Town of Northlake, Texas, and Mayor Brian Montini v. George Roland

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00577-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00577-CV ___________________________

TOWN OF NORTHLAKE, TEXAS, AND MAYOR BRIAN MONTINI, Appellants

V.

GEORGE ROLAND, Appellee

On Appeal from the 467th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 24-7363-467

Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This interlocutory appeal1 concerns the interplay between the Texas Public

Information Act (TPIA)2 and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.1396,3

which provides that a person stopped or arrested on suspicion of an intoxication

offense is entitled to receive a copy of certain video footage made by or at the

direction of a peace officer as part of the stop or arrest. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.

§§ 552.001–.376; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.1396. Relying on Article 2.1396,

attorney and Appellee/Cross-Appellant, George Roland, sued Appellant, Town of

Northlake, Texas (the Town), and its mayor and Cross-Appellee, Brian Montini (the

Mayor),4 for failing to produce the video of his client and for characterizing his

request as a public information request. The Town and the Mayor later filed a plea to

the jurisdiction, urging that Roland’s claim was moot because the Town had released

1 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit). 2 The TPIA guarantees access to public information, subject to certain exceptions. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011). 3 Effective January 1, 2025, Article 2.1396 is found at Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2B.0154. See Act of June 12, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 765, H.B. 4504, § 3.001(1). Because this case was filed before the effective date of the amendments, we will refer to the provision as Article 2.1396. 4 While the Town and the Mayor refer to themselves as “Appellants” in the style and in their briefs, only the Town and Roland filed notices of appeal.

2 the video in accordance with an Attorney General’s decision and because both were

entitled to immunity. After the trial court granted the Mayor’s plea to the jurisdiction

but denied the Town’s plea to the jurisdiction, both the Town and Roland appealed.

We will affirm the order granting the Mayor’s plea to the jurisdiction, reverse the

order denying the Town’s plea to the jurisdiction, and render judgment that Roland’s

claims against the Mayor and the Town are dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Roland’s Request for the Intoxication Video of His Client, the Town’s Response, and Roland’s Suit

Roland’s client was arrested for an intoxication offense in July 2024. Shortly

thereafter, Roland requested a copy of the video involved in the arrest. Specifically,

Roland’s email to the Town’s police department sought, “pursuant to Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure art. 2.1396[,] . . . copies of all audio and/or video recordings,

including bodycamera, dashcamera, and surveillance, if any, related to [the] arrest” of

his client.

In response, Valerie Strubelt—the Town’s police department records clerk—

asked that Roland submit the request through the Town’s website to “better ensure[]

that the information gets to you in a timely manner and better track[] that we have

completed your request as well.” As instructed, Roland made his request through the

Town’s information portal, and a receipt was sent to Roland acknowledging his

request.

3 Approximately two weeks later, Roland received a copy of a request for an

Attorney General’s decision that was made by the Town’s attorney in response to

Roland’s request. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.301(a) (providing that a

governmental body that receives a written request for information that it wishes to

withhold from public disclosure and that it considers to be within one of the

exceptions of the TPIA “must ask for a decision from the attorney general about

whether the information is within that exception”), (e–1) (providing that the

governmental body must send a copy of the written comments submitted to the

attorney general to the person who requested the information from the governmental

body). After failing to receive the requested video, Roland filed suit against the Town,

asserting “causes of action” for (1) mandamus compelling the Town to disclose the

video “which is not and never has been public information but required to be

disclosed pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure” and (2) permanent

injunction “enjoining [the Town] from ever characterizing in the future any request

made pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 2.1396 by any proper

individual or entity as any type or form of a public information request pursuant to

the Texas Government Code.”

B. The Attorney General’s Decision

After Roland filed suit, the Attorney General issued a decision regarding the

Town’s request. See Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2024-035166. In its ruling, the Attorney

General noted that the body-worn-camera recordings were subject to Chapter 1701 of

4 the Occupations Code, were not properly requested,5 and need not be released. Id.

However, “the portions of the remaining video recordings that depict the stop, the

arrest, the conduct of the requestor’s client, or a procedure in which a specimen of the

blood or breath of the requestor’s client is taken pursuant to article 2.1396 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure” must be released. Id. Finally, according to the Attorney

General, the Town’s police department “may withhold the remaining information

under section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code.”6 Id.

5 Section 1701.661 of the Texas Occupations Code—which was in effect when this case was filed—provides, in relevant part, the following:

(a) A member of the public is required to provide the following information when submitting a written request to a law enforcement agency for information recorded by a body worn camera:

(1) the date and approximate time of the recording;

(2) the specific location where the recording occurred; and

(3) the name of one or more persons known to be a subject of the recording.

Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1701.661. Effective January 1, 2025, Section 1701.661 is found at Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2B.0112. See Act of June 12, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 765, H.B. 4504, § 3.001(7). 6 Section 552.108(a)(1) of the Texas Government Code excepts from disclosure “[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime . . . if . . . release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime[.]” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.108(a)(1).

5 C. The Town’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

After answering the lawsuit, the Town filed its plea to the jurisdiction, asserting

that after suit was filed, the Attorney General had issued a ruling and that pursuant to

the ruling, the Town had “withheld all body worn camera recordings and removed all

portions of the remaining videos that did not depict [Roland’s] client” and mailed the

redacted videos to Roland one week later. Therefore, the Town asserted that

Roland’s claims were moot and that neither the TPIA nor the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act [UDJA] waived immunity. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.001–.376;

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001–.011. The Town requested dismissal of

the lawsuit.

D. Roland’s Amended Pleadings and the Town and the Mayor’s Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction

Roland amended his pleadings, adding the Mayor as a defendant and asserting

an ultra vires cause of action.7 Roland continued to seek a mandamus regarding his

client’s video, an injunction regarding any future requests under Article 2.1396, and

attorney’s fees. In the amended pleadings, Roland asked the trial court “to declare

those actions [of the Town and the Mayor] as violating the Texas Code of Criminal

“An ultra vires action is one in which the plaintiff seeks relief in an official- 7

capacity suit against a government actor who allegedly has violated statutory or constitutional provisions by acting without legal authority or by failing to perform a purely ministerial act.” Lazarides v. Farris, 367 S.W.3d 788, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

6 Procedure which is clear on its face as to the duties of Defendants and the rights of

Plaintiff.”

The Town and the Mayor then filed their amended plea to the jurisdiction,

asserting that Roland’s claim was moot as the video had been released and that

Roland had not pleaded facts waiving immunity. With regard to the Mayor, the plea

asserted that Roland had failed to properly plead an ultra vires claim, arguing that

“Mayor Montini is not involved in the processing of public information requests by

the Town, nor was he involved in processing [Roland’s] request.” Several exhibits

were attached to the plea, including ones showing that Strubelt, the “Records Clerk”

for the Town’s police department, was the “Assigned Staff” who responded to

Roland’s request. In addition, an affidavit from a legal assistant for the Town and the

Mayor stated that on October 17, 2024, “one flash drive containing two redacted dash

camera recordings” was mailed to Roland together with the Attorney General’s

decision responding to the Town’s request.

Roland responded to the plea, and the trial court set the matter for hearing. At

the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of its file, but no other evidence was

admitted. Initially, the trial court granted the amended plea and entered an order

dismissing the case with prejudice.

However, later the same day, the trial court signed an order vacating the order

granting the plea and noting that the “order [was] to be revised.” Three days later,

7 Roland amended his pleadings, added Strubelt as a defendant,8 and removed his

request for mandamus relief.

E. Order Granting and Denying the Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction, and the Town’s and Roland’s Notices of Appeal

Ultimately, the trial court entered an order granting the Mayor’s amended plea

to the jurisdiction and denying the Town’s amended plea to the jurisdiction. Both the

Town and Roland appealed from that order.

III. DISCUSSION

In two issues in their combined brief, the Town and the Mayor contend that

(1) the trial court erred in denying the Town’s amended plea to the jurisdiction “where

[Roland] failed to comply with any requirements of the [TPIA] when requesting

mandamus and a permanent injunction against the Town for its processing of

requests for public information”9 and (2) the trial court correctly granted the Mayor’s

8 In his brief, Roland notes that Strubelt has not been served. This appeal stayed all of the proceedings in the trial court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(b). 9 While the Town’s first issue does not specifically mention immunity, the Town contended in the argument part of its brief that even if the TPIA does not apply, Roland’s claim does not fall within a waiver of the Town’s governmental immunity. In addition, the amended plea to the jurisdiction heard by the trial court included arguments related to governmental immunity. Therefore, we will consider the immunity argument under the Town’s first issue. See Gill v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 863, 869 (Tex. 2024) (stating that “briefs do not have to perfectly articulate every point of law to preserve arguments that are fairly subsumed in the issue addressed”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary issue that is fairly included.”).

8 amended plea to the jurisdiction “where the Mayor has no authority under the Town

Charter to process requests for information received by the Town and [Roland’s]

pleading did not raise any facts indicating the Mayor acted at all in responding to the

request for information.”10 In one issue in his cross-appeal, Roland states that the

trial court erred in granting the Mayor’s plea to the jurisdiction “as there is no

evidence that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over an ultra vires claim.”

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case. Tex.

Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). A plea to the

jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). When the plea

challenges the claimant’s pleadings, we determine whether the claimant has pleaded

facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction, construing the

pleadings liberally and in favor of the claimant. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.

We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Hous. Belt

& Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016). In our review,

we look to the pleader’s intent to determine whether the facts alleged affirmatively

10 While the “Issues Presented” section of the Town’s brief lists this second issue, the issue is more of a response to Roland’s appeal rather than a complaint regarding the trial court’s ruling. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The brief must state concisely all issues or points presented for review.”). Moreover, the argument section of the Town’s brief does not contain any argument relating to this issue, and the Town’s prayer only requests relief as to the Town. Therefore, we will construe the Town’s second issue as a response to Roland’s cross-notice of appeal.

9 demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &

Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

Governmental immunity protects the state’s political subdivisions, including its

cities, against suits and legal liability. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392

(Tex. 2022); Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006).

Cities retain immunity unless the Legislature clearly and unambiguously waives it.

Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 392; see Herrera v. Mata, 702 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. 2024) (stating

that political subdivisions of the state are entitled to governmental immunity absent

legislative waiver). Immunity “shield[s] the public from the costs and consequences

of improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325,

332 (Tex. 2006).

Under the TPIA, the Legislature has waived sovereign and governmental

immunity to permit requestors to file suit for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel a

governmental body to make information available for public inspection. AIM Media

Tex., LLC v. City of Odessa, 663 S.W.3d 324, 334 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet.

denied); see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.321(a) (“A requestor . . . may file suit for a

writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for

public inspection if the governmental body . . . refuses to supply public

information . . . .”). But immunity is not waived under the TPIA for the delay in

releasing requested information. AIM Media Tex., LLC, 663 S.W.3d at 334.

10 Therefore, “mandamus compelling the ongoing, timely production of information is

not available . . . under the TPIA.”11 Id.

Even if a governmental entity’s immunity has not been waived by the

Legislature, a claim may be brought against a governmental official if the official

engages in ultra vires conduct. Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2017). A

plaintiff in an ultra vires suit must “allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted

without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” City of El Paso v.

Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). “Ministerial acts” are those “where the law

prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as

to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v.

Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. 2015) (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers,

883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1994)). Conversely, “discretionary acts” are those that

“require the exercise of judgment and personal deliberation.” Id.

“In cases in which the alleged ultra vires conduct is governmental inaction, a

court may issue a writ of mandamus compelling action to bring the official into

conformance with the law.” City of Houston v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.,

11 Section 552.3215 of the TPIA provides another statutory waiver of immunity by authorizing declaratory relief. Id. (citing City of Georgetown v. Putnam, 646 S.W.3d 61, 70 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied)); see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.3215; see also Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex. 2017) (“The [TPIA] further authorizes certain local or state officials to seek declaratory or injunctive relief based on a complaint by ‘a person who claims to be the victim of a [TPIA] violation,’ but only after the governmental body is afforded notice and fails to timely cure the alleged violation.” (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.3215)). Roland has made no such request for declaratory relief under Section 552.3215.

11 549 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018). If, however, the actions alleged to be ultra vires

were not truly outside the officer’s authority or in conflict with the law, the plaintiff

has not stated a valid ultra vires claim and therefore has not bypassed immunity.

Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021).

B. Analysis

1. Mandamus—the request for specific information

Under its first issue, the Town argues that Roland’s mandamus claim is moot

because the Town has released the “responsive information in accordance with the

Attorney General’s ruling.” Because the claim is moot, the Town contends that the

trial court erred in failing to dismiss Roland’s claims. Roland agreed in his response to

the amended plea to the jurisdiction that his initial request for mandamus relief had

“become moot.” Moreover, on appeal, Roland states that he “can think of no viable

reason this argument was included as the request for writ of mandamus has been

removed in this matter as a result of the [Town] producing the videos requested under

article 2.1396.” However, Roland’s amended pleadings removing his request for

mandamus relief were not filed until after the hearing on the amended plea to the

jurisdiction.

Mootness deprives a court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Univ. of Tex. Med.

Branch at Galveston v. Est. of Blackmon ex rel. Shultz, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100–01 (Tex. 2006).

“A case becomes moot when (1) a justiciable controversy no longer exists between

the parties, (2) the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the case’s

12 outcome, (3) the court can no longer grant the requested relief or otherwise affect the

parties’ rights or interests, or (4) any decision would constitute an impermissible

advisory opinion.” Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation

Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 634–35 (Tex. 2021). If a controversy ceases

to exist at any stage of the proceedings, the issues presented are no longer “live” and

the case becomes moot, thereby depriving a court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001); see City of Georgetown, 646 S.W.3d

at 72 (“Courts have uniformly held that a plaintiff’s claims for both injunctive and

declaratory relief under the [T]PIA are rendered moot upon the governmental body’s

release of the requested information to the Plaintiff.”).

Here, the information Roland requested pursuant to Article 2.1396 that

pertained to the arrest of his client for an intoxication offense was released consistent

with the Attorney General’s decision. Therefore, an actual controversy concerning

that information no longer exists. See F.D.I.C. v. Nueces Cnty., 886 S.W.2d 766, 767

(Tex. 1994) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Emp. Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988))

(stating that the “mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual

controversy exists”); see also Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (stating that a controversy

“must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the

appeal”). And Roland’s mandamus claim under Article 2.1396 is moot. See City of

Georgetown, 646 S.W.3d at 72 (holding that the requestor’s mandamus claim was moot

because the document being sought had been produced); see also Hous. Chronicle Publ’g

13 Co. v. Thomas, 196 S.W.3d 396, 400–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)

(stating that where the governmental body released requested information to the

plaintiff, any pronouncement on the construction of the TPIA and its exceptions with

regard to the released document would be an impermissible advisory opinion on a

hypothetical fact situation). Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this

part of Roland’s claim against the Town.

2. Injunction—the request for prospective relief

Also addressed under the Town’s first issue is its complaint that the part of

Roland’s pleadings seeking a permanent injunction failed to establish a proper waiver

of immunity. The crux of this sub-issue is based on Roland’s complaint that the

information he requested is not governed by the TPIA. The Town, on the other

hand, argues that Roland “fails [to] cite to any legal authority, whether statute, case

law, or Attorney General opinion, that states these requests should not be treated as

requests for public information.” It complains that Roland “failed to follow the

conditions precedent to waive the Town’s immunity under the [TPIA] and did not

plead sufficient facts to waive the Town’s immunity under any other statute.”

Therefore, we will first look at whether Roland’s specific request for information was

a request under the TPIA and whether immunity was waived. Then, we will address

whether Roland can seek injunctive relief on behalf of future, unnamed parties.

14 a. Roland’s specific request

The TPIA defines “public information,” in relevant part, as “information that

is written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or

in connection with the transaction of official business: (1) by a governmental body;

[or] (2) for a governmental body and the governmental body: (A) owns the

information; [or] (B) has a right of access to the information.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.

§ 552.002(a). “A public information request typically involves the governmental body

holding the information and the citizen requesting it; if the governmental body

believes an exception applies, it must promptly ask the Attorney General for a ruling.”

UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Paxton, 691 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet.

denied).

While Roland contends that his request for information was not a request for

“public information” under the TPIA but was limited to Article 2.1396, Roland’s

request for information went beyond the scope of Article 2.1396, which provides,

A person stopped or arrested on suspicion of an offense under Section 49.04, 49.045, 49.07, or 49.08, Penal Code, is entitled to receive from a law enforcement agency employing the peace officer who made the stop or arrest a copy of any video made by or at the direction of the officer that contains footage of:

(1) the stop;

(2) the arrest;

(3) the conduct of the person stopped during any interaction with the officer, including during the administration of a field sobriety test; or

15 (4) a procedure in which a specimen of the person’s breath or blood is taken.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.1396.

Roland’s request was for “copies of all audio and/or video recordings,

including bodycamera, dashcamera, and surveillance, if any, related to” his client’s

arrest. The breadth of Roland’s request is reflected in the Attorney General’s

decision, which held that the body-worn-camera recordings were not properly

requested under Chapter 1701 of the Occupations Code and that certain information

was subject to being withheld pursuant to Section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government

Code. Therefore, Roland’s request in this case implicated the TPIA.

While the Legislature has waived sovereign and governmental immunity to

permit requestors to file suit for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the

governmental body to make information available to the public, immunity is not

waived for the delay in releasing requested information. AIM Media, Tex., LLC,

663 S.W.3d at 334; see Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00631-

CV, 2016 WL 3521888, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 23, 2016, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (stating that the TPIA waives sovereign immunity and allows suit for a writ of

mandamus against a governmental body for disclosure of information, but the

“legislature has not addressed or provided a waiver of sovereign immunity as to a

claim that is based on a governmental body’s delay or its motives for delaying the

release of information that is subject to disclosure under the [T]PIA”). And immunity

16 precludes a claim for declaratory relief against a governmental entity to either construe

the TPIA or to construe the plaintiff’s rights under the TPIA. Fallon v. Univ. of Tex.

MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., 586 S.W.3d 37, 55–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2019, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). Because Roland is seeking prospective relief against the

Town that it is not in compliance with the production requirements of Article 2.1396,

the Town’s governmental immunity has not been waived. See AIM Media Texas, LLC,

663 S.W.3d at 336.

b. Roland’s requests for other parties

In addition to the request for information regarding his client, Roland sought

prospective relief for “any proper individual or entity” seeking information pursuant

to Article 2.1396. However, Roland does not have standing to seek relief for

hypothetical parties facing hypothetical problems. See Optimal Utils., Inc. v. Smitherman,

No. 13-16-00385-CV, 2017 WL 3431788, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

Aug. 10, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant “does not have

standing to seek relief for hypothetical parties facing hypothetical problems”).

We need not decide if future requests by other parties for information pursuant

to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.1396 implicate the TPIA, because such

a claim is not ripe and would constitute an advisory opinion. See Patterson v. Planned

Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442–43 (Tex. 1998) (explaining

that “[a] case is not ripe when its resolution depends on contingent or hypothetical

facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass” and recognizing an opinion in a

17 case that is not ripe is an advisory opinion); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444

(“The distinctive feature of an advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question

of law without binding the parties.”); see also Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 196 S.W.3d

at 401 (holding declaratory judgment action seeking construction of TPIA was moot

because autopsy report sought was produced and declining to construe act based on

future hypothetical fact situations).

Because immunity has not been waived with regard to Roland’s claims for the

production of specific information regarding his client and because courts lack

jurisdiction to grant prospective relief regarding claims for other unspecified parties,

the trial court erred in denying the Town’s plea to the jurisdiction. The Town’s first

issue is sustained.

3. The ultra vires claim

While the Town remains immune, governmental immunity does not preclude

prospective injunctive remedies that seek to bring government officials into

compliance with statutory or constitutional provisions. See City of El Paso, 284 S.W.3d

at 368–69, 372; see also Harris Cnty. Emergency Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Harris Cnty. Emergency

Corps, 999 S.W.2d 163, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)

(upholding an injunction preventing the appellant governmental entity from holding

certain types of meetings in the future without proper notice based on a “pattern” of

past improper meeting notices). A claim seeking to compel a governmental official to

18 perform a prospective act that the plaintiff considers to be nondiscretionary is in the

nature of an ultra vires claim. See City of El Paso, 284 S.W.3d at 372.

The proper defendant to an ultra vires claim is the governmental official

“whose acts or omissions allegedly trampled on the plaintiff’s rights.” Tex. Dep’t of

Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011) (citing City of El Paso, 284 S.W.3d at

372–73). “[A]n ultra vires suit must lie against the ‘allegedly responsible government

actor in his official capacity,’ not a nominal, apex representative who has nothing to

do with the allegedly ultra vires actions.” Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 240 (quoting Patel v. Tex.

Dep’t of Licensing and Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015) (italics removed)).

Roland generally alleged an ultra vires claim against the Mayor, stating that the

Mayor “is included in this suit as a necessary party for injunctive relief.”12 However,

12 Under Roland’s “ultra vires” claim in his amended pleadings, he also asserts that the “actions of Defendants set forth above are therefore the basis for this court to declare those actions as violating the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which is clear on its face as to the duties of Defendants and the rights of Plaintiff.” This claim is really a request for declaratory relief because it seeks a determination as to how the Town should respond to both current and future requests for information. See AIM Media Tex., LLC, 663 S.W.3d at 334. Sovereign immunity is inapplicable when a suit challenges the constitutionality of a statute and seeks only equitable relief. See Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 75–76. However, the UDJA does not enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction, and a litigant’s request for declaratory relief does not alter a suit’s underlying nature. See City of El Paso, 284 S.W.3d at 370. Texas courts do not have jurisdiction to consider a party’s claim for declaratory relief against either the state or a political subdivision that seeks to have that party’s rights construed under a statute. See AIM Media Tex., LLC, 663 S.W.3d at 335 (citing Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621–22 (“But Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision of the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”)). In his brief, Roland “agree[s] that Sefzik does include language that would indicate that [the Town’s] immunity arguably still exists.”

19 he failed to plead any facts showing that the Mayor had any part in dealing with

Roland’s request for information. See City of El Paso, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (stating that

an ultra vires suit “must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion,

but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal

authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Sunset Transp., Inc., 357 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (“[M]erely

asserting legal conclusions or labeling a defendant’s actions as ‘ultra vires,’ ‘illegal,’ or

‘unconstitutional’ does not suffice to plead an ultra vires claim—what matters is

whether the facts alleged constitute actions beyond the governmental actor’s statutory

authority, properly construed.”). Rather, Roland’s pleadings complain about the

actions of Strubelt. And Roland did not dispute the statements in the amended plea

to the jurisdiction that the Mayor “is not involved in the processing of public

information requests by the Town, nor was he involved in processing [Roland’s]

request.”

Moreover, on appeal, the Mayor asserts that the “scope of the Mayor’s

authority is established by the Northlake Town Charter” and that he “has not been

granted any authority related to processing requests under the Public Information Act,

nor has he been granted authority regarding maintaining Town records or responding

to discovery requests.”13 The Town directs us to the Town Charter, which provides

We consider this argument even though the Mayor did not raise it in the trial 13

court. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 94–97 (Tex. 2012) (holding

20 that the Mayor’s duties are limited to (1) presiding over meetings of the Council,

performing such other duties as are imposed upon the Mayor by ordinances and

resolutions, being recognized as the official head of the Town for purpose of

enforcing military law and for all ceremonial purposes, and voting on matters before

the Council; (2) exercising emergency powers set forth by State law and local

ordinances; and (3) appointing a chairperson(s) for any special or ad hoc commissions

or committees established by the Town Council. See Northlake, Tex., Charter,

Art. III, § 3.07. Roland does not respond to this argument.

Because Roland pleaded no ultra vires acts against the Mayor and the Mayor

has not been given authority related to processing requests under the TPIA or

Article 2.1396, the trial court properly granted the Mayor’s amended plea to the

jurisdiction. Roland’s sole cross-issue is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having sustained the Town’s first issue14 and overruled Roland’s sole issue, we

affirm the order granting the Mayor’s plea to the jurisdiction, reverse the order

defendants may bring—and courts must address—immunity-based jurisdictional challenges that are raised for the first time on appeal, even in the context of an interlocutory appeal); see also Dall. Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013) (“Under Rusk, an appellate court must consider all of a defendant’s immunity arguments, whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional arguments in the trial court or none at all.”); City of Grapevine v. Muns, 651 S.W.3d 317, 339 n.30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). 14 We need not address the Town’s second issue, because as noted above, it is actually a response to Roland’s cross-appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

21 denying the Town’s plea to the jurisdiction, and render judgment that Roland’s claims

against the Town and the Mayor are dismissed.15

/a/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Delivered: May 29, 2025

15 In his reply brief, Roland alternatively asks for a remand to allow him to amend his pleadings in the event that the Mayor is not the appropriate state official. See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 623 (“When this Court upholds a plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, we allow the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured.”). Remand is not necessary in this case, as Roland’s amended pleadings—which were not before the trial court when it ruled on the amended plea to the jurisdiction—remain pending.