Townshend v. Duncan
This text of 2 Md. Ch. 45 (Townshend v. Duncan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering High Court of Chancery of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Bland, Chancellor.
The defendants William J. B. Duncan and Caroline Duncan, and Joseph Robinson, having been returned summoned, and not having appeared, or filed their answers within the time allowed by the rules of the court, it is Decreed, that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, but as it does not appear to what relief they are entitled, it is Ordered, that a commission issue to such person as the complainants may name to take testimony to ascertain to what they are entitled,
The plaintiffs, by their petition, stated, that the defendant Thomas Iglehart, had died since the commencement of this suit; and that administration de bonis non upon the estate of the testator William Duncan, had been granted to John Iglehart. Whereupon they prayed that he might be accordingly summoned as a defendant.
8th March, 1827.
Ordered, that the said John Iglehart, be, and he is hereby made a party defendant, as prayed; and he is hereby directed to be summoned accordingly, to appear on the 10th day of April next; provided, that the summons be served as the law requires, on or before the twentieth instant.
After which, John Iglehart having been summoned, and having failed to appear and answer, a decree was, on the 20th of December, 1827, passed against him similar to that of the 6th of December, 1826. Under which decrees a commission was issued, in execution and return of which, the commissioners said that the solicitor of the plaintiff had produced and filed a certified copy of the last will and testament of William Duncan, which together with the commission, he returned and filed, on the 31st of Decem[48]*48her, 1827. No other testimony was taken or returned with that commission.
On the 24th of January, 1828, the infant defendants put in their answer, by their guardian ad litem, in which they said, that they knew nothing of the contents of the bill; nor could they admit them; but prayed that they might be proved, and that their interests might be protected.
21st February, 1828.
This case standing ready for hearing, and having been submitted, the proceedings were read and considered.
The law of a case arises out of the facts of which it is constituted, and it is the duty of the court to declare what that law is. It is therefore not only unnecessary, but, in some cases it may be deemed impertinent, in a suitor to set forth, and comment upon what he conceives to be the law arising out of his case. To do so, without stating all the facts, or upon an imperfect statement of facts ; as for example, to charge a defendant with fraud, without stating any such facts, as in contemplation of law, constitute a fraud, can form no foundation for relief or defence. It is sufficient that each party should state the facts of his own case; and therefore, although it is not unusual for a plaintiff to state in his bill, by way of anticipation, some of the allegations and pretences of the defendant; it is not indispensably necessary, in any case, or even proper in all cases, to set forth any matter in the bill, which if brought out at all, should come from the defendant as constituting a part or the entire foundation of his defence. But, it is essential that the plaintiff should distinctly state every fact necessary to constitute such a case as gives him a right to claim relief from the defendant at the time of filing his bill; and moreover, to set forth those peculiar circumstances which justify him in passing by the ordinary tribunals of the common law, and coming into a Court of Equity to seek that relief. The plaintiff may state his case in the alternative, or with a double aspect, so 'that it may be considered in one way, or in another; provided, that in whatever way it is presented, it falls properly within the cognizance of a Court of Equity. Upon a case, so stated, the plaintiff may either pray for special or for general relief; or he may make both special and general prayers for relief. And where the nature of the case is such, that the special prayer or designated relief cannot be granted; then, under the general prayer, relief may be granted, suitable to the peculiar nature of the case; as to which the court [49]*49is not confined to that which may be specially asked or suggested, orally or otherwise; but may adapt the relief exactly to the nature of the case stated in the bill, regardless of any thing that may be said to the contrary by any of the parties. But if there be no general prayer, and the special prayer cannot be granted, the plaintiff must amend his bill or have it dismissed,
Before a decree can be so correctly framed as to suit the peculiar nature of the case now under consideration, the court must be furnished with some further information, and with some statements by way of illustration of the bearings of the allegations of the bill. But no case can be sent to the auditor for any such purposes, where there is no ground for relief shewn by the pleadings, or where the facts as stated in the bill, do not, of themselves, exhibit a sufficient foundation for some relief, either under the special or the general prayer,
The facts of which the plaintiffs have constituted their case, are these : William Duncan, being seized and possessed, in fee simple, of a parcel of land, containing two hundred and twenty-nine acres and a half, by his last will devised it to his two infant children, the defendants William and Caroline, and their heirs forever as joint tenants; and to his daughter Anna Maria, now the wife of the plaintiff Perry Townshend, he bequeathed an annuity of sixty dollars, to be paid to her out of the rents and profits of his real estate above mentioned, annually during her life; and appointed his wife Deborah, the mother of the defendants William and Caroline, his executrix; that the testator died in March, 1819; and the executrix Deborah, administered upon his estate, and paid to the plaintiff Anna Maria, her annuity for one year; after which the executrix Deborah died, and administration de bonis non was thereupon granted to Thomas Iglehart; that the defendant Robin[50]*50son, who is the guardian of the infant defendants William and Caroline, had also paid to the plaintiff Anna Maria, her annuity for one year, under the will of her father. But, that those defendants have failed and refused to pay any more of the annuity to her, either before, or since her intermarriage; and that the defendant Thomas Iglehart having died since the filing of the bill, and administration de bonis non having been granted to John Iglehart, he had been summoned as a defendant, and the suit had been revived against him accordingly.
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Bland, Chancellor.
The defendants William J. B. Duncan and Caroline Duncan, and Joseph Robinson, having been returned summoned, and not having appeared, or filed their answers within the time allowed by the rules of the court, it is Decreed, that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, but as it does not appear to what relief they are entitled, it is Ordered, that a commission issue to such person as the complainants may name to take testimony to ascertain to what they are entitled,
The plaintiffs, by their petition, stated, that the defendant Thomas Iglehart, had died since the commencement of this suit; and that administration de bonis non upon the estate of the testator William Duncan, had been granted to John Iglehart. Whereupon they prayed that he might be accordingly summoned as a defendant.
8th March, 1827.
Ordered, that the said John Iglehart, be, and he is hereby made a party defendant, as prayed; and he is hereby directed to be summoned accordingly, to appear on the 10th day of April next; provided, that the summons be served as the law requires, on or before the twentieth instant.
After which, John Iglehart having been summoned, and having failed to appear and answer, a decree was, on the 20th of December, 1827, passed against him similar to that of the 6th of December, 1826. Under which decrees a commission was issued, in execution and return of which, the commissioners said that the solicitor of the plaintiff had produced and filed a certified copy of the last will and testament of William Duncan, which together with the commission, he returned and filed, on the 31st of Decem[48]*48her, 1827. No other testimony was taken or returned with that commission.
On the 24th of January, 1828, the infant defendants put in their answer, by their guardian ad litem, in which they said, that they knew nothing of the contents of the bill; nor could they admit them; but prayed that they might be proved, and that their interests might be protected.
21st February, 1828.
This case standing ready for hearing, and having been submitted, the proceedings were read and considered.
The law of a case arises out of the facts of which it is constituted, and it is the duty of the court to declare what that law is. It is therefore not only unnecessary, but, in some cases it may be deemed impertinent, in a suitor to set forth, and comment upon what he conceives to be the law arising out of his case. To do so, without stating all the facts, or upon an imperfect statement of facts ; as for example, to charge a defendant with fraud, without stating any such facts, as in contemplation of law, constitute a fraud, can form no foundation for relief or defence. It is sufficient that each party should state the facts of his own case; and therefore, although it is not unusual for a plaintiff to state in his bill, by way of anticipation, some of the allegations and pretences of the defendant; it is not indispensably necessary, in any case, or even proper in all cases, to set forth any matter in the bill, which if brought out at all, should come from the defendant as constituting a part or the entire foundation of his defence. But, it is essential that the plaintiff should distinctly state every fact necessary to constitute such a case as gives him a right to claim relief from the defendant at the time of filing his bill; and moreover, to set forth those peculiar circumstances which justify him in passing by the ordinary tribunals of the common law, and coming into a Court of Equity to seek that relief. The plaintiff may state his case in the alternative, or with a double aspect, so 'that it may be considered in one way, or in another; provided, that in whatever way it is presented, it falls properly within the cognizance of a Court of Equity. Upon a case, so stated, the plaintiff may either pray for special or for general relief; or he may make both special and general prayers for relief. And where the nature of the case is such, that the special prayer or designated relief cannot be granted; then, under the general prayer, relief may be granted, suitable to the peculiar nature of the case; as to which the court [49]*49is not confined to that which may be specially asked or suggested, orally or otherwise; but may adapt the relief exactly to the nature of the case stated in the bill, regardless of any thing that may be said to the contrary by any of the parties. But if there be no general prayer, and the special prayer cannot be granted, the plaintiff must amend his bill or have it dismissed,
Before a decree can be so correctly framed as to suit the peculiar nature of the case now under consideration, the court must be furnished with some further information, and with some statements by way of illustration of the bearings of the allegations of the bill. But no case can be sent to the auditor for any such purposes, where there is no ground for relief shewn by the pleadings, or where the facts as stated in the bill, do not, of themselves, exhibit a sufficient foundation for some relief, either under the special or the general prayer,
The facts of which the plaintiffs have constituted their case, are these : William Duncan, being seized and possessed, in fee simple, of a parcel of land, containing two hundred and twenty-nine acres and a half, by his last will devised it to his two infant children, the defendants William and Caroline, and their heirs forever as joint tenants; and to his daughter Anna Maria, now the wife of the plaintiff Perry Townshend, he bequeathed an annuity of sixty dollars, to be paid to her out of the rents and profits of his real estate above mentioned, annually during her life; and appointed his wife Deborah, the mother of the defendants William and Caroline, his executrix; that the testator died in March, 1819; and the executrix Deborah, administered upon his estate, and paid to the plaintiff Anna Maria, her annuity for one year; after which the executrix Deborah died, and administration de bonis non was thereupon granted to Thomas Iglehart; that the defendant Robin[50]*50son, who is the guardian of the infant defendants William and Caroline, had also paid to the plaintiff Anna Maria, her annuity for one year, under the will of her father. But, that those defendants have failed and refused to pay any more of the annuity to her, either before, or since her intermarriage; and that the defendant Thomas Iglehart having died since the filing of the bill, and administration de bonis non having been granted to John Iglehart, he had been summoned as a defendant, and the suit had been revived against him accordingly.
Upon these facts the plaintiffs have prayed for an account; that the land might be sold; and that the proceeds thereof might be applied to the payment of their annuity with costs, and the balance so invested as to stand as an available fund to meet future instalments of said annuity; or, that such other relief might be given to them as to the court might seem meet.
It will be seen by adverting to the will of William Duncan deceased, that he has expressly declared, that the annuity should be paid out of the rents and profits of the estate; thus unequivocally shewing it to have been his intention, that it should be charged altogether and exclusively upon that estate; and that his personalty should be in no way liable
The subject claimed by these plaintiffs is an annuity charged upon, and payable out of the rents and profits of a certain real estate; which real estate, so charged, was devised to these infant defendants William and Caroline. These facts are sufficiently stated in the bill, and are more fully shewn by the last will of the testator, which is exhibited as a part of it. The bill further states, that after the death of the testator, Deborah, who was the mother of the infant defendants William and Caroline, paid the plaintiff Anna Maria one year’s annuity; and that the defendant Robinson, who is their guardian, also paid the plaintiff Anna Maria one year’s annuity, under her father’s will. Here then is a sufficient statement of the fact, that these infant defendants, by their mother, and afterwards by their legal guardian, took the real estate so devised to them; and actually, in consequence thereof, paid a part of the annuity so charged upon it.
[51]*51The bill, it is true, does not allege that the devisees, or their guardian, received the rents and profits of the land charged with the payment of the annuity. But no such allegation by the plaintiffs was necessary; since it was enough for them to have shewn, that the devisees actually took the estate as devised. If they derived no profit from it, it was their own fault; and a matter with which the plaintiffs could have no concern. If the estate charged was wholly insufficient to pay the annuity, they should have disclaimed all right to it; or the fact should have been, in some way, put upon the record by the defendants; which has not been done. But, according to the common law, the mother, as guardian, has an interest in, and is bound to take charge of her wards’ estate,
[52]*52But the plaintiffs are here asking a Court of Equity to enforce the payment of this annuity — an annuity, given by a will, is, for [53]*53many purposes treated as a legacy, and so considered, its payment may certainly be enforced in equity,
It appearing then, that these plaintiffs have just grounds to ask relief of this court; and that, therefore, the case may be referred to the auditor, for any purpose falling within the scope of its duty; the next inquiry is, as to the mode in which they should be relieved. In making this inquiry, it must be recollected, that this is a case of provisions for children, which admits, perhaps, of a greater variety of determinations, and of judgment on circumstances, than any other kind of case, that can be brought before a Court of Equity;
It may be, that this real estate is, in truth, of much less, or of no greater value than the annuity with which it is charged. In that case, it would be thus shewn to have been the intention of the testator, who must have known the value of his estate, to give to the plaintiff, Anna Maria, a life interest in it; or that, whatever might have been his intention, his express direction would be [55]*55carried into effect, most beneficially for all concerned, by a sale. But if, on the other hand, it should appear, that the annual value of the land was greatly more than sufficient to pay the annuity, then it may fairly be inferred, that the testator could not have intended, that the estate should be sold; but as the annuity might, so it should, as expressly directed, be raised out of the rents and profits.
The mode of making such inquiries, and of obtaining information, in cases like this, by a reference to a master, is common and well settled in England; but here, as this court has now no officer belonging to it denominated, a Master in Chancery, I deem it proper in this, the first case of the kind which has been brought before me, to take such a comprehensive view of the office of the auditor, as may enable me to see how far the powers and duties of a master in chancery in England, in making all such special investigations, have devolved or been conferred upon the auditor here, in addition to those with which he has been expressly clothed by the act of assembly under which he is appointed.
In England, the officers called masters in chancery, are assistants and associates to the Chancellor; and two of them at a time, by turns, usually sit with him in court. They have the power to administer oaths, take affidavits, and acknowledgments of deeds, recognizances, &c.
In general, there is no question of law or equity, or disputed fact, respecting which, a master may not be called upon to make a report;
Besides these masters in chancery, there are other standing officers of the Court of Chancery of England, whose duties are, in some respects, similar to those of masters, called Examiners, who are appointed by the master of the rolls. The office of the examiners is to examine, upon oath, the witnesses on both sides, that are brought before them in any case, as also parties in contempt ; and to put their answers and depositions in writing; which they are to keep close and private until publication. But if the witnesses reside more than twenty miles from the place where the court is held, then a commission issues to certain commissioners, nominated by the parties, who are authorized and directed, to take the depositions of such witnesses in private; which are returned and kept secret, until an order of publication is passed. The examination of witnesses was originally in chancery before the master of the rolls, who'was one of the judges of the court; and therefore, such examinations now by a master, by an examiner, or by commissioners,. must be considered as a delegation, by the court, of a part of its authority to them.
[58]*58Considering the nature of the office and duty of a master in chancery, and recollecting, that the practice and course of proceeding of the Court of Chancery of England, had been generally adopted and followed by the Court of Chancery of Maryland,
It appears, that until some time after the year 1699, when the seat of government was removed to Annapolis, the High Court of Chancery, which was directed to be held at the same place,
It appears, that there were a number of officers called assistants, masters in chancery, examiners or auditors, appointed to assist the court in the discharge of its various functions. And, for some time, two of those masters were appointed, as in England, to sit, by turns, in court with the Chancellor as his assistants, during each term.
In England, a master in chancery, and an examiner, are distinct officers; but it appears, that here, the powers and duties of the two offices were, by a commission from the Chancellor, conferred upon the same person, who was expressly invested with all powers and authorities, practised or exercised by any such officer of the Court of Chancery of England,
The legislature of the republic has authorized the Chancellor to appoint, during his pleasure, a person of integrity, judgment and skill in accounts to be auditor for the Court of Chancery; and has also declared, that all accounts directed by the Chancellor to he stated, shall he referred for such purpose to the auditor, who shall have authority to administer an oath to all witnesses, and persons proper to be examined upon such account; and shall state such accounts agreeably to the order of the Chancellor, and return the same, to he done with as the Chancellor shall think just.
But there is nothing in that, or in any other legislative enactment which either expressly, or virtually withholds from the auditor any other authority which necessarily, or properly belongs to his office; or which abrogates any powers or duties which had been assigned to masters in Chancery, to commissioners to audit accounts, to an auditor, or to any other similar officer, whose assistance the Chancellor had found to he useful, or indispensably' necessary to the proper exercise of his jurisdiction. Conse[75]*75quently, this legislative enactment, so far as it goes, can only be regarded as an affirmance of the pre-existing powers of the Chancellor. And this court has, in many cases, since the passage of that law, assumed the position, that it was in fact nothing more, so far as it went, than an affirmance of its preexisting powers; it has, where occasion required, issued a commission to audit accounts; it has referred cases to persons with directions to perform duties properly belonging to a master in chancery or auditor, considering them as special auditors; and it has, in various instances, treated the auditor as a standing officer of the court, clothed with powers analogous to those of a master in chancery in England; and with all such powers as had been formerly understood to belong to a master in chancery here.
In fine, deeming it to be entirely within the legitimate scope of the auditor’s powers to make any inquiry, to take testimony, to state any account, or to frame any statement wffiich may be necessary or proper to enable the court correctly to dispose of any case in which it has the power to grant relief, I shall send this case to the auditor, with such instructions accordingly.
Ordered, that this case be and the same is hereby referred to the auditor, with directions to report the whole value of the land [76]*76in the proceedings mentioned; the annual value thereof since the death of the testator; and by whom, if by any one,- the rents and profits thereof have been received, and the amount thereof; the amount of the arrearages of the annuity with interest; and the age and general state of health of the plaintiff Anna Maria Townshend ; and that the auditor make his statements and report as to these particulars, from the proceedings and such proofs as may be laid before him. And it is further Ordered, that the parties be, and they are hereby permitted, to take the depositions of witnesses to be read in evidence, in relation to the matter of this order, before any justice of the peace, on giving three days notice as usual to the opposite party or his solicitor.
On the 25th of May, 1829, the auditor reported, that in execution of this order, and at the instance of the solicitor for the complainants, he issued notice to the parties, that he would attend at his office in Annapolis, on the first day of August then next, to receive such evidence in relation to the matters in dispute, as the parties should then produce before him, &e. The proof of service thereof on the defendant Robinson, was therewith filed. The counsel for the plaintiffs filed the following interrogatories, &c. And Samuel Harrison of John, a witness of lawful age, produced on the part of the complainants, being duly sworn and interrogated, deposed, &c. The auditor attended pursuant to the last adjournment; and neither party appearing, he adjourned sine die. That the complainants had since filed with him the deposition of John Hanan relative to the age and state of health of the complainant Anna Maria; and also their admission of the payment of three years annuity which were returned.
The auditor further reported, that upon consideration of the said testimony, and other the proceedings in the cause, the whole value of the land, in the proceedings mentioned, was $2,983 50, or thereabouts. That the annual value thereof, at the time of the testator’s death, and for five years thereafter, was $200; and since that time to the present, $150. And that the average annual [77]*77value thereof, from the death of the testator to the present time, might be estimated at $175. That said land remained in possession of Deborah Duncan, the deceased’s widow, from his death, on the 4th of March, 1819, to the latter end of 1824, the time of her death, say for the space of six years. There was no evidence of the amount of rents and profits actually received during this-period. The value thereof, according to the proofs, might be' estimated at $ 1150. That from the death of Deborah Duncan, the rents and profits of the said land had been received by the defendant Joseph Robinson. And the value thereof, to the 4th of March, 1829, might be estimated at $600. That Mrs. Duncan discharged the annuity to the 4th of March, 1820; and the defendant Robinson had paid the annuity for the years ending respectively on the 4th of March, 1826 ; 4th of March, 1827; and 4th of March, 1828» The complainants, therefore claim their annuity from the 4th of March, 1820, to the 4th of March, 1825,- and from the 4th of March, 1828, to the 4th of March, 1829; six years, at $60, being $360; and interest on each year as it became due, amounting to $112 86; being in the whole, $472 86. And that the plaintiff Anna Maria Townshend, was aged thirty-three years, or thereabouts, and enjoyed good health.
The defendants excepted to this report, first, because the auditor had not allowed to the defendants all the credit to which, by the evidence in the cause, they were entitled; especially the sum of $20, admitted to have been paid by the late Mrs. Duncan over and above the amount credited to her, by the auditor in his account; second, because there was no evidence whatsoever in the cause, duly and regularly taken, according to the course of chancery proceedings, by which the said defendants can, in any wise, be charged or affected, or any decree passed against the infant defendants and Robinson, or touching or concerning the interest of said infants or said Robinson in the land in the bill mentioned, or otherwise; and thirdly, because the said report and accounts are in other respects erroneous.
After these exceptions had been filed, the plaintiffs admitted, that the late Deborah Duncan had paid $20, which had not been credited by the auditor.
On the 25th of July, 1829, the infant defendants William and Caroline, by their next friend, filed their petition, in which they stated, that they could prove that Deborah Duncan had been appointed guardian for them by the Orphans Court of Anne Arun[78]*78del county, and had received the rents and profits of the said land for six years; but had never accounted with the Orphans Court, as guardian, for any other sum of money than the balance remaining, after deducting from the gross amount of rents and profits, the sum of $60 per year. Whereupon they prayed, that a commission might be issued; or some order passed to enable them to obtain the benefit of the .said testimony, &c. ' -
Upon which the Chancellor expressed a wish to hear counsel; and for that purpose Ordered, that the matter should stand over until further order. But the matter was not again moved on behalf of the infant defendants.
12th August, 1829.
This case standing ready for hearing, and having been submitted on notes by the solicitors of the parties, the proceedings were read and. considered.
It was the well settled practice of the. Court of Chancery of Maryland, under the provincial government, and has continued to be so ever since the establishment of the republic, without any doubt or interruption, that in all cases where an account was required by the court, or the parties, a special commission might issue, directing the commissioners to take testimony; ‘and also to state, audit, settle, and adjust all accounts relating to the matter in dispute, that should be produced to them;’ and to reduce into writing such account; and to return the same, with the depositions of the witnesses,
Hence, as the court might clothe commissioners, appointed to take testimony, with authority to state an account from the proofs collected by them; and as it appears that formerly, when1 a case was referred to a master to take the depositions of witnesses, upon oath; so it has been held, ever since the passage of the act of assembly authorizing the appointment of an auditor, that when a case is referred to the auditor, by any interlocutory .decree to account; or by an order directing him to state an account, or make estimates, as in this instance, from the proofs then in the case, and such other proofs as may be laid before him, such a reference in itself clothes him with the power properly belonging [79]*79to such an officer according to the ancient course; as if the case had been referred to a master in chancery, or a special commission had been issued to take testimony and state an account: -which, indeed, it is conceived, has been virtually affirmed by the act of assembly directing the appointment of an auditor, and authorizing him to administer an oath to all witnesses and persons proper to be examined upon such account.
[81]*81With regard to the taking of testimony under the authority of a special order of the court, before a justice of the peace, I have not [82]*82been able to ascertain the origin of the practice; but it seems to have prevailed from an early period of the provincial government; [83]*83and appears to have been at all times, and very commonly resorted to since the revolution;
The testimony taken under the order of the 21st of February, 1828, before a justice of the peace, has therefore, been brought in according to the regular course of the court.
The will of the late William Duncan, it appears, has been proved and recorded, according to the act of assembly, which declares, ‘that it shall and may be lawful for the judge of probate of wills to take the probate, or cause to be proved any last will or testament within this province, although the same concerns titles of lands;’
From the pleadings and proofs it-is very clear, that this will cannot be so construed, as to authorize a sale of the real estate for [87]*87the purpose of raising or securing the payment of this annuity; nor can it be construed to give the plaintiff Anna Maria an estate for life, or any other lesser estate in the lands charged with the payment of the annuity. These infant devisees could only take this estate subject to the charge upon it, and the annual rents and profits, as it is now shewn, so far exceed the annuity in amount as to demonstrate, that it is much to their benefit so to take it. And consequently, all their property, in respect of this large amount of assets thus placed in their hands, and which they have taken, must be held liable for the payment of this annuity.
For the arrears which accrued since the death of the testator, and were left unpaid by Deborah Duncan, the late guardian of these infants, her sureties as guardian, if she gave any, or her legal representatives may be held liable; but their estate is liable to these plaintiffs, to whom the sureties or legal representatives of the late Deborah Duncan can, perhaps, be in no way held accountable; certainly not in this suit. The present guardian of these infant defendants, Joseph Robinson, not having answered; and having thereby tacitly admitted, that he had received a sufficiency of rents and profits from his ward’s estate, must be held absolutely liable for the whole amount of the annuity which has accrued and been left unpaid, during the time of his guardianship. For the purpose of having a statement made upon these principles, the case must be again sent to the auditor.
Ordered, that this case be, and the same is hereby again referred to the auditor, with directions to state an account, shewing the amount of the arrearages of the said annuity which became due during the life time of the late Deborah Duncan ; after giving her credit for the sum of $20, as of the year 1821, in addition to the credits heretofore given. And further, to state an account of the amount of the arrearages of the said annuity, left unpaid by the present guardian, the defendant Joseph Robinson.
On the 13th of August, 1829, the auditor reported, that he had in obedience to this order, again examined the proceedings, and stated, first, an account between Deborah Duncan, deceased, and the complainants, in which was charged the arrearages of the complainant’s annuity to the supposed time of Deborah Duncan’s death. That the proof was, that she died in the latter end of the year 1824; upon which he had assumed, as a mean period, the 4th of October of that year. That he had allowed a credit for [88]*88$20, paid on account of the annuity accrued on the 4th of March, 1821, agreeably to the said order. That interest was charged on the annual arrearages from the 4th of March of each year. And that the sum due to the complainants, was $354 16, with further interest on $255, part thereof, from that date until paid. And secondly, an account between Joseph Robinson and the complainants, of arrearages accrued since the death of Deborah Duncan. That interest was there also allowed on the annual arrearages, as in the first account. And that there appeared to be due to the complainants on this account, the sum of $93 26, with further interest on $85, part thereof, from that date until paid. Upon which report the case was submitted by the solicitors of the parties for final adjudication.
nth August, 1829.
Decreed, that the said bill of complaint be and the same is hereby taken pro confesso, as against the defendant Joseph Robinson. And it. is further Decreed,, that the infant defendants Caroline Duncan and William J. B. Duncan, or the said Joseph Robinson as their guardian out of the estate and property of his said wards, now in his hands, or which may hereafter come into his hands, pay unto the plaintiffs Perry Townshend and Anna Maria his wife, or bring into this court to be paid to them, the sum of $354 16, with interest on $255, part thereof, from the 13th instant, until paid or brought in. And it is further Decreed, that the said Joseph Robinson also pay unto the plaintiffs Perry Townshend and Anna Maria, his wife, or bring into this court to be paid to them, the sum of $93 26, with legal interest on $85, part thereof, from the 13th day of the present month, until paid or brought in; together with the costs of this suit, to be taxed by the register; the same to be paid by the said Robinson, out of the assets of his said wards in his hands, if any there be, if not out of his own proper estate , and effects. And it is further Decreed, that the several reports of the auditor, heretofore made in this case, so far as they accord with this decree, be and the same are hereby confirmed; and so far as they are at variance with this decree, they are hereby rejected. And it is further Decreed, that the said complainants’ bill of complaint, as against the defendant John Iglehart, be and the same is hereby dismissed with costs, to be taxed by the register.
Appeal. — See the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 Gill and John, 413.
It is declared that wherever a subpoena shall be returned summoned, as to all or any of the defendants, making no distinction in favour of infants, the court must enter an interlocutory decree, &c. 1820, ch. 161, s. 1.
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2 Md. Ch. 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/townshend-v-duncan-mdch-1826.