Mr. Justice FIELD
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented for our determination in this case is, whether the property of the present St. Louis and Iron Mountain Bail road: Company, a corporation created under the laws of Missouri, is, by an irrepealable legislative grant, forever exempted from all State and county taxes. Two corporations bearing that name have existed in Missouri, the second .succeeding the first in the possession and ownership of its road and property. The first was created by an act of the legislature of the State, passed in March, 1851; the second was formed in July, 1867, under an act of the previous year authorizing the incorporation of the purchaser or purchasers of any railroad, or any part, section, or branch thereof, which had previously been, or might thereafter be, forfeited to or sold by the State.
The property of the first corporation was undoubtedly exempt from State and county taxes. The act of incorporation adopted as part of it a provision of another act, which decláred in terms that the stock,of the.company should be thus
exempt.
It is true that at this time a statute was in existence, passed in 1845, which declared that the charter of every corporation subsequently granted should be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal at the .discretion of the legislature. But from the operation of this provision the company was expressly exempted by an act amendatory of its charter, passed in 1853.
From that time at least the exemption of its stock from State and county taxation was placed beyond legislative interference. The amendatory act also declared that all the engines, cars, wagons, machines, and other property belonging to the company should be deemed a part of its capital stock, and be vested in its respective shareholders, according to their respective shares. All the property of the company was thus placed within the exemption which attached to the original stock; that designated was to be deemed a part of such stock, as well as that originally embraced by this term.
Ou the argument some attempt was made, from the use of the term
stock
in the original act, and the language of the amendatory act, that the property should be vested in the respective shareholders according to their respective shares, to establish the position that the exemption extended only to the separate shares of the individual stockholders. But the argument does not strike us as possessing much force. The. terms “ stock of the company,” imported the capital stock of such company, the subscribed fund which the company held, as distinguished from the separate interests of the individual stockholders The language of the amendatory act did not qualify this meaning; that only declared that other property of the company should also be deemed capital stock, and the additional provision that it should be vested in the respective shareholders, according to their respective shares, only meant that they should have the interest of shareholders in the property, according to their respective shares.
The corporation in question was created to construct a
railroad from a point in the city of St. Louis to the Iron Mountain and Pilot Knob, in Missouri, with liberty to extend the road to the Mississippi River, or to the southern part of the State. This road was constructed from St. Louis to Pilot Knob, a distance of about eighty-seven miles, with a, branch to Potósi. During the progress of the work, and in order to aid in its construction, the legislature of the State, preyious to 1880, passed various acts providing for the loan of the bonds’of the State to the company. All the acts referred for the terms of the loans to an act. passed in 1851 to expedite the construction of the Pacific Railroad and of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad.
, That act provided that no part of the bouds should be delivered to the company until it signified its acceptance of them to the secretary of state, by filing in his office a certificate of such acceptance under the corporate seal of the company and the signature of its president; that such acceptance should be recorded, and upon its record should become to all intents and purposes a mortgage of the road of the company, and every part and section thereof, and its appurtenances, to the people of the State, to secure the payment of tb.e principal and interest of the bonds. That act authorized the governor, in case default was made in the payment of either the interest or principal of the bonds, to sell the road and its appurtenances at auction to the highest bidder, or to buy in the same at such sale for the use and benefit of the State, subject to such disposition in respect to the road or its proceeds as the legislature might thereafter direct.
Under the different acts bonds of the State to a large amount were issued to the company; its acceptance of them in proper form was given to the secretary of state, and the acceptance was duly recorded, and from the date of such record the State acquired, for the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, a lien upon the 'road and every part and section thereof and its appurtenances.
The company failed to pay the interest on these bonds.
It does not appear for how long a period the company was thus in default, nor is this material. It is sufficient to say that in 1865 the right of the State, under the provisions of the acts cited, co interfere and sell the property, had become complete. Before a sale, however, was made the legislature passed another act for the sale of this and other railroads by the governor, and the foreclosure of the State lieu thereon. This act, which was approved in February, 1866, among other things required the governor to advertise for sale the different railroads, with their appurtenances, rolling stock, and property of every description, and all rights and franchises thereto belonging; and to sell the same at auction to the highest bidder, in'pursuance of the several acts creating a lien thereon. It also provided for the appointment of three commissioners to attend the sale of the different roads as advertised, and to bid in the same for the use and benefit ' of the.State for an amouut not exceeding the respective liens thereon; and in ease the roads were struck off and sold to them, to take possession of and hold the same, with their appurtenances and property, and again, after due advertis'ement, inviting proposals for the purchase of the different roads, their lands, appurtenances, and'franchises, to resell the same. Under this act the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Was advertised for sale, with its rights and privileges, and at the sale was bid in by the commissioners for the State. However broad the terms of the advertisement, the interest sold could not extend beyond the property upon which the State at the time held a lien, and this was the entire road of the company and its appurtenances. But as the property was sold to the State it is unnecessary to determine vriiether, if the sale had been made to a third party, the immunity from taxation possessed by the company would have passed to the purchaser.
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Mr. Justice FIELD
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented for our determination in this case is, whether the property of the present St. Louis and Iron Mountain Bail road: Company, a corporation created under the laws of Missouri, is, by an irrepealable legislative grant, forever exempted from all State and county taxes. Two corporations bearing that name have existed in Missouri, the second .succeeding the first in the possession and ownership of its road and property. The first was created by an act of the legislature of the State, passed in March, 1851; the second was formed in July, 1867, under an act of the previous year authorizing the incorporation of the purchaser or purchasers of any railroad, or any part, section, or branch thereof, which had previously been, or might thereafter be, forfeited to or sold by the State.
The property of the first corporation was undoubtedly exempt from State and county taxes. The act of incorporation adopted as part of it a provision of another act, which decláred in terms that the stock,of the.company should be thus
exempt.
It is true that at this time a statute was in existence, passed in 1845, which declared that the charter of every corporation subsequently granted should be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal at the .discretion of the legislature. But from the operation of this provision the company was expressly exempted by an act amendatory of its charter, passed in 1853.
From that time at least the exemption of its stock from State and county taxation was placed beyond legislative interference. The amendatory act also declared that all the engines, cars, wagons, machines, and other property belonging to the company should be deemed a part of its capital stock, and be vested in its respective shareholders, according to their respective shares. All the property of the company was thus placed within the exemption which attached to the original stock; that designated was to be deemed a part of such stock, as well as that originally embraced by this term.
Ou the argument some attempt was made, from the use of the term
stock
in the original act, and the language of the amendatory act, that the property should be vested in the respective shareholders according to their respective shares, to establish the position that the exemption extended only to the separate shares of the individual stockholders. But the argument does not strike us as possessing much force. The. terms “ stock of the company,” imported the capital stock of such company, the subscribed fund which the company held, as distinguished from the separate interests of the individual stockholders The language of the amendatory act did not qualify this meaning; that only declared that other property of the company should also be deemed capital stock, and the additional provision that it should be vested in the respective shareholders, according to their respective shares, only meant that they should have the interest of shareholders in the property, according to their respective shares.
The corporation in question was created to construct a
railroad from a point in the city of St. Louis to the Iron Mountain and Pilot Knob, in Missouri, with liberty to extend the road to the Mississippi River, or to the southern part of the State. This road was constructed from St. Louis to Pilot Knob, a distance of about eighty-seven miles, with a, branch to Potósi. During the progress of the work, and in order to aid in its construction, the legislature of the State, preyious to 1880, passed various acts providing for the loan of the bonds’of the State to the company. All the acts referred for the terms of the loans to an act. passed in 1851 to expedite the construction of the Pacific Railroad and of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad.
, That act provided that no part of the bouds should be delivered to the company until it signified its acceptance of them to the secretary of state, by filing in his office a certificate of such acceptance under the corporate seal of the company and the signature of its president; that such acceptance should be recorded, and upon its record should become to all intents and purposes a mortgage of the road of the company, and every part and section thereof, and its appurtenances, to the people of the State, to secure the payment of tb.e principal and interest of the bonds. That act authorized the governor, in case default was made in the payment of either the interest or principal of the bonds, to sell the road and its appurtenances at auction to the highest bidder, or to buy in the same at such sale for the use and benefit of the State, subject to such disposition in respect to the road or its proceeds as the legislature might thereafter direct.
Under the different acts bonds of the State to a large amount were issued to the company; its acceptance of them in proper form was given to the secretary of state, and the acceptance was duly recorded, and from the date of such record the State acquired, for the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, a lien upon the 'road and every part and section thereof and its appurtenances.
The company failed to pay the interest on these bonds.
It does not appear for how long a period the company was thus in default, nor is this material. It is sufficient to say that in 1865 the right of the State, under the provisions of the acts cited, co interfere and sell the property, had become complete. Before a sale, however, was made the legislature passed another act for the sale of this and other railroads by the governor, and the foreclosure of the State lieu thereon. This act, which was approved in February, 1866, among other things required the governor to advertise for sale the different railroads, with their appurtenances, rolling stock, and property of every description, and all rights and franchises thereto belonging; and to sell the same at auction to the highest bidder, in'pursuance of the several acts creating a lien thereon. It also provided for the appointment of three commissioners to attend the sale of the different roads as advertised, and to bid in the same for the use and benefit ' of the.State for an amouut not exceeding the respective liens thereon; and in ease the roads were struck off and sold to them, to take possession of and hold the same, with their appurtenances and property, and again, after due advertis'ement, inviting proposals for the purchase of the different roads, their lands, appurtenances, and'franchises, to resell the same. Under this act the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Was advertised for sale, with its rights and privileges, and at the sale was bid in by the commissioners for the State. However broad the terms of the advertisement, the interest sold could not extend beyond the property upon which the State at the time held a lien, and this was the entire road of the company and its appurtenances. But as the property was sold to the State it is unnecessary to determine vriiether, if the sale had been made to a third party, the immunity from taxation possessed by the company would have passed to the purchaser. When the State became the purchaser the immuuity ceased; the property stood in its hands precisely'the same a3 any other unincumbered property of the State, exempt from taxation, not by virtue of any previous stipulation with the company, but as all property of the State is thus exempt. Subsequently the road and its
appurtenances, and all the franchises, which, under the new constitution -of Missouri, adopted in 1865, were transferable by the State, were sold by the commissioners to McKay, Yogel, and Simmons, who conveyed the same to Thomas. Allen, who with others, in July, 1867, became incorporated under the name of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company. That company is still in. existence, and is one of the defendants herein. To it Allen transferred all the rights and privileges acquired by him from his vendors, and all which they acquired from the State. The' act under which the sale was made provided that the' ¡purchasers of the road should have all the rights, franchises, privileges, and immunities which were enjoyed by the defaulting company under its charter and laws amendatory thereof, subject to the limitations and conditions therein contained, and not inconsistent with the act authorizing the sale. The new company thus acquired all the immunity from taxation which the original company had possessed, if it were competent for the legislature at the time, under the new constitution, to confer this privilege. The question, therefore, is, whether the legislature was competent to grant the immunity claimed, under that constitution, which went into operation on the 4th of July, 1865, previous to the passage of any of the acts authorizing the proceedings uuder which the new company acquired its rights.
The sixteenth section of the eleventh article of that instrument provides that “no property, real or personal, shall be exempt from taxation, except such as may be used exclusively for public schools and such as may belong to the United States, to this State, to counties, or to municipal corporations within this State;” and the twenty-seventh section of the fourth article declares that “the Genei’al Assembly shall not pass special laws . . exempting any property of any named person or corporation from taxation.”
These provisions require no explanation; they are absoi lute prohibitions against the grant of any new immunity from taxation, unless railroad companies of the State existing at the time are excepted from their operation. Such
exception is claimed under the “ordinance for the payment of State and railroad indebtedness,” which accompanied the constitution and.was adopted with it. That ordinance first provides for the levy and collection from different railroads, and among others from the St. Louis'and Irou Mountain Railroad 'Company, an annual tax of ten per cent, on all their, gross receipts for the transportation of freight or passengers (not including amounts received from and taxes paid to the United States) from the 1st of October, 1866, to the 1st of October, 1868, and fifteen per cent, thereafter; and then enacts that the tax shall be collected from the companies only for the payment of the principal and interest on the bonds of the State issued for their benefit, or on bonds guaranteed by the State; that if any of the companies refuse or neglect to pay the tax thus required, and the principal or interest of any of the bonds, or any part thereof, remain due and unpaid, the General Assembly shall provide by law for the sale of the railroad and other property and the franchises of such company under the lien reserved to the State; and that whenever the State becomes the purchaser of any railroad or other property, or the franchises thus sold, the General Assembly shall provide by law in what manner the same shall be sold for the payment of the indebtedness of the company; that no railroad or other property or franchises purchased by the State, shall be restored to tbe defaulting company until it shall have first paid the interest due from it, and that no sale or other disposition of any such railroad or other property, or its franchises, shall be made without reserving a lien upon the property and franchises thus sold or disposed of for all sums remaining unpaid.
Now, the argument of the appellants is that as the ordinance authorizes the legislature to provide for the sale of the franchises of a defaulting corporation, it can transfer under that designation immunity from taxation, if the company ever possessed such immunity; and that this was the effect of the sale of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain railroad. aud its franchises to McKay, Vogel, and Simmons.
And authority for this position is supposed to be found'in the answers-given by the judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri, in November, 1865,- to certain questions propounded by the governor under a provision of the constitution authorizing him to take their opinion on important' questions of constitutional law. The questions propounded were substantially these:
1st: Whether the provisions of the ordinance operated to suspend the right of the State to sell the roads named; or either of them, until there was a refusal or neglect to pay the tax imposed by the ordinance; or whether the State might order the sale of the railroads or either of them, prior to such refusal or neglect;
2d. If the judges -were of opinion that a sale of the railroads might be ordered before such refusal or neglect, whether such sale could be made “without reserving a lien upon all the property and franchises thus sold for all sums remaining unpaid,” or, in other words, whether this clause •constituted a condition of
all
sales of railroads ordered by the State, or referred only to sales made under the ordinance for refusal and neglect to pay the tax.
3d. If the judges should be of opinion that all .sales of railroads by authority of the State were subject to the restriction mentioned, whether the words-“ all sums remaining unpaid” referred to the sums for which the railroad sold was in default, or to that portion of the purchase-money not paid in cash at the time of sale; and,
4th: Whether upon a stile of a railroad under a lien of the State the constitution authorized the State to receive,'in payment of the .purchase-money, preferred or other shares of stock issued by a corporation purchasing the road.
None of these questions, as will be perceived, call for any -opinion as to the effect of the sale of the franchises of a road, or the meaning of that term. They call only for an opinion upon the power of the legislature to order a- sale of the roads, the liens to be reserved, the payments to be made, and the right to receive shares of stock of a purchasing corporation.' The answer of the judges stated that the fifth
section of the ordinance related
to all sales of
railroads, whether in default for not paying the interest on the bonds of the State or not paying the tax levied; that when the State.had become the purchaser of any railroad sold under the lien of the State, the General Assembly could provide in what manner such railroad could again be sold for the payment of the iúdebtedneés which the State had incurred on account of bonds loaned to it or guaranteed for its benefit; that it would have had this power without the aid of the ordinance, but that no sale or other disposition of any such railroad, or other property, could be made by the State without reserving a lien upon the property sold for all sums remaining unpaid, and that the purchaser was required to mdke all payments therefor in money or in bonds ór other obligations of the State; and then adds that the “ legislature is left unrestricted further as to the time, terms, and conditions of the sale.” This language is supposed to determine that in the sale of such property the legislature is not bound by the provisions of the constitution we have cited.
But we do not think the language used justifies any such conclusion, but was rather intended to indicate that the ordinance imposes no other restrictions than those designated, and has no reference whatever to the clauses of the constitution in respect to which no opinion was asked.
It seems to us that the plain meaning of the ordinance, when it says that the General Assembly shall provide by law in what manner the railroad and its franchises shall be sold, is that they shall be sold in conformity with such law as the legislature may constitutionally pass, not in conformity with.any law which the legislature could devise if it had unlimited discretion in the matter. It would conflict with well-settled rules of construction to hold that the language used authorizes any legislation regardless of the provisions of the constitution. And there is nothing in the authority conferred to provide for the sale of its franchises with the road of the defaulting company, which requires immunity from taxation to be embraced within them. The language
evidently refers to such franchises as are essential to the operation of the road sold, withóut which the ownership of the road would be comparatively valueless, such as the franchise to run cars, to take tolls, and the like.
But if'we are mistaken in this particular, we are clear that it never was intended by the ordinance to sanction, by the sale of the franchises of a defaulting corporation, the renewal of an exemption-which had once ceased to exist, and which the constitution had declared should never thereafter be created. The inhibition of the constitution applies in' all its force against the renewal of an exemption equally as against its original creation; and this inhibition the legislature could not disregard in providing for the sale of the property which it had purchased.
Judgment affirmed.