Town of Randolph v. Finkle and Quillia

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedNovember 8, 2006
Docket32-02-04 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Town of Randolph v. Finkle and Quillia (Town of Randolph v. Finkle and Quillia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of Randolph v. Finkle and Quillia, (Vt. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} Randolph Town Office Zoning Appeal } Docket No. 225‐12‐04 Vtec (Appeal of Rydjeski) } }

Decision and Order

Letita H. Rydjeski appeals from the decisions of the Town of Randolph (Town)

Development Review Board (DRB) granting site plan approval and a zoning permit to

Appellee‐Applicant Town for the renovation and expansion of their municipal office

building on 7 Summer Street in the Town’s Commercial zoning district. Appellant

appears and represents herself; the Town is represented by Peter M. Nowlan, Esq.; and

William J. Kevan and Interested Person Leigh R. Wright appeared and represent

themselves.

This appeal is on‐the‐record, since the Town has adopted and implemented the

procedures necessary for such appeals, pursuant to 24 V.S.A. §§ 4471 and 4472. Mr.

Wright and the Town have filed briefs on the merits of this appeal for the Court’s

consideration. William J. Kevan has also filed a motion to intervene, pursuant to 10

V.S.A. § 8504(n). Appellant and Mr. Kevan also filed a “Motion for de Novo

Proceedings,” asserting that a trial de novo is warranted because the tape recording of

the hearings was allegedly inaudible and was not transcribed.

I. Summary Issues

Appellant’s Statement of Questions raises a variety of issues in seven questions,

almost all of which are not appropriate for our consideration in this permit appeal

proceeding. Appellant’s first Question, labeled Question A, asks, “Why is the proposed

addition now placed over an existing VCP sewer?” Appellant neither cites nor refers to

any provisions in the Town’s Zoning or Subdivision Regulations prohibiting the

1 placement of the proposed addition over an existing sewer. Moreover, Appellant never

expresses concern about the sewer in her letters or responsive motions to the Court. In

the absence of any specific reference to a bylaw or regulatory provision being violated

by building the proposed addition on top of a municipal sewer, and being unable to

find such provision ourselves, the Court declines to answer that question, and it is

hereby DISMISSED.

Appellant’s second Question, actually labeled Question 1, concerns why the

Town presented different plans to the DRB for the proposed addition to the municipal

office building than were presented to the public at a November 2, 2004 bond issue vote

for the same addition. Similarly, Appellant’s fourth Question, labeled Question 3, also

concerns a change in plans from those presented at the time of a municipal bond issue

vote. While we sympathize with Appellant’s position, we cannot address this specific

concern because our review of the DRB’s decision in this on‐the‐record appeal is limited

to the application presented to the DRB below. We cannot address matters beyond the

Town’s current plans and applications, as presented to the DRB.

This Court does not have jurisdiction to review decisions of a Town Selectboard

or issues of public indebtedness arising under Chapter 53 of Title 24 relating to the

impropriety of a bond issue, a vote on a particular bond issue, or on the plans

submitted pursuant to a bond issue vote. Our jurisdiction is limited to certain appeals,

as articulated in 4 V.S.A. § 1001 (2005):

10 V.S.A. Chapters 201 and 220 and matters arising under 24 V.S.A. Chapters 201 and 220 and matters arising under 24 V.SA. Chapter 117 and Chapter 61, subchapter 12. In addition, the judges shall have original jurisdiction to revoke permits under 10 V.S.A. Chapter 151.

Appellant’s allegations relating to the impropriety of the Town’s bond issue for

improvements to the municipal offices are therefore not within this Court’s jurisdiction.

2 Appellant’s remaining questions for our review, Questions 2, 4, 5, and 6, concern

the Town’s planned removal of a flowering crab apple tree located to the south of the

existing municipal office building in the middle of green space adjacent to the existing

municipal offices. The crab apple tree is labeled on the Town’s site plan as “existing 20″

apple” tree and is considered a public shade tree under the control of the Town’s tree

warden. See 24 V.S.A. § 2502.

Although the Randolph tree warden also happens to be the Town Zoning

Administrator, the Legislature has limited our jurisdiction to those provisions of the

Vermont Statutes Annotated enumerated in 4 V.S.A. § 1001. Decisions of tree wardens

are not reviewable in this Court, as they arise under Chapter 67 of Title 24. Appellant

may find the relief she seeks in Superior Court. However, we cannot make an advisory

statement as to whether an action in Superior Court will succeed or even be heard.

Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction over Appellant’s remaining Questions, relating to

the crab apple tree, specifically Questions 2, 4, 5, and 6.

II. Kevan Intervention Request

Before reviewing the Town’s decision on the proposed municipal office building

addition, we must first address Mr. Kevan’s motion to intervene under 10 V.S.A.

§ 8504(n). Section 8504(n) sets out six instances when it is permissible for a person to

intervene. As we have already ruled in our July 15, 2005 Entry Order, Mr. Kevan does

not meet sub‐sections 1, 2, or 5, as he did not appear in the action appealed from, is not

a party of right under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(5), and does not qualify as an interested person

under 24 V.S.A. § 4465. Subsection 3 and 4 are similarly inapplicable because Mr.

Kevan is not a member of the natural resources board or a panel of that board, nor is he

a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(7) because this is not an appeal of an act or

decision by a district commission or coordinator, the secretary of the Agency of Natural

Resources, the environmental court, or the supreme court.

3 The only possible avenue for allowing Mr. Kevan to intervene in this proceeding

is whether he would be allowed to intervene under the standards established by the

Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure (V.R.C.P.). 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n)(6). V.R.C.P. 24 allows

a party to intervene when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene, which is

not the case here, or when the potential intervener can demonstrate an interest relating

to the property which is the subject of this action and where the disposition of the action

may as a practical matter impair or impede the potential intervener’s ability to protect

that interest, unless the potential intervener’s interest is adequately represented by

existing parties. V.R.C.P. 24(a).

Mr. Kevan’s interest related to property at issue in this appeal is a mortgage

interest in the property of Russell Royce at 13 Summer Street. Mr. Royce is the record

title holder of that property, but Mr. Kevan holds a mortgage interest. In Town of

Sandgate v. Colehamer, 156 Vt. 77, 81‐83 (1990), our Supreme Court held that the

interest of a possessor of property who made mortgage payments on that property on

behalf of the titleholder was an insufficient interest for standing to appeal a zoning

decision under 24 V.S.A. § 4464(b) (now § 4465). We find the Court’s reasoning

instructive and find that Mr. Kevan cannot intervene under V.R.C.P. 24(a) and 10 V.S.A.

§ 8504(n)(6) because any disposition relating to the Town’s expansion of their municipal

office building will not directly affect Mr. Kevan‘s mortgage interest in the property at

13 Summer Street.

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Related

Petition of Town of Sherburne
581 A.2d 274 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1990)
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589 A.2d 1205 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1990)

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