Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.

86 F.3d 725, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1213, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14854, 1996 WL 334222
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJune 19, 1996
DocketNo. 95-2896
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 86 F.3d 725 (Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 86 F.3d 725, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1213, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14854, 1996 WL 334222 (7th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

Whenever we are called upon to decide an issue for which state law provides the rule of decision, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, and the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), require us to ascertain what state law requires as accurately as we possibly can. Parties should not have an incentive to switch from a state courtroom to a federal courtroom in the hopes of altering the substantive law that applies to their cases. As a federal court, however, we operate under one critical limitation that does not exist for the state judiciary: when the state law is unsettled, or there is a possibility that it may change or evolve, only the state court has the authority to resolve the matter definitively.

Notwithstanding this advantage of litigating in state court, parties continue to exercise their undoubted right to file lawsuits in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and unsettled questions of state law continue to arise. In the normal case, the federal courts consult decisions of the state supreme court, state appellate courts, and any other source of guidance, and they do the best they can. When the question is truly unsettled, however, and when its resolution will be determinative of the outcome, a federal court may have the option of certifying the issue to the state supreme court, which in turn may choose to take the case and provide the authoritative answer.

We have concluded that the ease before us is an ideal candidate for certification to the Illinois Supreme Court, pursuant to the procedure set forth in Rule 20 of that Court’s rules. We explain in this opinion why we believe that there are “questions as to the law of [Illinois], which may be determinative of the ... cause,” and why there appear to be “no controlling precedents in the decisions” of the Illinois Supreme Court. We hereby respectfully request the Supreme Court of Illinois to answer the following questions:

1. For proposes of the economic loss doctrine, as developed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill.2d 69, 61 Ill.Dec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982), Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill.2d 431, 80 Ill.Dec. 743, 466 N.E.2d 195 (Ill.1984), Board of Education v. A, C and S, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 428, 137 Ill.Dec. 635, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989), and In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill.2d 233, [727]*727204 Ill.Dec. 216, 641 N.E.2d 440 (1994), does Illinois recognize a “sudden and calamitous occurrence” exception to the doctrine under which recovery in tort is possible for injury to the single product?
2. Can a product and one of its component parts ever constitute two separate products, and if so, did the airframe and the engine that failed in this case constitute a single product or two distinct products?

For the reasons set forth below, we believe that the answers to these questions will definitively resolve the dispute now before us.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 17, 1991, Trans States Airlines Flight 7128 left St. Louis, Missouri, for Peoria, Illinois, as scheduled. The left engine on the ATR 42-300 airplane had operated safely for nearly two years and more than 5,500 flight hours. On the plane’s final approach to the Peoria airport, the left engine failed catastrophically, catching fire and shutting down. After regaining control of the plane, the pilot was able to land safely. The crew quickly evacuated the passengers and, working with airport firefighters, extinguished the fire without further incident. The post-incident investigation revealed that the engine failed after some of its interturbine duct (ITD) bolts loosened and fractured in flight. Bolt fragments hit the engine’s power turbine blades, damaging the blades and causing an imbalance overload of the power turbine rotor. The resulting fire damaged both the engine and the body of the aircraft.

Discovery revealed that Pratt & Whitney had been concerned for some time prior to the accident about the ability of the ITD bolts to withstand the high temperatures to which they were exposed during flight. Pratt & Whitney engineers raised this concern in various memoranda, prompting the company to conduct a number of tests. Following the tests, the engineers recommended certain modifications, and Pratt & Whitney began monitoring ITD bolt failures in the field. Pratt & Whitney did not, however, alter the engine or the maintenance procedure before July 17,1991.

Pratt & Whitney manufactured the allegedly defective engine in 1988. It sold the engine to Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, Usine de Toulouse, Service de Comptabilte (Aerospatiale), a large French aircraft manufacturer, under a written sales contract that included an express warranty clause. Aerospatiale incorporated the engine into one of its ATR 42-300 airplanes, which it sold to McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation (MDFC), passing Pratt & Whitney’s warranty through to MDFC. MDFC then leased the plane to a company called GPA ATR Inc. (GPA), which in turn subleased the plane to Trans States, the plaintiff below and appellee here.

Although the engine had passed through a number of hands between Pratt & Whitney and Trans States, the engine warranty ran directly to Trans States. It appeared as section 4(a) of the Sales Contract between Pratt & Whitney and Aerospatiale and provided for repair or replacement of the engine for a defect discovered during the first 90 days or 150 flight hours of operation, whichever occurred first. Subsection 4(d) of the Sales Contract made this express warranty the “Buyer’s” exclusive remedy, in lieu of any implied warranties and “any obligation, liability, right, claim, or remedy in contract or tort, whether or not arising from Seller’s negligence, actual or imputed.” A subsequent warranty and service agreement modified the express warranty, extending it to 1,000 flight hours, 1,000 flights, or six months, whichever occurred last.

Trans States contacted Pratt & Whitney directly for matters relating to the maintenance and condition of the engine. In response to certain engine condition monitoring data that Trans States had sent to it, Pratt & Whitney on July 9, 1991, faxed Trans States a letter recommending a visual inspection of the engine with a horoscope and other “appropriate action.” Trans States followed through on the suggestion, but found nothing noteworthy. It asserts that the specified procedures neither did nor could identify the problem with the ITD bolts.

In many ways, the parties treated the engine and the aircraft as two distinct products. [728]

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86 F.3d 725, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1213, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14854, 1996 WL 334222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trans-states-airlines-v-pratt-whitney-canada-inc-ca7-1996.