Trang Vu v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 26, 2024
DocketDA-315H-23-0433-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Trang Vu v. Department of the Air Force (Trang Vu v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trang Vu v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TRANG T. VU, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-315H-23-0433-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: June 26, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Curtis Mitchell Jr. , Midwest City, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

Petria Pennington , Esquire, Mary Rahimi-Ahrabi , Esquire, and S. Maggie Lanier , Esquire, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, for the agency.

BEFORE Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 In her petition for review, the appellant continues to contest the merits of her termination. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The merits of the appellant’s termination, however, do not pertain to the jurisdictional issue, and we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction entitling her to a hearing. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-4. ¶3 Only an “employee,” as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1), may appeal an adverse action, like a removal from Federal service, to the Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d); see, e.g., Bryant v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. At the time of the appellant’s appointment to her competitive-service position in August 2021, an individual appointed to a permanent competitive-service position at the Department of Defense (DOD) was subject to a 2-year probationary period and only qualified as an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2016) and 10 U.S.C. § 1599e (2016) if she was not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment, or if she had completed 2 years of current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 8 at 30; see Bryant, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. In December 2021, while the 3

appellant was serving her probationary period, Congress repealed 10 U.S.C. § 1599e and the 2-year probationary period for such DOD appointments. Bryant 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. However, this repeal was made effective December 31, 2022, and only applied to individuals appointed on or after that date. 10 U.S.C. § 1599e note; Bryant 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. The repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 1599e does not affect the outcome of this appeal. Because the appellant was appointed in August 2021, before the effective date of the repeal, the administrative judge properly concluded that the appellant was serving a 2-year probationary period and lacked the required 2 years of current continuous service at the time of her termination, and therefore that she was not an “employee” with adverse action appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. ID at 2-3; IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 8 at 30; see Bryant, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶¶ 8-9. ¶4 We further find that the administrative judge properly concluded that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 or any other basis. ID at 3-4. She has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that she was terminated due to discrimination based on marital status or for partisan political reasons, or because of conditions arising before her appointment to the position in question. ID at 3; see Blount v. Department of the Treasury, 109 M.S.P.R. 174, ¶ 5 (2008). Absent an allegation that she was terminated for preappointment reasons, she has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that she was entitled to the notice and response procedures afforded under 5 C.F.R. § 315.805, and there is no basis for Board jurisdiction pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(c). To the extent that the appellant argues that sources other than 5 C.F.R. § 315.805, such as Air Force Instructions and a collective bargaining agreement, provide her with advanced notice and response rights, we find that these allegations provide no basis for Board jurisdiction. PFR File, Tab 1; IAF, Tab 7. 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction.

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Trang Vu v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trang-vu-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2024.