Transamerica Premier Life Insurance Company v. Carpenter

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 22, 2022
• Docket: 3:19-cv-02367-BAS-AGS
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 Case No. 19-cv-02367-BAS-AGS

12 TRANSAMERICA PREMIER LIFE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 13 INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., ANDREW MUSAELIAN’S Plaintiffs, MOTION TO REOPEN AND 14 v. MODIFY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 15 30) ALMA REYES CARPENTER, et 16 al., 17 Defendants. 18

19 On March 26, 2020, the Court entered final judgment to resolve an interpleader 20 action brought by Plaintiffs Transamerica Premier Life Insurance Company and 21 Wilton Re Assignment Illinois, Inc. (collectively, “Insurers”). (J., ECF No. 22.) 22 Now before the Court is Defendant Andrew Musaelian’s “Motion to Reopen and 23 Modify Judgment Based on New Uncontroverted Evidence.” (Mot., ECF No. 30.) 24 Insurers oppose Mr. Musaelian’s motion (Insurers’ Opp’n, ECF No. 35), as does 25 Defendant Alma Lydia Carpenter (Carpenter’s Opp’n, ECF No. 34). Mr. Musaelian 26 replied (Reply, ECF No. 36) and later filed a supplemental declaration (Suppl. Decl., 27 1 ECF No. 37).1 The Court finds Mr. Musaelian’s motion suitable for determination 2 on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. 3 L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion. 4 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 5 A. Insurers’ Interpleader Action 6 In December of 2019, Insurers filed an interpleader action seeking to resolve 7 several competing claims on monthly payments due to Defendant Alma Lydia 8 Carpenter pursuant to a personal injury structured settlement owned and issued by 9 Insurers. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 33–43, ECF No. 1.) In addition to Ms. Carpenter, Insurers 10 named as defendants Andrew Musaelian, Stanley Tanaka, and Richard M. 11 Kipperman (as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Ms. Carpenter), each 12 of whom had obtained by assignment the right to collect various judgments against 13 Ms. Carpenter. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 29, 31.) These Defendants sought to collect on their debts 14 against Ms. Carpenter out of the monthly payments that Insurers paid to her. (Id.) 15 Insurers pled that “[d]ue to the timing of the numerous judgments, [they were] unable 16 to put one judgment ahead of any other without facing . . . risk of multiple litigation,” 17 and sought intervention of this Court to resolve Defendants’ competing claims to the 18 monthly payments. (Id. ¶¶ 36–38.) 19 The parties negotiated a stipulated judgment, which the Court entered on 20 March 26, 2020 (the “Judgment”). (See generally J.) The Judgment resolved 21 Defendants’ claims to the monthly payments by setting forth the manner and order 22 in which Insurers would pay Defendants. (Id. ¶ 5.) Pursuant to the Judgment, Mr. 23 Musaelian would be paid first followed by Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Kipperman. (Id.) 24 Insurers would then resume monthly payments to Ms. Carpenter until November 1, 25

26 1 Ms. Carpenter objected to Mr. Musaelian’s reply and supplemental declaration. (Carpenter’s Obj., ECF No. 38). The Court SUSTAINS the objection with respect to the 27 supplemental declaration (ECF No. 37) and disregards that filing as an improper sur-reply. See 1 2027. (Id.) The Judgment also prohibited Defendants from “commencing any 2 actions or asserting any of their claims identified in the complaint other than in this 3 action” (id. ¶ 2), and discharged Insurers from “any and all liability to Defendants . . 4 . in connection with, arising out of, or relating to the underlying settlement 5 agreement, the Annuity, the Payments at Issue [i.e. the monthly payments], 6 Defendants’ judgments, and/or any claims that were or that could have been asserted 7 in this action[]” (id. ¶ 3). Finally, the Judgment provided that it “may only be 8 modified by order of this Court, good cause showing, and shall be binding upon and 9 inure to the benefit of each of the parties.” (Id. ¶ 7(a).) 10 B. Defendant Musaelian’s Motion 11 Insurers named Mr. Musaelian as a defendant in their interpleader action 12 because of his efforts to collect on nine judgments against Ms. Carpenter from the 13 monthly payments by Insurers. (Compl. ¶¶ 30–31.) The Judgment unequivocally 14 resolves Mr. Musaelian’s nine previous claims, and Insurers have fully satisfied the 15 Judgment with respect to those claims. (See Mot. at 5; Carpenter’s Opp’n 3; Insurers’ 16 Opp’n 3–5.) 17 Nevertheless, on April 11, 2022, more than two years after Insurers’ 18 interpleader action was resolved, Mr. Musaelian filed a motion to reopen and modify 19 the Judgment “in order to enforce a criminal restitution judgment against Alma Lydia 20 Carpenter which was unbeknown to anyone when this case was closed.” (Mot. 1.) 21 Mr. Musaelian argues that Ms. Carpenter was a criminal defendant in a massive real 22 estate fraud case and that she agreed in May of 2013 to pay restitution to two 23 aggrieved lenders, Nationstar Mortgage (“Nationstar”) and Bank of America. (Id. at 24 7–8.) Mr. Musaelian claims—without specifying a date—that Nationstar assigned 25 him its restitution judgment (“Nationstar Restitution Judgment”) “for collection and 26 enforcement purposes.” (Id.) Although Mr. Musaelian’s motion is unclear, he 27 appears to be asking the Court to reopen Insurers’ interpleader action to modify the 1 Judgment in a manner that would enable him to collect directly from Insurers on the 2 2013 Nationstar Restitution Judgment. (Id. at 11.) 3 Ms. Carpenter opposes Mr. Musaelian’s motion, arguing (1) that Mr. 4 Musaelian has known about her criminal conviction since at least 2019; (2) that he 5 has no proof of any assignment from Nationstar to himself; and (3) that this Court 6 lacks jurisdiction to enforce state court judgments. (Carpenter’s Opp’n 3–4.) 7 Insurers also oppose Mr. Musaelian’s motion arguing that they are disinterested 8 stakeholders who now face the same “predicament that caused the need for 9 interpleader relief in 2019, which was seemingly resolved by the 2020 Judgment.” 10 (Insurers’ Opp’n 5.) Insurers argue they “need not be included in the ongoing 11 financial issues created by Defendant Carpenter and the seemingly endless 12 judgments presented by her creditors” and that “Insurers should be discharged from 13 involvement in matters stemming from Defendant Carpenter’s financial matters.” 14 (Id. at 6.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b) governs the reconsideration of 17 final orders of the District Court. Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party 18 from a final judgment, order, or proceeding upon a showing of: (1) mistake, 19 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an 20 adverse party’s fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct; (4) a void judgment; (5) a 21 satisfied, released, or discharged judgment; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief 22 from the operation of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 23 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1) [mistake], (2) 24 [newly discovered evidence], and (3) [fraud] no more than a year after the entry of 25 the judgment or order[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Thompson v. Kernan, No. 06-CV- 26 2314-BAS-RBB, 2015 WL 7820679, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015). 27 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Legal Basis for Mr. Musaelian’s Motion 3 Mr. Musaelian does not state any legal grounds for his motion; however, the 4 “Motion to Reopen and Modify Judgment Based on New Uncontroverted Evidence” 5 fits best as a Rule 60(b)(2) motion since Mr. Musaelian requests changes to a final 6 judgment based on “new” evidence.2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). 7 Mr. Musaelian’s motion could also be construed liberally as a Rule 60(b)(6) 8 motion, 3 since he argues there is “good cause” to modify the Judgment, which if 9 true, could constitute a “reason that justifies relief from the operation of the 10 [J]udgment.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). However, Rule 60(b)(6)’s “catch-all 11 provision is to be ‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest 12 injustice’ and ‘only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking 13 timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’” Thompson, 2015 WL 14 7820679, at *2 (quoting Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 15 1103 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 16 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “is 17 available only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a litigant from seeking 18 earlier, more timely relief”). 19 B. Rule 60(b)(2) Motion 20 To the extent the Court construes Mr. Musaelian’s motion as a request for 21 relief under Rule 60(b)(2), the motion fails as untimely. As explained above, a 22 motion for reconsideration based upon Rule 60(b)(2) must be made “no more than a 23 year” after the final judgment or order at issue. This Court entered judgment to 24

25 2 The Court also considered whether the Motion could constitute a “motion to alter or amend a judgment” under Rule 59(e). A Rule 59(e) motion would be long since time barred, however, 26 since it was not filed within twenty-eight days after entry of Judgment on March 26, 2022. (J.) 3 At the time Mr. Musaelian filed his motion, he was pro se. Counsel has since appeared 27 on his behalf (see ECF No. 33), but because his motion was filed pro se the court will construe it 1 resolve Insurers’ interpleader action on March 26, 2020. (J.) Mr. Musaelian did not 2 bring the present motion to “reopen and modify” that Judgment until over two years 3 later on April 11, 2022. (Mot.) 4 Thus, Mr. Musaelian’s delay in bringing this motion exceeds the stated one- 5 year time limit and precludes the Court from considering the motion under Rule 6 60(b)(2). See Nevitt v. United States, 886 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that 7 district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b)(2) motion that was not filed 8 within one year of entry of judgment). The Court has no discretion to extend the 9 time permitted to file a Rule 60(b)(2) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court 10 must not extend the time to act under Rule[] . . . 60(b).”). Accordingly, the Court 11 finds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr. Musaelian’s motion under Rule 12 60(b)(2). 13 C. Rule 60(b)(6) Motion 14 To the extent the Court construes Mr. Musaelian’s motion as arising under 15 Rule 60(b)(6), it still fails. As discussed previously, Rule 60(b)(6) enables a court to 16 relieve a party from a final judgment for any reason that justifies the relief. Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 60(b)(6). However, the Ninth Circuit has limited the use of Rule 60(b)(6) to 18 apply “only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely 19 action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment” and only when necessary “to 20 prevent manifest injustice.” Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1103. Neither justification is 21 present here. 22 1. Extraordinary Circumstances to Warrant Delay 23 Mr. Musaelian does not articulate any extraordinary circumstances that 24 prevented him from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment. 25 The crux of his argument is that because the Nationstar Restitution Judgment was 26 “unbeknown to anyone” at the time this Court issued final judgment in Insurers’ 27 interpleader action, there is good cause to modify the Judgment. (Mot. 4.) He does 1 Nationstar Restitution Judgment was “unbeknown to anyone” at the time this Court 2 resolved the interpleader action.4 Given that the Nationstar Restitution Judgment has 3 existed since 2013 (Mot. 8), and Mr. Musaelian has been engaged in collection 4 efforts against Ms. Carpenter for over a decade (Reply 2), he has failed to provide a 5 sufficient justification for his two-year delay in attempting to modify a final order of 6 this Court. See Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1103. 7 Not only does Mr. Musaelian fail to provide this Court with a justification for 8 his delay in filing this motion, but his motion does not challenge the Judgment as 9 erroneous. Even if Mr. Musaelian had acted in a timely manner—which he did not— 10 he does not raise any error in the Judgment that needs to be corrected. Nor can he 11 genuinely do so since he stipulated to the Judgment and had no objection to it while 12 Insurers were paying out his claims pursuant to it. Instead, two years later, he asks 13 this Court to reopen Insurers’ interpleader action, not because of any error with the 14 Judgment, but because he wants to collect additional sums from Insurers on claims 15 that existed at the time of the interpleader action. The Court declines to do so and 16 finds that Mr. Musaelian has failed to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances 17 that prevented him from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous 18 judgment. 19 2. Manifest Injustice and Good Cause 20 Mr. Musaelian has also failed to articulate any manifest injustice that would 21 occur absent modification of the Judgment. Since the Judgment indicates it can be 22 modified for “good cause” (see J. ¶ 7(a)), Mr. Musaelian spends much of his motion 23 arguing there is good cause to modify the Judgment because Nationstar is entitled to 24 collect restitution. (Mot. 8–11.) In particular, Mr. Musaelian asks the Court “to 25 26 4 In fact, Ms. Carpenter correctly points out that at the time of the interpleader action, 27 Nationstar certainly knew about its Restitution Judgment but never made a claim to Insurers as a 1 reopen/modify the March 26, 2020 order . . . so that the criminal restitution judgment 2 enforcement action can commence and the victim [Nationstar] can obtain closure of 3 this serious theft.” (Mot. 11.) That Nationstar might be entitled to restitution from 4 Ms. Carpenter, however, is insufficient to constitute good cause to modify the 5 Judgment, since nothing in the Judgment precludes Nationstar from collecting from 6 Ms. Carpenter. Thus, there is no manifest injustice to Nationstar warranting 7 modification of the Judgment, because Nationstar was not a party to the interpleader 8 action and its ability to collect from Ms. Carpenter is unaffected by the Judgment. 9 See Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1103. 10 Even were this Court inclined to reopen Insurers’ interpleader action to allow 11 Mr. Musaelian to “enforce a criminal restitution judgment,” the Court would 12 necessarily be “step[ping] in to enforce state court judgments because a federal 13 [party] wants to speed up or delay state court proceedings.” Waste Action Project v. 14 Buckley Recycle Ctr., Inc., No. C13-1184 RSM, 2020 WL 7043597, at *7 (W.D. 15 Wash. Dec. 1, 2020) (quoting Johnson v. Fitial, No. 1:09-CV-000023, 2012 WL 16 12542689, at *5 (D. N. Mar. I. Sept. 26, 2012)). “To do so would implicate principles 17 of equity, comity, and federalism and would reflect a lack of respect for the state’s 18 ability to resolve the cases properly before its courts.” Id. (internal quotations 19 omitted). This Court cannot allow Mr. Musaelian to use its Judgment resolving 20 Insurers’ interpleader action as an end run around the variety of state court 21 procedures available to Nationstar to enforce its Restitution Judgment. 22 Since the Court is not persuaded that any manifest injustice would result absent 23 modification of the Judgment, the Court refuses to modify its prior Judgment and 24 finds that Mr. Musaelian’s motion is improper under the Ninth Circuit’s limited 25 interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6). See Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1103. 26 // 27 // 1 || ITV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Mr. Musaelian’s motion. 3 || (ECF No. 30.) Insurers are directed to dispense the monthly payments in accordance 4 || with the Judgment unless this or another Court orders otherwise. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 ||DATED: June 22, 2022 , g (pill (Lyshand 9 United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28