Town of New Haven v. City Bank

31 Conn. 106
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedSeptember 15, 1862
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 31 Conn. 106 (Town of New Haven v. City Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 106 (Colo. 1862).

Opinion

Sanford, J.

The absolute inviolability of the contract between the sovereign power of the state and the City Bank, [109]*109by which the former undertook that the a capital stock ” of the latter should be and forever remain free from taxation (until the happening of an event not yet arrived) is conceded. The only question between the parties is, what is “ the capital stock ” thus exempted.

The object for which a banking company is incorporated is well understood and needs no elucidation or remark. But in the solution of the question now submitted to us we may derive some assistance from the consideration that although created for the purposes of trade the corporation had originally nothing to trade in. All its property, its capital, its stock, was contributed by individual subscribers from their private funds, and was by them intrusted to its keeping and its management for their benefit, taking from it no tangible property in return, nothing but the evidence of their contributions and their consequent interest in the common fund or capital stock thus contributed.

Originally then, “ the capital stock of the bank ” was all the property of every kind, every thing, which the bank possessed. And this “ capital stock,” all of it, in reality belonged to the contributors, it being intrusted to the bank to be used and traded with for their exclusive benefit; and thus the bank became the agent of the contributors, so that the transmutation of the money originally advanced by the subscribers, into property of other kinds, though it altered the form of the investment, left its beneficial ownership unaffected ; and every new acquisition of property, by exchange or otherwise, was an acquisition for the original subscribers or their representatives, their respective interests in it all, always continuing in the same proportion as in the aggregate capital originally advanced. So that, whether in the form of money, bills of exchange, or any other property in possession or in action into which the money originally contributed has been changed or which it has produced, all is, as the original contribution was, the capital stock of the bank, held as the original contribution was, for the exclusive benefit of the original contributors and those who represent them. The original contributors and those who represent them are the stockholders. Each one of [110]*110them holds an undivided portion of the entire stock, and together they hold all the stock of the corporation. The stock certificate which each of them holds is the muniment of his title, specifying his proportion of interest in all the property of the corporation, and all these stock certificates together represent the entire property of the bank, in whatever form it may exist.

By the terms of the charter the capital stock of the bank was to consist of five thousand shares of one hundred dollars each. Had that amount been subscribed and at once paid in, the money so accumulated would have been the capital stock of the bank, and as such exempted from taxation. And when one hundred thousand dollars of the money thus accumulated had been paid out by the bank on its subscription for stock of the Hampshire and Hampden Canal Corporation, that canal stock took the place of the money paid, for it, and became pro tanto capital stock of the City Bank, and exempt, as the money was, from taxation. And so when afterwards, for debts previously contracted, houses, lands or goods were necessarily taken in payment, such houses, lands or goods became, in lieu of the money for which they were received, part of the capital stock, and entitled to the same exemption. Otherwise the canal stock thus purchased, and the houses, lands and goods thus acquired, might be taxed, and thus the promised exemption, purchased by the shareholders, and assured to them by the charter, would be rendered worthless and delusive.

We see no reason for a distinction in this respect between real estate so taken by the bank in payment of a debt, and the real estate which is the subject of this controversy.

The right to erect a building, suitable and proper for the transaction in it of the business authorized by the legislature, is undeniable. The grant of a right carries with it as an incident the grant of suitable and proper means to enable the grantee to exercise that right and to reap and enjoy its fruits. And the case states that the building erected by the City Bank was a suitable and proper one for a banking house in that locality. It became as legitimately the property of the bank, legally acquired and held under the charter, as the houses [111]*111and lands taken in payment of debts previously contracted. The entire cost of the building was paid, and properly paid, out of “ the capital stock” existing in the form of money, and thus the building became what the money paid for it was, capital stock in its stead. In putting on the second story of the building the directors may have made an unprofitable, or otherwise ill advised investment of the stock, but of such investment, unless it was illegal, none but the stockholders can complain.

And if the bank has violated its charter by investing a part of its capital in a way prohibited, it may be liable to the forfeiture of its franchises, but this is not the time or the place for the infliction of such a penalty.

But the primary object of the bank in erecting the building was the accommodation of the proper business of the bank, and the temporary renting of the room was but an incident to the ownership, neither affecting the title to the property nor the right to hold it free from taxation.

We are satisfied that the property in question is to be regarded as .part of the capital stock of the corporation, and therefore exempted from taxation by the express provisions of the charter.

We can not, in the absence of explicit declarations to that effect, impute to the legislature an intention to provide merely that the shareholders should be individually exempt from taxation on account of their respective interests in the property of the bank, while it retained the power and right to assess and tax all or any portion of that property against the-bank itself. Such reservation of right would render the promised exemption a worthless figment.

But it is said there is an obvious distinction between the real property of a corporation and the shares of capital stock in the hands of its stockholders, and we may add that there is the same difference between the personal property of the corporation and its stock in the hands of the stockholders; but this consideration goes but a very little way, if at all, toward the solution of the question now before us. That question is, whether the promised exemption, which confes[112]*112sedly covers the intangible ideal rights called shares in the hands of the stockholders, covers also the property, real and personal, in which the whole value of those shares consists ; whether it is possible to impose a tax upon the latter, without having the entire burden of the imposition fall upon the former ; and if it is not, whether the construction contended for by the town can be the true construction of the grant. And for the purposes of this question, we can see no difference between the real and personal property held by the corporation. The shares of the capital stock cover and include them both.

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Bluebook (online)
31 Conn. 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/town-of-new-haven-v-city-bank-conn-1862.