Toy Biz, Inc. v. United States

19 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 831, 22 C.I.T. 831, 20 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1948, 1998 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 118
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 20, 1998
DocketSlip Op. 98-121. Court No. 94-05-00257
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 19 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (Toy Biz, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Toy Biz, Inc. v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 831, 22 C.I.T. 831, 20 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1948, 1998 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 118 (cit 1998).

Opinion

Opinion

AQUILINO, Judge.

This case contests denial by the U.S. Customs Service of duty-free entry for merchandise it classified under subheading 9503.49.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (1992) as “Toys representing animals ...: ... Other”. The plaintiff claims that duties at the rate of 6.8 percent ad valorem should not have been demanded (and paid) in view of subheading 9902.95.02, which at the time exempted

Stuffed or filled toys representing animals or non-human creatures, not having a spring mechanism and not exceeding 63.5 cm in either length, width, or height (provided for in subheading 9503.41.10 or 9503.49.00)[.]

I

The parties take the position that there are no material facts as to which there is a genuine issue to be tried within the meaning of CIT Rule 56 and have therefore interposed cross-motions for summary judgment. Jurisdiction over this case is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) and § 2631 et seq., and in the exercise thereof the court has reviewed their submissions, including plaintiffs item and its retail package 1 emblazoned in color with pictures and the name “Ralf!™ The Barking Dog”, and concurs that trial is not necessary. Any disagreements can be resolved via the cross-motions, which posit substantive issues that are essentially legal in nature. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363 (1998), and the cases cited therein.

Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs statement of material facts describes Ralf as

made of white thick fur-like textile material. Its body, legs and tail are made of this white material. It has brown pads on all four feet. Its ears are made of black fur-like material. It has one black eye, a black muzzle, and a red bandana. The muzzle is fitted with a mechanical noisemaker which, when squeezed sharply, emits a “barking” noise that sounds somewhat like “rrralf.” It has a horizontal slit across the abdomen, where a hand can be inserted to make RALF bark and/or move its head like a puppet. Unlike a puppet, however, the inserted hand cannot manipulate any of its limbs, since there is no opening from the cavity to the limbs. In addition, the limbs are stuffed to distention with a nonwoven polyester fiberfill type of material.

The defendant responds as follows:

Admits ¶ 5, sentences 1-6 and 9. With respect to ¶ 5, sentence 7, admits that the abdomen has a horizontal opening which leads to the hollow torso, neck and head areas. Avers that this opening allows a hand, arm and elbow to fit inside Ralfs body and a hand to fit up in Ralfs head to move or manipulate his head, body and *1130 mouth like a puppet, and make him bark (by squeezing the sound mechanism located in the muzzle cavity), but denies the remainder of sentence 7. With respect to ¶ 5, sentence 8, admits that the hand cannot be inserted into the ... limbs, since there is no opening from the body and head cavities to the limbs, but denies the remainder of sentence 8. Avers that Ralf has wrap-around arms which wrap around the puppeteer (user), eliminating the need for a stage, and facilitating movement with the puppet in any setting.

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts, para. 5 (emphasis in original).

These characteristics and plaintiffs plea for duty-free treatment under the HTSUS subheading 9902.95.02 quoted above have engendered three issues for resolution herein, to wit, the meanings of “stuffed” and “filled”, plus Ralf’s essential measurements.

A

The plaintiff contends that Ralf is indeed classifiable under HTSUS subheading 9503.49.00, but also under 9503.41.10 (“Stuffed toys”). Customs does not concur as to that alternative section. See, e.g., id., para. 6. The parties do agree, however, that the term stuffed is not defined in the HTSUS. See id. and Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts, paras. 8. In such a circumstance, a court will “normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138, reh’g denied, 509 U.S. 940, 114 S.Ct. 13, 125 L.Ed.2d 765 (1993), citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). And that meaning often can be discerned from dictionaries and other lexicons. Stuffed is the past participle of the verb stuff, which has been defined by one such resource to mean, among other things,

to fill (a receptacle) to fullness or distention by packing things in: CRAM ... to fill (as one’s stomach) to fullness ... to fill (as a cushion or ticking) with a soft material or padding ... to fill out the skin of (an animal or bird) for mounting ... to fill (as a hole or opening) by packing in material ...[J

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, p. 2269 (1981). Another, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 2403 (1930), indicates to stuff is

to fill with material specially prepared for such use; as, to stuffs, cushion; to stuff a fowl for cooking.... In taxidermy, to fill out with suitable material (the skin of a bird or beast), and arrange so as to make a lifelike form.

As set forth above, the parties agree, and the court finds, that only Ralf’s limbs are fully stuffed to distention. Indeed, were he completely stuffed á la the skin of a taxidermized bird or beast, Ralf could not be animated by hand in the manner intended by his creator. Be that as it may, given the lack of complete stuffing, the plaintiff commissioned a former chief of the U.S. Customs Technical Branch, Office of Laboratories & Scientific Services, to examine Ralf. The resultant “Analysis of a Hand Puppet to Determine the Percent by Weight and by Volume of the ‘Stuffed’ Versus ‘Not Stuffed’ Portions to Determine ‘Essential Character’ ” 2 is part of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

. The court has perused this submission and accepts its findings that 63.5 percent of Ralf is stuffed by weight and 70.7 percent by volume. Nevertheless, the court cannot, and therefore does not, concur with the report’s conclusion that,

[bjeeause the stuffed portion of Ralf constitutes the predominant “bulk, quantity, (and) weight” of his components, and because his long, huggable forelegs play a predominant “role ... in relation to the use of the goods,” we can see no other conclusion than to consider Ralf to be stuffed for tariff purposes.

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19 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 831, 22 C.I.T. 831, 20 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1948, 1998 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toy-biz-inc-v-united-states-cit-1998.