Traci K. Stevenson v. Corporation of Lloyd's

668 F. App'x 880
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 19, 2016
Docket16-10704
StatusUnpublished

This text of 668 F. App'x 880 (Traci K. Stevenson v. Corporation of Lloyd's) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Traci K. Stevenson v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 668 F. App'x 880 (11th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

In this bankruptcy appeal, Traci Stevenson, as Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Nasser and Wendy Ayyoub, challenges the October 1, 2015 order of the bankruptcy court, later affirmed by the district court on February 10, 2016, dismissing with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, her second amended complaint, which charged, as relevant here, common law breach of insurance contract. Stevenson claims that these courts erred because Lloyd’s Corporation and its relevant syndicates and subscribers (collectively, the “Insurers”) are obligated to provide insurance coverage for claims arising out of the sale of alcohol to a minor on February 28, 2008 pursuant to a one-page binder that was issued by the Insurers on February 18, 2008. After thorough review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm for the reasons detailed by the bankruptcy court in its oral ruling on September 24, 2015.

As we see it, the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that, under Florida’s longstanding common law merger doctrine, the binder merged with the terms and conditions of the full insurance policy that was issued on March 6, 2008 (the “2008 Policy”). Under the common law rule, if a binder was in effect at the time of loss, the exclusions in the forthcoming policy could preclude coverage even though the policy had not yet been issued. See 1A Couch on Ins. § 13:8. No Florida statute clearly and unequivocally departs from this longstanding common law rule. Since the binder merges with the 2008 Policy, the terms and conditions of the 2008 Policy must be applied to the claims arising out of the sale of alcohol on February 28, 2008.

What’s more, we agree with the bankruptcy court that Stevenson’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that prevents identical parties from relit-igating the same issues that have already *881 been decided. See Mobil Oil Corp. v, Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977). The central issue in this case — whether the Insurers owe coverage under the terms of the 2008 Policy — was already decided in a 2010 declaratory judgment action, where the district court earlier held that, under the terms of the 2008 Policy, the Insurers had no obligation to defend or indemnify the debtors or their employees based on the liquor liability exclusion contained in the Policy. [DE 69 Ex. R.] Stevenson is not entitled to another bite at that apple.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin
354 So. 2d 372 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
668 F. App'x 880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/traci-k-stevenson-v-corporation-of-lloyds-ca11-2016.