. 4–6].”3 Travelers asked the Superior Court to certify an interlocutory

appeal of three rulings included in the Opinion: (i) that the Pollution Exclusion “is

properly construed to exclude only coverage from traditional environmental

pollution”4 (the “Pollution Exclusion Ruling”), (ii) that the court did not need to look

beyond the Policies and the underlying complaints to determine whether Travelers

had a duty to defend (the “Extrinsic Evidence Ruling”), and (iii) that further

discovery was not necessary to determine that Travelers was not excused from its

duty to defend because of prejudice (the “Further Discovery Ruling”). Syngenta

opposed the application. On February 26, 2026, the Superior Court denied

Travelers’ application.

(4) With regard to the Pollution Exclusion Ruling, the court first found that

certification was not warranted because the Opinion had merely interpreted the

language of Policy Nos. 1–3, and issues of contract interpretation do not generally

constitute a “substantial issue of material importance”—a threshold inquiry under

Rule 42. In any event, the court found that the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors cited by

3 Id. at *9. 4 Id. 3 Travelers did not weigh in favor of certification: the court’s interpretation of the

Pollution Exclusion did not involve a question of law resolved for the first time

(Factor A), nor did it conflict with other trial court decisions (Factor B).

(5) Turning to the Extrinsic Evidence Ruling and the Further Discovery

Ruling, the court appeared to agree with Travelers that its decision to exclude

extrinsic evidence vis-à-vis Travelers’ duty to defend and its refusal to delay a ruling

on summary judgment to allow Travelers to engage in further discovery were

substantial issues of material importance. Nevertheless, the court did not find that

the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors cited by Travelers supported interlocutory review: these

rulings did not resolve novel questions of law (Factor A), nor did they did not

conflict with other trial court decisions (Factor B). And the court found that Factor

H (the considerations of justice) did not weigh in favor of certification because: (i)

the potential prejudice to the parties cut both ways, (ii) the issues resolved by the

Opinion could be adequately addressed in a future appeal following a final judgment,

and (iii) appellate review at this time “would only narrow some issues for trial.”

Relatedly, the court observed that Factor G (whether an interlocutory appeal would

terminate the litigation) weighed against certification: regardless of the outcome of

an interlocutory appeal, the parties would need to litigate coverage under Policy Nos.

4–6, which do not include the Pollution Exclusion. We agree with the Superior

Court’s conclusion.

4 (6) Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound

discretion of the Court.5 Giving due weight to the Superior Court’s analysis and in

the exercise of our discretion, this Court has concluded that the application for

interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under

Supreme Court Rule 42(b). Exceptional circumstances that would merit

interlocutory review of the Ruling do not exist in this case,6 and the potential benefits

of interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable

costs caused by an interlocutory appeal.7

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is

REFUSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

5 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v). 6 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). 7 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii). 5