OPINION AND ORDER
TOLEDO, District Judge.
On August 21, 1971, plaintiff, Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc. (hereinafter “TTT”), instituted the instant action for injunctive relief together with a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order against all the defendants
for a period of 10 days, setting down the hearing upon the preliminary injunction for August 25, 1971.
Jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by plaintiff on the basis of Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a), as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970); Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and on Section 8(b) of the Act.
On August 23, 1971, upon Motion and Memorandum filed by Seafarer’s International Union and/or Seafarers International Union de Puerto Rico and/or SIU de Puerto Rico, and National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 2,
this Court issued an Order Vacating the Temporary Restraining Order above referred to. The only defendants thus covered by the Temporary Restraining Order were National Marine Enginers Beneficial Association, MEBA District 1, and the individual persons named in the complaint.
Hearing on the preliminary injunction was commenced on August 25, 1971 and
except for non-working days, interruptions because of criminal and civil proceedings pending in the Court, and adjournments at the request of counsel, said hearing was held continuously until September 7, 1971, at which time, this Court issued its decision from the bench dismissing the instant complaint.
During the hearing, several motions filed by the parties and oppositions thereto, with their respective memoranda, were entertained by this Court. On August 27, 1971, the defendant’s subject to the Temporary Restraining Order filed a Motion requesting that the same be declared null and void. Said Motion was denied by this Court on August 30, 1971, on the grounds that on the basis of the verified complaint filed by plaintiff, TTT had complied with both the requirements of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, supra, and those of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. TTT was thus entitled to the Temporary Restraining Order which had been issued by this Court on August 21, 1971. On August 28, 1971, plaintiff requested the extension of the Temporary Restraining Order for an additional period of 10 days, which extension was granted by this Court on August 31, 1971.
Again on September 2, 1971, defendants subject to the Temporary Restraining Order, questioned the power of this Court to issue the relief requested by plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed the same by way of oral argument and written brief. On September 7, 1971, hearing on this motion was held, defendants introducing the oral testimony of William Divine, Administrative Assistant to the President of National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and District 1, and Michael Di Prisco, Chief of Labor Relations of the American Maritime Association, in support of its contention. Plaintiff did not introduce any oral testimony or documentary evidence on its own behalf.
On the basis of the foregoing, the whole record of the case, and the evidence which was introduced by the parties herein, this Court makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, TTT, is engaged in the transportation of cargo between the ports of San Juan and New York and is the operator of the ships SS. Eric K. Holzer and SS. Ponce de León.
2. TTT and co-defendants National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and MEBA, District 1, are signatories to a collective bargaining agreement executed on or about June 1967, (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4 a).
3. Co-defendant, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1, is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the engineers employed on board plaintiff’s vessels the SS. Eric K. Holzer and the SS. Ponce de León.
4. Co-defendant, Frank Costello, is a patrolman of codefendant Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1.
5. Co-defendants Richard S. Gerald, Ellio Roderman, Clarence E. Hawkins, Rudolph Saliga, Leo V. Niham and Jeremiah McGillicuddy, at the time of commencement of this action worked as engineers on board plaintiff’s vessel SS. Eric K. Holzer and were members of Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1.
6. Co-defendants George Phaler, Alfredo Benitez, Otto Manning, Louis Glathome, Cristobal Jacquez, David Boyd and George Prescott, at the time of the commencement of this action, worked as engineers on board plaintiff’s vessel SS. Ponce de León and were members of Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1.
7. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between TTT and co-defendants National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and MEBA, District 1, was supplemented by the said signatories by virtue of a document entitled “Memorandum of Understanding”, hereinafter referred to as “Memorandum”. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5).
8. The said collective bargaining agreement as supplemented, provides for the arbitration of grievances, at the request of either party.
9. The “letter agreement”
to which reference is made in the “Memorandum” dated June 26, 1969, plaintiff’s exhibit No. 5, is the letter introduced in evidence by District 1, as defendants’ Exhibit C. In regards to this aspect of the case, defendants submitted the oral testimony of William Divine and Michael Di Prisco. The Court gives great weight to the testimony of said witnesses, and their demeanor on the witness stand and their forthright testimony convinced this Court of the correctness of the conclusion herein made. Further, if the Letter Agreement which District 1 introduced as Exhibit C was not the Tetter to which the Memorandum referred, as contended by plaintiff, plaintiff had ample opportunity to offer evidence in support of its contention, which it did not do.
10. MEBA District 2 is not the collective bargaining representative for the engineers employed aboard plaintiff’s vessels the SS. Eric K. Holzer and SS. Ponce de León.
11. MEBA District 2 is not a party signatory to the collective bargaining agreement covering the engineers employed by TTT.
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OPINION AND ORDER
TOLEDO, District Judge.
On August 21, 1971, plaintiff, Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc. (hereinafter “TTT”), instituted the instant action for injunctive relief together with a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order against all the defendants
for a period of 10 days, setting down the hearing upon the preliminary injunction for August 25, 1971.
Jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by plaintiff on the basis of Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a), as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970); Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and on Section 8(b) of the Act.
On August 23, 1971, upon Motion and Memorandum filed by Seafarer’s International Union and/or Seafarers International Union de Puerto Rico and/or SIU de Puerto Rico, and National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 2,
this Court issued an Order Vacating the Temporary Restraining Order above referred to. The only defendants thus covered by the Temporary Restraining Order were National Marine Enginers Beneficial Association, MEBA District 1, and the individual persons named in the complaint.
Hearing on the preliminary injunction was commenced on August 25, 1971 and
except for non-working days, interruptions because of criminal and civil proceedings pending in the Court, and adjournments at the request of counsel, said hearing was held continuously until September 7, 1971, at which time, this Court issued its decision from the bench dismissing the instant complaint.
During the hearing, several motions filed by the parties and oppositions thereto, with their respective memoranda, were entertained by this Court. On August 27, 1971, the defendant’s subject to the Temporary Restraining Order filed a Motion requesting that the same be declared null and void. Said Motion was denied by this Court on August 30, 1971, on the grounds that on the basis of the verified complaint filed by plaintiff, TTT had complied with both the requirements of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, supra, and those of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. TTT was thus entitled to the Temporary Restraining Order which had been issued by this Court on August 21, 1971. On August 28, 1971, plaintiff requested the extension of the Temporary Restraining Order for an additional period of 10 days, which extension was granted by this Court on August 31, 1971.
Again on September 2, 1971, defendants subject to the Temporary Restraining Order, questioned the power of this Court to issue the relief requested by plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed the same by way of oral argument and written brief. On September 7, 1971, hearing on this motion was held, defendants introducing the oral testimony of William Divine, Administrative Assistant to the President of National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and District 1, and Michael Di Prisco, Chief of Labor Relations of the American Maritime Association, in support of its contention. Plaintiff did not introduce any oral testimony or documentary evidence on its own behalf.
On the basis of the foregoing, the whole record of the case, and the evidence which was introduced by the parties herein, this Court makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, TTT, is engaged in the transportation of cargo between the ports of San Juan and New York and is the operator of the ships SS. Eric K. Holzer and SS. Ponce de León.
2. TTT and co-defendants National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and MEBA, District 1, are signatories to a collective bargaining agreement executed on or about June 1967, (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4 a).
3. Co-defendant, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1, is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the engineers employed on board plaintiff’s vessels the SS. Eric K. Holzer and the SS. Ponce de León.
4. Co-defendant, Frank Costello, is a patrolman of codefendant Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1.
5. Co-defendants Richard S. Gerald, Ellio Roderman, Clarence E. Hawkins, Rudolph Saliga, Leo V. Niham and Jeremiah McGillicuddy, at the time of commencement of this action worked as engineers on board plaintiff’s vessel SS. Eric K. Holzer and were members of Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1.
6. Co-defendants George Phaler, Alfredo Benitez, Otto Manning, Louis Glathome, Cristobal Jacquez, David Boyd and George Prescott, at the time of the commencement of this action, worked as engineers on board plaintiff’s vessel SS. Ponce de León and were members of Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, District 1.
7. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between TTT and co-defendants National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and MEBA, District 1, was supplemented by the said signatories by virtue of a document entitled “Memorandum of Understanding”, hereinafter referred to as “Memorandum”. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5).
8. The said collective bargaining agreement as supplemented, provides for the arbitration of grievances, at the request of either party.
9. The “letter agreement”
to which reference is made in the “Memorandum” dated June 26, 1969, plaintiff’s exhibit No. 5, is the letter introduced in evidence by District 1, as defendants’ Exhibit C. In regards to this aspect of the case, defendants submitted the oral testimony of William Divine and Michael Di Prisco. The Court gives great weight to the testimony of said witnesses, and their demeanor on the witness stand and their forthright testimony convinced this Court of the correctness of the conclusion herein made. Further, if the Letter Agreement which District 1 introduced as Exhibit C was not the Tetter to which the Memorandum referred, as contended by plaintiff, plaintiff had ample opportunity to offer evidence in support of its contention, which it did not do.
10. MEBA District 2 is not the collective bargaining representative for the engineers employed aboard plaintiff’s vessels the SS. Eric K. Holzer and SS. Ponce de León.
11. MEBA District 2 is not a party signatory to the collective bargaining agreement covering the engineers employed by TTT.
12. On or about August 20, 1971, at approximately 6:00 p. m., defendant MEBA District 2, set up a picket line in front of the plaintiff’s ship, the SS Eric K. Holzer.
Members of MEBA District 1, employed aboard the SS Eric K. Holzer, were advised by Mr. Frank Costello, that according to the terms of Section 2(h) of the collective bargaining agreement signed by National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, MEBA Dis
trict 1 and TTT, they were entitled to respect the picket line set up by MEBA District 2.
13. Although plaintiff made oral requests to Frank Costello to submit the grievance to arbitration and made additional oral requests to representatives of MEBA District 1, in New York, at no time did TTT make a written request to arbitrate nor did it follow any of the arbitration procedures established either by the collective bargaining agreement, or the Memorandum and/or the Letter Agreement.
In view of the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The picketing of MEBA District 2, was the result of a labor dispute as defined in Section 13 of the Norris La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 113.
2. Section 7 of the Norris La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C., Section 107, prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctive relief in a case growing out of a labor dispute.
3. A narrow judicial exception to the broad prohibition of the Norris La Guardia Act, was created by the Supreme Court of the United States in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970). The Supreme Court stated however, that its decision was not intended to “undermine the vitality of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.”
4. In
Boys Markets,
supra, it was held that before a party can obtain injunctive relief in a federal court, the court must hold (1) that the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate, despite the Norris La Guardia Act: (2) that there is a collective bargaining agreement in effect between the parties; (3) that the contract contains a mandatory arbitration procedure; (4) that the dispute which is the subject of the grievance is one about which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate; (5) that the dispute is the cause of the conduct or activity sought to be enjoined; (6) that the aggrieved party has invoked the grievance and/or arbitration procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement, and (7) that issuance of an injunction be warranted under ordinary principles of equity — that is, whether breaches are occurring and will continue or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance. Without deciding whether plaintiff herein has satisfied the first five requirements and the seventh requirement set forth above, this Court finds that the collective bargaining agreement herein, as supplemented, upon which plaintiff bases its cause of action, establishes an arbitration procedure to which TTT was bound to submit the dispute.
5. It is the opinion of this Court, that when the collective bargaining agreement establishes a specific procedure to be followed to submit a dispute to the grievance and arbitration proceedings, a mere oral request or offer to arbitrate is not enough to entitle plaintiff to injunctive relief. Before he is entitled to injunctive relief, plaintiff must have strictly complied with his obligation under the contract and show that the defendants refuse to comply with theirs. Since TTT did not properly invoke said arbitration procedure, it is not entitled to injunctive relief under
Boys Markets, Inc.,
supra.
6. Since the power of this Court to issue injunctive relief in a Section 301 (a) suit, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a) is based solely upon the judicial interpretation of Section 301 by the Supreme Court in
Boys Markets,
and since TTT has failed to satisfy a prerequisite to the issuance of injunctive relief mandated by the Supreme Court, this Court lacks the power to decide the merits of this case.
Wherefore, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the Temporary Restraining Order entered on August 21, 1971 and extended on August 31, 1971, be vacated and the preliminary injunction requested by plaintiff, is hereby denied; and
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the complaint be dismissed on the aforementioned grounds with costs and without attorney’s fees.
It is so ordered.