Toyo Tire Corporation v. Atturo Tire Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedFebruary 9, 2021
Docket1:14-cv-00206
StatusUnknown

This text of Toyo Tire Corporation v. Atturo Tire Corporation (Toyo Tire Corporation v. Atturo Tire Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Toyo Tire Corporation v. Atturo Tire Corporation, (N.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

TOYO TIRE CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 14-cv-00206 v. Judge Mary M. Rowland ATTURO TIRE CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Toyo Tire Corporation and Toyo Tire U.S.A. Corp. (collectively, “Toyo”), brought this action against Defendants Atturo Tire Corporation (“Atturo”) and Svizz- One Corporation Ltd. (“Svizz-One”) asserting a number of claims including that Defendants infringed the trade dress on Toyo’s Open Country Mountain Tires (“OPMT” tires). The allegedly infringing tire is Atturo’s Trail Blade M/T. Atturo responded with seven counterclaims. Toyo and Atturo have both filed motions for summary judgment. Atturo moves for summary judgment on the issues of trade dress functionality, secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion. Atturo requests a finding that it is not liable for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act or for violation of the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act. For the reasons stated below, Atturo’s motion [619] is granted.1

1 Toyo’s summary judgment motion [606] is addressed in a concurrently issued opinion. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted). The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court “must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). When cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, the Court construes all facts

and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion was filed. Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 849 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court treats the motions separately. Marcatante v. City of Chi., 657 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 416 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Each cross movant for summary judgment bears a respective burden to show no issue of material fact with respect to the claim.”).

BACKGROUND2 I. Relevant Procedural History

Toyo filed this lawsuit against Atturo and Svizz-One in January 2014, alleging design patent infringement and trade dress infringement and dilution. (Dkt. 1). Atturo responded to Toyo’s complaint with seven counterclaims. (Dkt. 39). Toyo’s remaining claims against Atturo and Svizz-One are for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and violation of the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510/1, et. seq. (“IDTPA”) (Dkt. 1, Cts. II & VI). Toyo’s other claims were dismissed with prejudice in 2014 and 2017. (see Dkts. 26, 38, 384).

2 The facts cited are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Atturo’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts in support of its motion for summary judgment as to functionality (Dkt. 619-2) is abbreviated as “DSOF Function.” Atturo’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts as to secondary meaning (Dkt. 619-3) is abbreviated as “DSOF Sec. Mean.” Toyo responded to these statements of fact at Dkt. 629 and Dkt. 633 respectively. Toyo’s Statement of Additional Facts (“TSAF”) is at Dkt. 637. Atturo responded to Toyo’s additional facts at Dkt. 652-1. The Court also incorporates by reference facts in the background section in its concurrently entered opinion ruling on Toyo’s summary judgment motion. On July 23, 2018, this Court granted Atturo’s motion for sanctions, barring Toyo from asserting that the trade dress is the two-dimensional surface layer of the tread blocks.3 (Dkt. 502). Instead the Court limited Toyo to the trade dress it had disclosed

during fact discovery: “the overall visual appearance and impression conveyed by the commercial Open Country M/T tire tread design,” the elements of which were “the three-dimensional shoulder blocks, center blocks, grooves, stone ejectors, and sipes of the OPMT tread.” (Id.; DSOF Function. ¶¶5-6). The Court’s sanctions order limiting Toyo to the three-dimensional version of its product design led to the Court’s Daubert ruling excluding the opinions of Toyo experts Michael Rappeport [405], Larry

Chiagouris [411], and Charles Patrick [413] who had each opined about a two- dimensional version of the trade dress. (Dkt. 564).4 II. Atturo’s Motion

Atturo’s summary judgment motion requests that the Court find as a matter of law that (1) Toyo’s asserted OPMT trade dress is functional; (2) Toyo’s asserted trade dress did not acquire secondary meaning by the time Atturo began using its allegedly infringing Trail Blade M/T tire in 2012; and (3) there is not a likelihood of confusion as to the source or affiliation of Atturo’s Trail Blade M/T tire. Atturo moves for

3 The Court found that Toyo asserted this two-dimensional trade dress for the first time during expert discovery after its three-dimensional trade dress was only articulated after several court orders requiring Toyo to do so. (See Dkt. 502, describing the procedural history of establishing what the trade dress actually is in this case in painstaking detail).

4 This order assumes familiarity with the Court’s Daubert ruling. The Court also granted in part and denied in part Toyo’s Daubert motion as to Atturo expert Aric Rindfleisch [416], denied in large part the motion as to Jeffrey Stec [417], and denied the motion as to Joseph Walter [419]. summary judgment on all of these elements but argues that each is dispositive on its own. (Dkt. 619-1 at 19). Toyo does not dispute that each of these elements is dispositive on its own. (Dkt. 648 at 11). However, Toyo responds that Atturo’s motion

should be denied because Toyo has protectable trade dress rights in its OPMT tire and Atturo infringed those rights.

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Toyo Tire Corporation v. Atturo Tire Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toyo-tire-corporation-v-atturo-tire-corporation-ilnd-2021.