Trana Discovery, Inc. v. Southern Research Institute

915 F.3d 249
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 7, 2019
Docket17-2136
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 915 F.3d 249 (Trana Discovery, Inc. v. Southern Research Institute) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trana Discovery, Inc. v. Southern Research Institute, 915 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Trana Discovery, Inc. has developed a technology that it believes can help find new drugs to treat HIV. It collaborated with Defendant-Appellee Southern Research Institute, a contract research organization, to put its technology to work by testing chemical compounds for signs that they inhibited the reproduction of HIV. When the testing yielded inconsistent results, Trana sued Southern for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

In Trana's view, Southern made two actionable misrepresentations in its research reports. First, Southern allegedly failed to identify certain promising compounds as potential HIV treatments. Trana calls these test results "false negatives." Second, Southern falsely identified other compounds as potential treatments when in fact they were not. Trana refers to these latter results as "false positives." After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Southern on both theories. We affirm.

I.

A. Background

Trana was founded in 2000 by scientists with expertise in "transfer RNA" (or "tRNA"), a molecule in the human body. Some viruses, including HIV, use tRNA to reproduce. Trana's scientists developed a proprietary test (in the lingo of biochemists, an "assay") that could quickly identify chemical compounds with the potential to inhibit HIV's reproduction by targeting the virus's use of tRNA. The parties refer to the compounds identified by Trana's test as "hits."

Trana's proprietary test is a "biochemical" test, meaning that it does not use living cells. A positive result in this test only shows that a "hit" compound might treat HIV in a living person. So it is just a first step in the development of a marketable HIV drug, a long process that ultimately includes clinical trials and FDA approval. The virtue of Trana's test is that it can winnow down a universe of thousands (or even hundreds of thousands) of compounds to a much smaller number of "hits" worth pursuing.

The next logical step is to see whether those "hits" also have antiviral activity in a "biological" test-one that does use living cells. Yet even if a "hit" showed activity in a biological test, that would still be only a preliminary step in the drug-development process. Trana's goal was not to complete that arduous process on its own, but to entice a large pharmaceutical company into a partnership deal that would reward Trana handsomely for its intellectual property (the testing technology itself and any promising compounds it identified). To do that, Trana had to show that its testing technology could successfully identify compounds with promise as HIV drugs.

Trana entered into a three-way arrangement with Southern and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ("NIAID"), a component of the National Institutes of Health (a federal government agency). The arrangement involved three separate agreements. The first was between Southern and NIAID. Under the agreement, NIAID paid Southern to identify "hit" compounds using Trana's biochemical test; Southern would then be paid to use standard biological ( i.e. , cell-based) tests to follow up on the "hits." The second agreement, between Southern and Trana, permitted Southern to use Trana's proprietary biochemical test. Under the third agreement, between Trana and NIAID, Trana would retain certain exclusive rights to the "hit" compounds (including the right to patent them) for a specified time. All sides stood to benefit from the arrangement, in different ways. The public, represented by NIAID, would benefit from research into potential HIV drugs; Southern would be compensated for its work; and Trana would reap the potential commercial rewards flowing from testing paid for by taxpayers.

As the arrangement proceeded, decisions had to be made about what type of cells to use in the follow-up biological tests Southern performed. Research scientists have different cell types available to them. One type, known as peripheral blood mononuclear cells (or "PBMCs," a kind of white blood cell), must be gathered from human donors; these cells are therefore expensive to obtain. Another type is called a "CEM" cell, a kind of cancer cell. Scientists commonly use cancer cells in biological research, and because cancer cells tend to reproduce prodigiously, they can be grown cheaply in a lab.

Testing the same compounds in different cell types can yield different results. For example, in 2007, Southern performed a PBMC test on 29 compounds for Trana. Two of the compounds showed some antiviral activity. Trana then sent the two compounds to a pharmaceutical company, which tested them using cancer cells in 2008. The company found no antiviral activity in either compound and explained to Trana that the inconsistent results might be caused by the use of different types of cells. J.A. 809.

B. "False Negatives"

Trana's first theory of liability-for "false negatives," as alluded to above-arose from a decision to use CEM cells instead of PBMCs in testing performed in 2009. Shortly before that, Southern had tested 13 "hit" compounds in PBMCs with no positive results. Hoping the disappointing results were due to the small sample size, the parties decided to perform biological tests on a much larger set of around 150 "hits." Testing that many compounds in PBMCs would have been expensive, costing the government around $150,000. By contrast, Southern estimated that testing the compounds in CEM cells would cost as little as $20,000.

NIAID approved Southern's use of CEM cells in the larger biological test. After consulting with Southern, NIAID's project officer noted that a CEM-cell test would be cheaper-a trait surely appealing to a budget-conscious government official (although presumably not to Trana, as it stood to gain the commercial benefit from the testing without paying for it).

This use of CEM cells, in Trana's view, was negligent: Southern should have used PBMCs or, at a minimum, advised NIAID and Trana of the benefits of using PBMCs, which might have led NIAID to select a PBMC test. Instead, Southern apparently told Trana that there was no good reason not to use CEM cells. One of Trana's expert witnesses, distinguished HIV scientist Mark Wainberg, opined that using CEM cells rather than PBMCs, which he described as the "gold standard," fell short of the standard of care for HIV research laboratories. And according to Trana, this negligence led to false information in the research report containing Southern's findings.

Southern issued the research report in June 2009 after using CEM cells to test the larger batch of compounds (which ultimately numbered 136). This report identified several compounds that demonstrated antiviral activity and thus showed promise for investigation as HIV drugs. In most of the tested compounds, however, the CEM-cell test revealed no antiviral activity. The June 2009 report listed the compounds in a table titled "Antiviral Efficacy of Hit Compounds against HIV-1 IIIB in CEM-SS Cells." J.A. 4577-80.

This same batch of compounds was retested three years later in PBMCs, revealing some antiviral activity for two of the compounds the 2009 report identified as inactive. These two compounds are Trana's purported "false negatives." This inconsistency did not result from an error in the 2009 testing: retesting confirmed that these two compounds were indeed inactive in CEM cells.

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915 F.3d 249, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trana-discovery-inc-v-southern-research-institute-ca4-2019.