Travelers Bank & Trust Co. v. Furlong

Connecticut Superior Court

Travelers Bank & Trust Co. v. Furlong

14 Conn. Super. Ct. 146, 14 Conn. Supp. 146, 1946 Conn. Super. LEXIS 49

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedJune 12, 1946

DocketFile 74912

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 14 Conn. Super. Ct. 146 (Travelers Bank & Trust Co. v. Furlong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Travelers Bank & Trust Co. v. Furlong, 14 Conn. Super. Ct. 146, 14 Conn. Supp. 146, 1946 Conn. Super. LEXIS 49 (Colo. Ct. App. 1946).

Pincite

Opinion

COMLEY, J.

Under § 73 of the Practice Book a party is entitled to a disclosure of such facts as are “material to the support of the mover’s cause of action or defense.” The word “material,” as used in the rule, is not employed in the sense in which we speak of evidence as being “material.” If so, one party could elicit from the other an unlimited quantity of merely evidential matter on a motion for disclosure by merely demonstrating that the facts sought would be admissible in evidence upon the trial of the case.

It seems to me that the word “material” in the rule means more than that. The facts sought must be such as are requisite or essential to the maintenance of the mover’s cause of action or defense. See Peyton v. Werhane, 126 Conn. 382, 389.

The interrogatories in the present motion involve facts which may well be received in evidence on the trial as showing the relationship between the testator and Lillian E. Furlong, but they are not of such importance or significance to the claim of Angela F. Mead as to be the proper subject of a motion for disclosure in advance of the trial.

The motion is denied.

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COMLEY, J.

Under § 73 of the Practice Book a party is entitled to a disclosure of such facts as are “material to the support of the mover’s cause of action or defense.” The word “material,” as used in the rule, is not employed in the sense in which we speak of evidence as being “material.” If so, one party could elicit from the other an unlimited quantity of merely evidential matter on a motion for disclosure by merely demonstrating that the facts sought would be admissible in evidence upon the trial of the case.

It seems to me that the word “material” in the rule means more than that. The facts sought must be such as are requisite or essential to the maintenance of the mover’s cause of action or defense. See Peyton v. Werhane, 126 Conn. 382, 389.

The interrogatories in the present motion involve facts which may well be received in evidence on the trial as showing the relationship between the testator and Lillian E. Furlong, but they are not of such importance or significance to the claim of Angela F. Mead as to be the proper subject of a motion for disclosure in advance of the trial.

The motion is denied.

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Bluebook (online)

14 Conn. Super. Ct. 146, 14 Conn. Supp. 146, 1946 Conn. Super. LEXIS 49, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/travelers-bank-trust-co-v-furlong-connsuperct-1946.

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