TOWNSEND, CARLOS v. HENDRICKSON USA, LLC

2025 TN WC 43
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJuly 14, 2025
Docket2018-06-1466
StatusPublished

This text of 2025 TN WC 43 (TOWNSEND, CARLOS v. HENDRICKSON USA, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TOWNSEND, CARLOS v. HENDRICKSON USA, LLC, 2025 TN WC 43 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2025).

Opinion

FILED Jul 14, 2025 01:27 PM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

CARLOS TOWNSEND, ) Docket No. 2018-06-1466 Employee, ) v. ) HENDRICKSON USA, LLC, ) State File No. 51887-2018 Employer, ) And ) AGRI General Ins. Co., ) Judge Joshua D. Baker Carrier. )

COMPENSATION ORDER

At a June 26, 2025 compensation hearing, Mr. Townsend requested permanent partial disability and future medical benefits for an alleged aggravation of his preexisting back injury. Hendrickson argued Mr. Townsend did not suffer a compensable aggravation. Due to insufficient expert medical proof, the Court denies benefits and dismisses this claim with prejudice.

Claim History

Mr. Townsend alleged that lifting an engine at work on July 6, 2018, aggravated his preexisting thoracic spine condition. He said his pain did not begin immediately but later that evening.

He testified that he first injured his back in a 2016 car accident while working for Hendrickson. His back pain then worsened after a 2017 car accident—so much so that he began experiencing episodic “flare-ups.” On the day he lifted the engine, he said his pain did not begin immediately when lifting the engine but later that evening.

Hendrickson cross-examined Mr. Townsend extensively, during which he admitted he lied on his application to get his job. He said he would do it again in the same circumstances where he needed to lie to gain employment. Several weeks before his work injury, neurosurgeon Dr. Richard Berkman evaluated him for surgery on his thoracic spine. In a new-patient questionnaire, Mr. Townsend called his pain “constant” and reported taking narcotic pain medicine three times a day for pain.

Dr. Berkman testified he found small disc bulges but saw nothing requiring surgery. He also explained to the referring physician and to Mr. Townsend that his condition “should be a self-limiting problem and not require long-term issues[.]”

Initially unaware of the surgical evaluation, Hendrickson accepted Mr. Townsend’s claim. It paid temporary disability benefits and authorized treatment with Dr. William DeVries, an orthopedic surgeon who placed Mr. Townsend at maximum recovery in March 2019 and assigned a 4% impairment. Hendrickson then denied the claim as a preexisting injury.

About nine months after Mr. Townsend reached maximum recovery, Dr. DeVries completed a C-32 form suggesting the work injury had aggravated and worsened Mr. Townsend’s preexisting back condition. Additionally, the doctor attached a typed statement reading, “An activity made the preexisting condition worse and more symptomatic. The employment activity was primarily responsible for the present need for treatment of the preexisting condition.”

Almost four years later, Hendrickson deposed Dr. DeVries, who agreed in his testimony with defense counsel’s statement that Mr. Townsend’s “[work] incident on July 16, 2018 . . . was not more than 50 percent of the cause of his injury, giving all causes consideration.” However, the doctor immediately added, “These are almost always the most complicated cases when someone has had issues prior and then they get an aggravation.”

Dr. DeVries acknowledged he knew when treating Mr. Townsend that he had received treatment for a preexisting back injury “immediately preceding” his work injury. However, he “was not aware he had seen Dr. Berkman.” He also said he thought Mr. Townsend had experienced pain immediately when lifting the engine instead of later that evening.

At the hearing, a Hendrickson human resources specialist testified that Mr. Townsend received $16,614.95 in temporary disability and $7,380.17 in medical treatment before the claim’s denial.

Hendrickson argued the claim should be denied and that the Court should order Mr. Townsend to reimburse the amount spent on temporary disability and medical treatment in his claim. Mr. Townsend requested permanent partial disability benefits and future medical treatment, relying on Dr. DeVries’s C-32 form responses and the form’s attached statement.

Law and Analysis

At a compensation hearing, Mr. Townsend must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2024).

Under Workers’ Compensation Law, an aggravation of a preexisting condition is not compensable “unless it can be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” Id. at § 50-6-102(12)(A).

An employee can satisfy the burden of proving a compensable aggravation if: “(1) there is expert medical proof that the work accident contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the aggravation, and (2) the work accident was the cause of the aggravation more likely than not considering all causes.” Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 23, at *16 (Jul. 2, 2024) (emphasis added) (appeal docketed No. W2024-01034-SC-R3-WC).

First, Mr. Townsend’s reliance on Dr. DeVries’s form responses and typed statements as his expert medical proof is misplaced given the evidentiary rules for a compensation hearing.

While the statute permits use of the form as expert testimony “in lieu of a deposition,” the deposition is in evidence here, making the form’s responses subordinate to the doctor’s actual testimony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-235(c)(2). Importantly, in his testimony, the doctor did not adopt any of his form responses or the typed statement as his present opinion. So, weighing the doctor’s earlier written responses and statements as evidence would require impermissible guesswork about whether the doctor’s answers and opinions remained the same or had changed between when he completed the form and when he testified.

Second, important information that Dr. DeVries would have used for his causation opinion when completing the form had changed by the deposition. For example, he did not know Mr. Townsend had met with Dr. Berkman only weeks before the work injury—for the same thoracic spine complaints later treated as a work injury. He also had an incorrect understanding of Mr. Townsend’s onset of pain.

Essentially, Mr. Townsend has only Dr. DeVries’s imprecise deposition testimony. Although the doctor called Mr. Townsend’s condition “an aggravation,” he did not explain how or if “the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment[,]” which is necessary to prove medical causation. Id. at § 50-6-102(12)(A). Moreover, he agreed the work incident “was not more than 50 percent of the cause of his injury, giving all causes consideration.” Id. at § 50-6-102(12)(B).

While an expert’s rigid recitation of statutory language is unnecessary, “what is necessary is sufficient proof from which the trial court can conclude that the statutory requirements of an injury as defined in [the statute] are satisfied.” Panzarella v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 30, at *14 (May 15, 2017).

Here, the expert medical proof is simply insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Townsend suffered a compensable aggravation of a preexisting injury.

Hendrickson also questioned whether the accident at issue even occurred. Mr. Townsend’s admission under oath that he lied to get his job brings his credibility into question. However, there no other witness to the accident testified.

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Related

§ 50-6-235
Tennessee § 50-6-235(c)(2)
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(c)(6)

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Bluebook (online)
2025 TN WC 43, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/townsend-carlos-v-hendrickson-usa-llc-tennworkcompcl-2025.