Toyota v. United States

268 U.S. 402, 45 S. Ct. 563, 69 L. Ed. 1016, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 579
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 25, 1925
Docket231
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 268 U.S. 402 (Toyota v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 45 S. Ct. 563, 69 L. Ed. 1016, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 579 (1925).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Hidemitsu Toyota, a person of the Japanese race, born in Japan, entered -the United States in 1913. He served .substantially-all-the time between November of that year and May, 1923, in the United States Coast Guard Service. This was a part of the naval force of the United States nearly ail of the'time the United States was engaged in the recent war. He received eight, or more honorable discharges, arid, some óf therii were for service during the war. May 14, 1921, he filed his petition for naturalization in the United States district court for the district of Massachusetts. The petition was granted, and a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. This case arises on a petition to cancel the certificate -on the ground that *407 it was illegally procured. § 15, Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, 601. It is agreed that if a person of the Japanese race, born in Japan, may legally be naturalized under the seventh subdivision of § 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended by the Act of May 9, 1918, c. 69, 40 Stat. 542, or under the Act of July 19, 1919, c. 24, 41 Stat. 222, Toyota is legally naturalized. The district court held he was- not entitled to be naturalized, and entered a decree canceling his certificate of citizenship. 290 Fed. 971. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that court under § 239, Judiciál Code, certified to this court. the following questions: (1) Whether a person of the Japanese race, born in Japan, may legally be naturalized under the seventh subdivision of § 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended by the Act of May 9, 1918, and (2) whether such subject may legally be naturalized under the Act of July 19, 1919. The material provisions of these enactments are printed in the margin. *

*408 Until 1870, only aliens being free white persons were eligible to citizenship. In that year,, aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent were made eligible. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 192. The substance of prior legislation is expressed in § 2169, Revised Statutes, which is: “ The provisions of this Title [Naturalization] shall apply to aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” A person of the Japanese race, born in Japan, is not eligible under that section. Ozawa v. United States, supra, 198.

It has. long been the rule that in ordér tó be .admitted to citizenship, an alien is required, at least two years prior to his admission, to declare his intention to become a citizen, and to show that he has resided continuously in the United States for at least five years immediately preceding his admission. Revised Statues, §§ 2165, 2170; *409 subd. 1, § 4, c. 3592, 34. Stat. 596. But at different timés, as to specially designated aliens serving in the armed forces of the United States, Congress modified and lessened these requirements. § 2166, Revised Statutes (Act of July 17, 1862, § 21, c. 200, 12 Stat. 594, 597); Act of July 26, 1894, c. 165, 28 Stat. 123, 124; Act of June 30, 1914, c. 130, 38 Stat. 392, 395. In each of the first two of these acts,, the-phrase “any alien” is used'as a part of the description of the. person for whose benefit the act was passed. In the last, the language is “ any alien . . . who may, under existing law, become a citizen, of the United States.” Prior to this act, it had been held .that the phrase “ any alien,” used in the earlier acts, did not enlarge the classes defined in § 2169, In re Buntaro Kumagai, (1908) 163 Eed. 922; In re Knight, (1909) 171 Fed. 299; Bessho v. United States, (1910) 178. Fed. 245; In re Alverto, (1912) 198 Fed. 688. The language used in the Act of 1914 merely expresses what was implied in the earlier provisions.

The seventh subdivision of § 4, of the act of 1918, per-: mits “ any native-born Filipino ” or “ any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the United States ” belonging respectively to the classes there described, on presentation of the required declaration of intention,, to pen tition for naturalization without proof of five years’ residence within the United States; and the act permits “ any alien ” serving in the forces of the United. States “ during the timé this country is engaged in the present, war ” to file his petition for naturalization without making the preliminary declaration of intention and without proof of five years’ residence in the United States. The act of. 1919 gave “ any person of foreign birth ” there mentioned," the benefits of the seventh subdivision of § 4. Evidently, a principal purpose of these acts was to facilitate the naturalization of service-men of the classes specified, there is hothing to show an intention to eliminate from the *410 definition of eligibility in § 2169 the distinction based on color or face. Nor is there anything to indicate that, if the seventh subdivision stood .alone, the words “ any alien ” should be taken to mean more than did the same words when used in the acts of 1862 and 1894. But § 2 of the act of 1918 provides that nothing in the act shall repeal or in any way enlarge § 2169 except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this Act and under the limitation therein defined.” This .implies some enlargement of § 2169 in respect of color and race; but it also indicates a purpose.not to eliminate all distinction based on color .and race so long continued in the naturalization laws. If it was intended to make such change and to extend the privilege of naturalization to all races, the provision of § 2 so limiting the enlargement of § 2169 would be inappropriate. And if the phrase “ any .alien ” in the seventh subdivision is-read literally, the qualifying words “ being free white persons ” and of African nativity ” in § 2169 are without significance. See In re Para, 269 Fed. 643, 646; Petition of Charr, 273 Fed. 207, 213.

When the act of 1918 was passed, it was doubtful whether § 30 of the act of 1908 extended , the privilége of naturalization to all citizens "of the Philippine Islands. They were held eligible for naturalization in In re Bautista, 245 Fed. 765, and in In re Mallari, 239 Fed. 416. And see 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 12. They were held not eligible in In re Alverto, 198 Fed. 688, in In re Lampitoe, 232 Fed. 382, and in In re Rallos, 241 Fed. 686. But we hold that until the passage, of that act, Filipinos not heing “ free white persons ” or “ of African nativity ” were not eligible, and that the effect of the act of 1918 was to make eligible, and to.authorize the naturalization of, nativebom Filipinos of whatever color or race having the qualifications specified in the seventh subdivision of § 4.

Under the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, December 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, Congress *411

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Bluebook (online)
268 U.S. 402, 45 S. Ct. 563, 69 L. Ed. 1016, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toyota-v-united-states-scotus-1925.