Tracy Shipman v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: June 5, 2019
• Docket: 17-3476
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17-3476 TRACY D. SHIPMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 16 C 50016 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED JUNE 5, 2019 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Tracy Shipman appeals the dis- trict court’s denial of his petition for collateral postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. When Shipman pleaded guilty to drug charges in 2003, the district court sentenced him un- der the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Because Ship- man had three prior “crime of violence” felony convictions, the district court sentenced him as a “career offender.” 2 No. 17-3476

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2002). 1 The career-offender provision of the Guidelines defined a “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)–(2). Two passages in that guideline are at issue here: the enumerated-offenses clause, and the residual clause. On appeal, Shipman argues the Guidelines’ residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. We agree, a conclusion that follows directly from our decision in Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 2018). Indeed, Cross abrogated the rationale supporting the district court’s dismissal of Shipman’s petition for collateral relief. With that issue re- solved, the case hits a snag: the record does not conclusively show whether Shipman was sentenced under the residual clause or the enumerated-offenses clause. We therefore re- mand this case for further proceedings on the merits of Ship- man’s § 2255 petition. I. BACKGROUND Because Cross was decided nearly seven months after the district court issued its dismissal order, we summarize the facts and proceedings in this case only to the extent necessary to address the issues presented on appeal. 2 Shipman pleaded guilty in 2003 to conspiring to manufac- ture and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). His presentence report used the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which at that time required

1Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Guidelines are to the 2002 United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 2The district court issued its dismissal order on November 20, 2017. Shipman filed a timely notice of appeal on December 5, 2017. Cross was decided on June 7, 2018, while Shipman’s appeal was pending. No. 17-3476 3

district courts to increase the offense level of a “career offender.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. A defendant qualifies as a career offender if: (1) the defendant was at least 18 at the time of the instant offense of conviction; (2) the offense of conviction is a “crime of violence or controlled substance offense”; and (3) the defendant has “at least two prior felony convictions of ei- ther a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” § 4B1.1. When Shipman was sentenced in 2003, the Guidelines’ career-offender provisions defined a “crime of violence” (in relevant part) as: [A]ny offense under federal or state law, pun- ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that— (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or ex- tortion, involves use of explosives, or oth- erwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an- other. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). Subsection (2) con- tains both the “enumerated-offenses clause” (non-italicized text) and the “residual clause” (italicized text). The probation officer calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment, based in part on Shipman’s designation as a career offender. Shipman’s age (35 years) and this drug charge supplied the first and second predicates for the career-offender designation. His three prior Arkansas convictions for “residential burglary” in 1986 and 1987 satisfied the third predicate. Shipman did not object to the report’s career-offender designation or suggested 4 No. 17-3476

sentencing enhancement. The district court adopted the presentence report’s findings and calculations, classified Shipman as a career offender, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. Neither the presentence report nor the district court explained whether Shipman’s career-of- fender designation rested on the enumerated-offenses clause or the residual clause. A succession of Supreme Court decisions followed Shipman’s sentencing. First, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines “effectively advisory” in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). About a decade later the Supreme Court struck down the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2257, 2563 (2015). 3 Then, in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016), the Supreme Court held that Johnson applied retroactively on collateral review. Within one year of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, Shipman petitioned for relief under § 2255. At this point, a word on § 2255 procedure is helpful. Sec- tion 2255(f)(1) establishes a “1-year period of limitation” within which a federal prisoner may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. In most cases, the one-year pe- riod begins to run when the judgment becomes final. Shipman invokes § 2255(f)(3), which sets a one-year filing deadline for postconviction relief starting from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the

3 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2564 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012)

(ACCA residual clause) (counting as a violent felony any crime that “oth- erwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”)). The ACCA’s residual clause used identical language as employed in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). No. 17-3476 5

Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Shipman argued the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson recognized the right he asserted in his petition: to be resen- tenced because a vague residual clause fixed his term of im- prisonment. Shipman’s petition, however, was not limited to a residual clause challenge—he claimed his drug sentence was improperly enhanced under the residual clause and enu- merated-offenses clause of the Guidelines’ career-offender provisions. Shipman’s residual clause challenge was straightforward: a sentence under the Guidelines’ residual clause is unconsti- tutional because that clause is identical to the ACCA’s resid- ual clause stricken in Johnson. Shipman’s second claim—that his burglary convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under the Guidelines’ enumerated-offenses clause—was more intricate, relying on a chorus of additional Supreme Court decisions. Those arguments made, Shipman’s case was put on hold while multiple cases worked their way through the courts, among them Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). In Beckles, the Supreme Court held Johnson does not apply to sen- tences enhanced under post-Booker advisory Guidelines. Id. at 895. After Beckles, the district court lifted the stay and signaled its intent to deny Shipman’s petition. The court observed that “following Beckles, there appears to be no legal basis” for Shipman’s void-for-vagueness challenge under Johnson, but it offered Shipman an opportunity to respond. Shipman argued 6 No. 17-3476

Beckles applied only to prisoners sentenced under the advi- sory Guidelines (post-Booker), not the mandatory Guidelines (pre-Booker). Shipman failed to persuade the district court, which denied Shipman’s petition as untimely. That court ruled a defendant may rely on § 2255(f)(3) for timeliness purposes only “if the defendant’s entitlement to relief … is so evident that it can no longer be considered an ‘open question.’” In the district court’s view, after Beckles it remained an open ques- tion whether Johnson’s reasoning extends to the pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines. 4 From that premise, the district court concluded Johnson did not commence a one-year limitation period, making Shipman’s petition untimely under § 2255(f)(1). In concluding the petition was time-barred, the district court did not reach the merits of Shipman’s claims. Although the district court dismissed Shipman’s petition as untimely, it granted him a certificate of appealability on the issue. II. DISCUSSION We review the district court’s denial of Shipman’s § 2255 petition de novo. D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2019). Because Shipman filed his petition more than one year after his judgment became final, he must show the Supreme Court has “recognized” a new right to obtain

4See also Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 903 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (observing that Beckles’ holding leaves open the question whether pre-Booker Guidelines can be challenged for vagueness under due process principles). No. 17-3476 7

postconviction relief. § 2255(f)(1), (3). Shipman again points to Johnson, and justifiably so. While Shipman’s appeal was pending, this court decided Cross, which held: “Under Johnson, the guidelines residual clause is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants.” 892 F.3d at 291. A petition challenging a career-offender enhance- ment under the mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause is timely under § 2255(f)(3) if it was filed within one year of Johnson. Id. at 294. Because Shipman met that deadline, his petition was not untimely. We next assess whether we can resolve this case on the merits. A prisoner is entitled to a hearing on a § 2255 claim “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case con- clusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief … .” § 2255(b). In other words, Shipman gets a hearing unless the record before us conclusively establishes he is not entitled to relief. First, we address Shipman’s residual clause challenge, and then turn to his challenge of a sentencing enhancement under the enumerated-offenses clause. Shipman contends that, after Johnson and Cross, his Arkan- sas burglary convictions no longer fit under the Guidelines’ residual clause. The government objects, arguing the district court classified Shipman’s burglary convictions as crimes of violence under the enumerated-offenses clause, not the resid- ual clause. Even if classified under the residual clause, the government asserts Shipman failed to raise a void-for-vague- ness challenge when sentenced in 2003, and so procedurally defaulted on this claim. We start with the government’s pro- cedural default objection. 8 No. 17-3476

In Cross, we held petitioners sentenced under the Guide- lines’ residual clause (in its mandatory form) can demonstrate the requisite cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default. Cross, 892 F.3d at 294–96. Thus, if Shipman’s burglary convictions were classified under the residual clause, the gov- ernment’s procedural default objection cannot stand under Cross. As for Shipman’s claim, Johnson and Cross are of no help to him unless he was sentenced under the residual clause. Sec- tion 2255(f)(3) does not require Shipman to prove at the outset that Johnson applies to his situation. Cross, 892 F.3d at 293–94 (holding an alternative interpretation of § 2255(f)(3) “improp- erly reads a merits analysis into the limitations period”). That said, neither Johnson nor Cross cleared a path to challenge every sentence under the mandatory career-offender Guidelines. See Sotelo v. United States, No. 16-4144, 2019 WL 1950314, at *6 (7th Cir. May 2, 2019). Shipman must still “claim the benefit of a right that the Supreme Court has recently rec- ognized.” Cross, 892 F.3d at 294. “Under Johnson, a person has a right not to have his sentence dictated by the unconstitu- tionally vague language of the mandatory residual clause.” Id. So Shipman must assert precisely that right for Johnson and Cross to apply. In any event, we cannot make that determination because the district court never reached the issue. At Shipman’s sentencing, the district court made no mention whether the burglary convictions rested on the enumerated-offenses clause or the residual clause. Shipman’s presentence report is similarly unavailing. Although the report concludes Shipman is a career offender under § 4B1.1, the report neither cites § 4B1.2(a)(2) nor explains which career-offender provision No. 17-3476 9

was applied. Without knowing which provision the district court relied on to classify Shipman as a career offender, we cannot assess the merits of Shipman’s claim under Johnson and Cross. Shipman’s second claim—that his Arkansas burglary convictions do not qualify under Guidelines’ enumerated-of- fenses clause—presents more detailed factual and legal ques- tions. His argument takes aim at the Arkansas burglary statute in effect when he was convicted in 1986 and 1987, arguing it does not qualify for federal sentencing enhance- ments. A state crime may qualify as a predicate conviction for federal sentencing purposes “only if the elements of the state crime mirror, or are narrower than, the elements of the ge- neric crime.” United States v. Elder, 900 F.3d 491, 501 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). When Shipman was sentenced, the enumerated-offenses clause listed “burglary of a dwelling” as one of several offenses constituting a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ career-offender provisions. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The Supreme Court defines “generic burglary” as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). The Arkansas burglary statute, however, included vehicles as “occupiable structures.” See Julian v. State, 298 Ark. 302, 303 (1989) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-101 (1987)). Because the Arkansas burglary statute included vehicles, Shipman argues it was not generic and therefore does not qualify as a crime of violence. 5

5Shipman cites a series of Supreme Court decisions to support this proposition: United States v. Stitt, 139 S.Ct. 399 (2018) (addressing the scope 10 No. 17-3476

The government responds that all viable bases for Shipman to attack a career-offender designation under the enumerated-offenses clause were available at sentencing and within the one-year limitations period of § 2255(f)(1). The government also argues there has been no change in the law since then to justify Shipman’s reliance on § 2255(f)(3). But in this case, without an explanation of the career-offender designation, it is unclear how Shipman could object to that categorization. Although this appeal has narrowed the issues, the record does not “conclusively show” that Shipman “is entitled to no relief” on his claims, so remand is warranted for further find- ings on these questions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Given the state of the record, we express no opinion on the merits of Shipman’s claims, reserving that for the district court to evaluate and decide in the first instance. III. CONCLUSION Because our decision in Cross negates the underpinnings of the district court’s dismissal, we VACATE the district court’s order dismissing Shipman’s petition and REMAND the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

of generic burglary); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016) (“[A] state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense.”); see id. at 2250, 2257 (con- cluding that defendant’s prior burglary convictions cannot give rise to ACCA’s sentence enhancement because the elements of Iowa's burglary law, which includes entries into vehicles, are broader than those of generic burglary, which is limited to unlawful entry into a “building or other structure”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 (defining “generic burglary”).