Township of Washington v. Coler

51 F. 362, 2 C.C.A. 272, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1365
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit·Decided July 5, 1892·No. No. 83·Published

Opinion

Sanborn, Circuit Judge,

after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.'

The act recited iu the bonds (chapter 107, Daws Kan. 1876, under which these bonds were issued) gave the authority to and imposed the duty on the county commissioners of determining whether the various provisions of the act and the various terms of the proposition adopted had been complied with before they issued the bonds. They did determine that there had been a full compliance with these terms and provisions. and so recited in the bonds, and it is conceded by counsel for the defendant that it is estopped by these recitals, as against the plaintiffs, to claim that the bonds are invalid on any other ground than that-upon their face they appear to have been issued in violation of some constitutional or statutory restriction. Chaffee Co. v. Potter, 142 U. S. 355-364, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; Town of Coloma, v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 491; Lake Co. v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674-681, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654.

[366] It is not claimed that these.bonds were issued in violation of any restriction of" the constitution, and the only provision of statute which is claimed to so restrict the power of the board of county commissioners to issue these bonds as to make them void is the clause contained in section 14 of the act, which reads as follows: “And to the said bonds shall be-attached coupons for annual installments of the principal and interest accruing from time to time by the terms of said bonds.” If this clause contained the only reference in the law to the time when these bonds should mature, there might be some force in the defendant’s contention, but the entire law must be considered, and the intent of the legislature drawn, not from a single clause, but from the entire body of the act. When this is done, the claim of the defendant is seen to be utterly without foundation. Section 13 of the act expressly provides that the principal of the bonds “shall be made payable at any time that may he fixed in tine proposition voted upon, not exceeding thirty years from their date.” Section 2 provides that the petition for the submission of the proposition to subscribe for stock shall state the terms of payment” therefor. Section 3 provides that these terms of payment shall be submitted to the vote of the people as a part of the proposition. Section 5 provides -that, if the proposition is carried by the vote of the people, the county commissioners shall cause such bonds, with such coupons attached, as may be required “by the terms of said proposition” to be issued. Doubtless a proposition might have been submitted and carried to issue bonds which should provide for the payment of annual installments of the principal, hut the terms of the proposition actually submitted and carried did not so provide, but provided for the issuance of bonds whose principal should be due in 30 years from their date, and in view of the express provision of section 13, that the principal “shall be made payable at any time that may be fixed in the proposition voted upon, not exceeding thirty years from date,” it is very clear that the clause in section 14, that “to the said bonds shall be attached coupons for annual installments of the principal and the interest accruing from time to time by the terms of said bonds,” cannot be held to mean more than that if the proposition submitted and the terms of the bonds issued in compliance therewith provide for the payment of the principal in annual installments, then coupons for such installments shall be attached to the bonds; and, as neither the proposition nor the terms of the bonds in this case did require the payment of any installments of the principal before the entire principal became due, no such coupons were necessar)*-, and this clause had no application to these bonds.

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Township of Washington v. Coler, 51 F. 362, 2 C.C.A. 272, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1365 (8th Cir. 1892).

51 F. 362 (Township of Washington v. Coler) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Lake County v. Graham
130 U.S. 674 (Supreme Court, 1889)
Chaffee County v. Potter
142 U.S. 355 (Supreme Court, 1892)