Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
At issue in this case is an interim curtailment plan negotiated by the Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (Transco) and its customers, in response to the natural gas shortage said to exist on the Transco pipe line. The plan is designed to allocate this gas shortfall among Transco’s distributor customers. One element of the proposed plan is a compensation scheme, whereby those Transco customers curtailed less than the system-wide average would compensate those curtailed more than the average. The Federal Power Commission found the compensation scheme violative of the Natural Gas Act, and therefore rejected the proposed interim plan. This appeal followed.
On August 1, 1975, this court withheld consideration of this case, “until the Commission has completed its own investigation and report to this court of Transco’s claims of reduced reserves. . . . ” On January 19, 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated this court’s order, and remanded with instructions that we should:
either . . . proceed to the merits of the issues presented by the compensation scheme and only thereafter deal with the adequacy of the record in regard to the evidence of shortage, or immediately remand the case to the Commission for the required inquiry.
423 U.S. 326, 96 S.Ct. 579, 46 L.Ed.2d 533 (1976). On February 6, 1976, we followed the latter course and remanded to the Commission: 1
[W]ell aware that the Commission has disapproved this compensation scheme rather than approved it, we do not see how we can fairly weigh the legality of that decision unless the record contains a basis for our deciding whether or not the agreement was a truly voluntary response to an actual shortage. No such basis is provided absent the Commission’s investigation of the shortage question and findings of fact on this issue which can be properly reviewed by this court.
[148]*148Memorandum accompanying Order of February 6, 1976, at 4-5.
Because we find that the information provided by the Commission on return of remand is still inadequate we must, reluctantly, remand the record once again.
I. DEFICIENCIES ON PRIOR REMAND
On remand, in an attempt to expand the record to establish proof of an actual gas shortage, the parties entered into a stipulation of “facts [which] demonstrate that Transco has had, and continues to have, a necessity to curtail service to its customers. . ” Among the recitations was that, “The annual volume of natural gas available from Transco’s producer-suppliers has been declining since 1971 and has been and continues to be, insufficient to enable Transco to satisfy the certificated requirements of its customers. . . . ” In support of the accuracy of this statement, the stipulation summarizes the affidavit of FPC staff witness, Wayne M. Thompson, a geologist in the Gas Supply and Production Section of the Bureau of Natural Gas. Thompson testified that staff initially undertook a review of the delivery capability of 18 fields connected to the Transco pipeline system and responsible for 12% of its supply. Thompson concluded that “Transco’s projections of deliverability are reasonably accurate, although somewhat lower than our own.” Affidavit at 2. He further concluded that “if the fields studied are representative of the entire Transco supply,” then “curtailment on Transco’s system will be necessary, roughly to the extent Transco itself has stated.” The stipulation also recites that Thompson “stated that a further staff review of 19 additional fields accounting for approximately 9% of Transco’s gas supply did not change his opinion. . . . ” Stip. at 2.
The Administrative Law Judge certified the stipulation to the Commission, along with relevant record evidence. On June 25, 1976, the Commission issued an eight-page order with these underlying materials as attachments. The principal Commission finding states,
Upon consideration of the mandate of the remand by the Court of Appeals and the record evidence properly before the Commission we find that a natural gas supply shortage has in the past and continues to exist on Transeo’s system which has necessitated some curtailment of service to Transco’s customers.
Order of June 25, 1976, at 8.2
We find that the record here, even as supplemented on remand, lacks the “ ‘substantial evidence’ . . . necessary to support any such finding [of shortage] by the Commission.” 423 U.S. 331, 96 S.Ct. 582 (1976). This court has previously suggested that the existence and legitimacy of shortage on the Transco system could best be proven by thorough examination of the pipeline’s proved reserves. But the Commission order on remand, while finding that a natural gas supply shortage has existed and continues to exist, does so exclusively in terms of “deliverability.” The Commission states that “deliverability (the amount of gas capable of delivery in a fixed time period) evidence is more relevant to the issue of need for curtailment than is evidence on total proved reserves.” Order, supra, at 7. Deliverability may, indeed, be “more relevant” to the question of whether curtailment is required on any given day; however, it seems clear that at least some explanation of the relationship between [149]*149Transco’s present deliverability crisis and its proved reserves, and the reasons for Transco’s alleged inability to bring sufficient gas onstream, is required in order for the Commission and a reviewing court to be able to assess the nature, extent, and duration of shortage.
Diminished deliverability does not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of actual and legitimate long-term shortage if, for example, a pipeline or producer could, by more or less simple acts, make its proved reserves more deliverable. Similarly, diminished proved reserves may not support a finding of long-run shortage if by physically and economically achievable acts lying entirely within the control of a pipeline or producer, sizeable reservoirs of gas might be moved from the “possible” or “probable” categories into the category of “proved reserves”.3
In a related context, the Commission has noted that the need for curtailment may arise in two legally distinct situations. In the first, reduction of service comes about because of government-ordered curtailment “necessary as a result of the [legitimate] gas shortage.” In the second, “the pipeline’s need to curtail resulted from its own negligence, bad faith, or other wrongful conduct.” See United Gas Pipeline Co., 49 F.P.C. 1211, 1220 (1973). We fail to see how the Commission can distinguish between these two shortfall conditions employing deliverability data alone.
However, even assuming that the deliver-ability data now in the record constituted proof of Transco’s immediate shortage sufficient to justify curtailment of some sort, a determination of the legality of compensation would require a broader base of information.
II. SCOPE OF THE PRESENT REMAND OF RECORD
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Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
At issue in this case is an interim curtailment plan negotiated by the Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (Transco) and its customers, in response to the natural gas shortage said to exist on the Transco pipe line. The plan is designed to allocate this gas shortfall among Transco’s distributor customers. One element of the proposed plan is a compensation scheme, whereby those Transco customers curtailed less than the system-wide average would compensate those curtailed more than the average. The Federal Power Commission found the compensation scheme violative of the Natural Gas Act, and therefore rejected the proposed interim plan. This appeal followed.
On August 1, 1975, this court withheld consideration of this case, “until the Commission has completed its own investigation and report to this court of Transco’s claims of reduced reserves. . . . ” On January 19, 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated this court’s order, and remanded with instructions that we should:
either . . . proceed to the merits of the issues presented by the compensation scheme and only thereafter deal with the adequacy of the record in regard to the evidence of shortage, or immediately remand the case to the Commission for the required inquiry.
423 U.S. 326, 96 S.Ct. 579, 46 L.Ed.2d 533 (1976). On February 6, 1976, we followed the latter course and remanded to the Commission: 1
[W]ell aware that the Commission has disapproved this compensation scheme rather than approved it, we do not see how we can fairly weigh the legality of that decision unless the record contains a basis for our deciding whether or not the agreement was a truly voluntary response to an actual shortage. No such basis is provided absent the Commission’s investigation of the shortage question and findings of fact on this issue which can be properly reviewed by this court.
[148]*148Memorandum accompanying Order of February 6, 1976, at 4-5.
Because we find that the information provided by the Commission on return of remand is still inadequate we must, reluctantly, remand the record once again.
I. DEFICIENCIES ON PRIOR REMAND
On remand, in an attempt to expand the record to establish proof of an actual gas shortage, the parties entered into a stipulation of “facts [which] demonstrate that Transco has had, and continues to have, a necessity to curtail service to its customers. . ” Among the recitations was that, “The annual volume of natural gas available from Transco’s producer-suppliers has been declining since 1971 and has been and continues to be, insufficient to enable Transco to satisfy the certificated requirements of its customers. . . . ” In support of the accuracy of this statement, the stipulation summarizes the affidavit of FPC staff witness, Wayne M. Thompson, a geologist in the Gas Supply and Production Section of the Bureau of Natural Gas. Thompson testified that staff initially undertook a review of the delivery capability of 18 fields connected to the Transco pipeline system and responsible for 12% of its supply. Thompson concluded that “Transco’s projections of deliverability are reasonably accurate, although somewhat lower than our own.” Affidavit at 2. He further concluded that “if the fields studied are representative of the entire Transco supply,” then “curtailment on Transco’s system will be necessary, roughly to the extent Transco itself has stated.” The stipulation also recites that Thompson “stated that a further staff review of 19 additional fields accounting for approximately 9% of Transco’s gas supply did not change his opinion. . . . ” Stip. at 2.
The Administrative Law Judge certified the stipulation to the Commission, along with relevant record evidence. On June 25, 1976, the Commission issued an eight-page order with these underlying materials as attachments. The principal Commission finding states,
Upon consideration of the mandate of the remand by the Court of Appeals and the record evidence properly before the Commission we find that a natural gas supply shortage has in the past and continues to exist on Transeo’s system which has necessitated some curtailment of service to Transco’s customers.
Order of June 25, 1976, at 8.2
We find that the record here, even as supplemented on remand, lacks the “ ‘substantial evidence’ . . . necessary to support any such finding [of shortage] by the Commission.” 423 U.S. 331, 96 S.Ct. 582 (1976). This court has previously suggested that the existence and legitimacy of shortage on the Transco system could best be proven by thorough examination of the pipeline’s proved reserves. But the Commission order on remand, while finding that a natural gas supply shortage has existed and continues to exist, does so exclusively in terms of “deliverability.” The Commission states that “deliverability (the amount of gas capable of delivery in a fixed time period) evidence is more relevant to the issue of need for curtailment than is evidence on total proved reserves.” Order, supra, at 7. Deliverability may, indeed, be “more relevant” to the question of whether curtailment is required on any given day; however, it seems clear that at least some explanation of the relationship between [149]*149Transco’s present deliverability crisis and its proved reserves, and the reasons for Transco’s alleged inability to bring sufficient gas onstream, is required in order for the Commission and a reviewing court to be able to assess the nature, extent, and duration of shortage.
Diminished deliverability does not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of actual and legitimate long-term shortage if, for example, a pipeline or producer could, by more or less simple acts, make its proved reserves more deliverable. Similarly, diminished proved reserves may not support a finding of long-run shortage if by physically and economically achievable acts lying entirely within the control of a pipeline or producer, sizeable reservoirs of gas might be moved from the “possible” or “probable” categories into the category of “proved reserves”.3
In a related context, the Commission has noted that the need for curtailment may arise in two legally distinct situations. In the first, reduction of service comes about because of government-ordered curtailment “necessary as a result of the [legitimate] gas shortage.” In the second, “the pipeline’s need to curtail resulted from its own negligence, bad faith, or other wrongful conduct.” See United Gas Pipeline Co., 49 F.P.C. 1211, 1220 (1973). We fail to see how the Commission can distinguish between these two shortfall conditions employing deliverability data alone.
However, even assuming that the deliver-ability data now in the record constituted proof of Transco’s immediate shortage sufficient to justify curtailment of some sort, a determination of the legality of compensation would require a broader base of information.
II. SCOPE OF THE PRESENT REMAND OF RECORD
Because of ambiguities in the Commission orders of November 12, 1974, and January 10, 1975, we are unable to determine whether the Commission concluded that all like compensation plans employed in the context of end-use curtailment would be barred by the Act, or whether instead it concluded only that this particular plan is improper.4 But whether the opinions are intended to be read broadly or narrowly, we believe it is clear that any proposed compensation plan cannot be measured against the strictures of § 4 of the Act5 without [150]*150substantial information regarding the duration, shape and causation of the alleged shortage on the Transco system. Such information is simply not provided by deliver-ability data alone. We believe that the legality of compensation may well turn, at least in part, on answers to the following sorts of questions: Are sufficient volumes of gas available as proved or provable reserves so that greater total deliverability can be foreseen in the short-term future? Are present levels of curtailment likely to continue for the indefinite future, or to deepen? And more specifically: will compensation be a short-term financial adjustment between customers of the pipeline to keep some of those customers financially afloat until the supply situation stabilizes, or will it be a permanent cross-subsidization? We believe that without such information, neither the Commission nor the court can hope to give meaning to statutory terms such as “rates,” “charges,” and “classes of service” in a regulatory landscape vastly altered by end-use curtailment.
III. CONCLUSION
In remanding the case to this court, the Supreme Court noted, “. . . it is at least conceivable that the Court of Appeals could determine that the lawfulness of the proposed compensation scheme is partially' a function of the actual severity of the shortage.” 423 U.S. 334, 96 S.Ct. 584 (1976). This court has so determined, as we suggested in our order of February 6, 1976. The additional information we now require in this second remand of the record is necessary to determine how Transco is marshaling its resources and proved and provable reserves to produce maximum deliverability in the future. Only when the anticipated duration and shape of the shortage is in better perspective will this court be able to assess the legality of the compensation scheme at issue here. The Clerk is instructed to remand the record herein to the Federal Power Commission for supplementation in accordance with this opinion.
So ordered.