Trainauskas v. Dalton

2021 IL App (4th) 200064-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 6, 2021
• Docket: 4-20-0064
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200064-U FILED This Order was filed under April 6, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the NOS. 4-20-0064, 4-20-0065 cons. 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

BRIAN TRAINAUSKAS, ) Appeal from the Petitioner-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County JACOB N. DALTON and KENDRA R. WOLF, in Their ) Nos. 18MR152 Official Capacities as Employees of the Department of ) 18MR153 Corrections, and TERI A. KENNEDY, in Her Official ) Capacity as the Warden of Pontiac Correctional Center, ) Honorable Respondents-Appellees. ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petitions for mandamus and a writ of certiorari was proper.

¶2 In September 2018, petitioner, Brian Trainauskas, filed a pro se petition for

mandamus in Livingston County case No. 18-MR-152 (appellate court No. 4-20-0064) and a

petition for a writ of certiorari in Livingston County case No. 18-MR-153 (appellate court No.

4-20-0065) against respondents, Jacob N. Dalton and Kendra R. Wolf, in their official capacities

as employees of the Department of Corrections (Department), and Teri A. Kennedy, in her

official capacity as warden of the Pontiac Correctional Center. In both petitions, petitioner

alleged his due process rights were violated because respondents did not follow Department

regulations in disciplinary proceedings for petitioner’s June 21, 2018, infraction. In April 2019,

respondents filed combined motions to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)). After a January 2020 hearing,

the Livingston County circuit court granted respondents’ motions to dismiss.

¶3 Petitioner appeals, asserting the circuit court erred by dismissing his petitions for

mandamus and a writ of certiorari. We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In case No. 18-MR-152, petitioner filed pro se a petition for mandamus, seeking a

list of nine items of relief including (1) expungement of his disciplinary report No. 201801878

and the sanctions imposed, (2) an order requiring respondents to properly classify him as

seriously mentally ill and provide him mental health treatment, and (3) compensatory and

punitive damages. Petitioner alleged he requested respondents to perform the duties contained in

Part 504 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 504 (2017)), which

addresses discipline and grievances, and respondents have refused to do them. Specifically,

petitioner claimed respondents violated his due process rights by failing to comply with the

following regulations: (1) section 504.20 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill.

Adm. Code 504.20 (2017)), (2) section 504.70 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20

Ill. Adm. Code 504.70 (2017)), (3) section 504.60 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code

(20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.60 (2017)), and (4) section 504.80 of Title 20 of the Illinois

Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80 (2017)). Petitioner asserted those regulations

had special provisions for those determined to be seriously mentally ill and he was designated

seriously mentally ill by a Department mental health professional in June 2017. He also

contended he was not granted a proper hearing and was found guilty in his absence.

Additionally, petitioner noted he had not received mental health treatment since arriving at

Pontiac Correctional Center on June 21, 2018.

-2- ¶6 Petitioner attached four exhibits to his mandamus petition. Exhibit A showed a

Department mental health professional had designated petitioner seriously mentally ill on the

following dates: (1) June 9, 2017; (2) November 30, 2017; (3) March 21, 2018; (4) May 9, 2018;

and (5) June 20, 2018. Exhibits B and C showed petitioner received disciplinary ticket No.

201801878/1-PON on June 21, 2018. Exhibit B is a document in which petitioner indicated he

would like Jacob Weatherford called as a witness at the disciplinary hearing. The note indicated

Weatherford could testify about petitioner’s seriously mentally ill designation, petitioner’s

diagnoses, and the discontinuation of petitioner’s medication. Exhibit C was the adjustment

committee final summary report stating petitioner pleaded guilty and received six months of the

following discipline: (1) C grade status, (2) segregation; (3) commissary restriction; (4) visiting

restriction, (5) audio/visual restriction, and (6) contact visit restriction. The final summary report

listed a hearing date and time of 2:12 p.m. on June 27, 2018, and was signed by all three

respondents. The report also stated petitioner was not seriously mentally ill per an attached

e-mail. The attachment is not part of the record on appeal. Exhibit D was a July 10, 2018,

comment written on a letter petitioner sent to a Ms. Brown, and the comment stated petitioner

was designated seriously mentally ill.

¶7 In case No. 18-MR-153, petitioner’s pro se petition for writ of certiorari sought

vacatur of the disciplinary ticket, expungement of the sanctions, and an order requiring the

mental health department at Pontiac Correctional Center to provide adequate treatment to

petitioner. He again alleged due process violations based on respondents’ noncompliance with

the same Department regulations as stated in his mandamus petition and attached the same four

exhibits to his certiorari petition.

¶8 In April 2019, respondents filed a combined motion to dismiss both petitions

-3- under section 2-619.1 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)) and a

memorandum of law with exhibits supporting their motions to dismiss. Respondents alleged

petitioner’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice under both sections 2-615 and 2-619

of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2018)). They contended the discipline

petitioner received did not rise to the level of an atypical or significant hardship and thus did not

create a liberty interest in the disciplinary proceedings. Respondents also argued petitioner was

afforded all the due process rights required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),

regardless of whether the discipline did or did not constitute a significant hardship. Petitioner

filed a memorandum in response to the motion to dismiss, asserting he did set forth a claim of

due process violations and violations of Department regulations and he did suffer an atypical and

significant hardship.

¶9 On January 13, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on respondents’ motions to

dismiss. The court granted respondents’ motions to dismiss under both sections 2-615 and

2-619, finding petitioner had received all of the due process rights afforded to him under Wolff.

¶ 10 On January 21, 2020, petitioner filed notices of appeal from the dismissal of his

petitions for mandamus and writ of certiorari that did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). On January 30, 2020, petitioner filed timely amended notices of

appeal in sufficient compliance with Rule 303. Thus, this court has jurisdiction of petitioner’s

appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 In this case, petitioner appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his petitions

for mandamus and a writ of certiorari. Both petitions alleged violations of petitioner’s due

process rights based on noncompliance with Department regulations in a disciplinary proceeding

-4- related to a disciplinary ticket issued on June 21, 2018. Regardless of whether the circuit court’s

dismissal of petitioner’s petitions was under section 2-615 or 2-619, or a combination of both

sections pursuant to section 2-619.1, this court’s standard of review is the same. Jane Doe-3

ex rel. Julie Doe-3 v. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1092, 951 N.E.2d 216, 223 (2011). We

review de novo the circuit court’s dismissal. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951 N.E.2d at 223.

“In doing so, we will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations.” White, 409 Ill. App. 3d

at 1092, 951 N.E.2d at 223. We can affirm the circuit court’s dismissal for any reason found in

the record. Akemann v. Quinn, 2014 IL App (4th) 130867, ¶ 21, 17 N.E.3d 223.

¶ 13 Our supreme court has held the proper analysis of an inmate’s allegations of

violations of Department regulations begins with a determination of whether the Department

regulations at issue create judicially enforceable rights for inmates. Fillmore v. Taylor, 2019 IL

122626, ¶ 38, 137 N.E.3d 779. “It is only if those regulations create judicially enforceable rights

for inmates that we consider whether plaintiff was entitled to mandamus or writ of certiorari

based upon defendants’ alleged failure to comply with those regulations.” Fillmore, 2019 IL

122626, ¶ 38. The Fillmore court’s consideration of that issue focused on the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), which reexamined the

circumstances under which state prison regulations afforded inmates a liberty interest protected

by the due process clause, including its prior decision in Wolff. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 39.

Ultimately, the Fillmore court determined that, “in the context of prison disciplinary

proceedings, a prisoner is entitled to due process protections, such as the procedural protections

set forth in Wolff, only when the penalty faced by the prisoner implicates a liberty interest

because it affects the nature or duration of his confinement.” Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 48.

Stated differently, “it is not the violation of the Department regulations itself that gives rise to a

-5- cause of action but, rather, the interest affected by the discipline imposed for that violation.”

Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 54.

¶ 14 Under certain circumstances, States may create liberty interests protected by the

Due Process Clause. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

“But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which,

while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek [v. Jones,]

445 U.S. [480,] 493 [(1980)] (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington [v.

Harper,] 494 U.S. [210,] 221-222 [(1990)] (involuntary administration of

psychotropic drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at

484.

After reviewing the disciplinary actions available to the Department in section 504.80(k)(4) of

Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80(k)(4), amended at 27 Ill.

Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003), the Filmore court stated that, “with limited exceptions, none of the

disciplinary actions set forth in the Department’s regulations impose atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Fillmore, 2019 IL

122626, ¶¶ 46-47.

¶ 15 In Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 12, the petitioner had received the following

discipline: “one year of C-grade status, one year in segregation, one year of contact visit

restrictions, the loss of one year of good conduct credits, and one year of a $15 per month

restriction.” Our supreme court only found the revocation of statutory good time or good

conduct credits implicated a liberty interest. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 56. Specifically, the

-6- court determined, “ ‘[a]s a general rule, only sanctions which result in loss of good conduct time

credits for inmates who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision or which otherwise

directly and adversely affect release on mandatory supervision will impose upon a liberty

interest.’ ” Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 56 (quoting Spicer v. Collins, 9 F. Supp. 2d 673, 685

(E.D. Tex. 1998)).

¶ 16 We note petitioner did not lose any good conduct credits. On appeal, he appears

to only argue segregation at Pontiac Correctional Center is an atypical and significant hardship.

However, the facts petitioner asserts in his appellate brief in support of that argument were not

set forth in his petitions. Moreover, our supreme court did not find one year of segregation was

an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoner in Fillmore. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626,

¶¶ 47, 55. Accordingly, we find petitioner did not plead any facts showing the discipline he

received imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. As such, petitioner did not plead a liberty interest subject to protection by the due

process clause. Thus, petitioner’s petitions failed to state causes of action for mandamus and a

writ of certiorari.

¶ 17 Additionally, for the first time on appeal, petitioner asserts the conditions of

confinement in the Pontiac Correctional Center’s segregation unit violates the eighth

amendment’s (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. We find

petitioner’s argument forfeited because he failed to raise it in his petitions. See Williams v.

Klincar, 237 Ill. App. 3d 569, 573, 604 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1992).

¶ 18 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petitions for

mandamus and a writ of certiorari was proper.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

-7- ¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Livingston County circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 21 Affirmed.

-8-