IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Town of Macy, Indiana, May 22 2026, 9:24 am
Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
Nyona South Mud Lake Conservancy District, Appellee-Defendant
May 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-2583 Appeal from the Fulton Superior Court The Honorable Gregory L. Heller, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 25D01-2305-PL-000287
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges May and Mathias concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 1 of 7 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] The Town of Macy, Indiana (the “Town”), contracted with the Nyona South
Mud Lake Conservancy District (the “District”) for wastewater treatment.
Several years later, both parties filed for declaratory judgment regarding their
rights under their agreement, and they both filed motions for summary
judgment to that effect. The trial court denied the motions and instead ordered
the parties to arbitration. The Town now appeals, raising several issues, one of
which is dispositive: Whether the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering the
parties to arbitrate their claims.
[2] Because we conclude the trial court erred by ordering arbitration, we reverse
and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In October 2010, the Town and the District executed a wastewater treatment
agreement (the “Agreement”) whereby the District would receive and process
sewage from the Town at the District’s treatment facility in exchange for a
lump sum plus a fixed rate that could be intermittently adjusted by the District.
The Agreement also included the following arbitration provision (the
“Arbitration Provision”):
In the event any dispute should arise between the parties to this Agreement as to any terms or conditions thereof, including any dispute as to amounts payable hereunder, the District and Town
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 2 of 7 shall agree upon an arbitrator who shall hear and resolve said dispute and whose decision shall be final and binding upon both parties.
Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 36.
[4] In mid-2023, after disputes arose between the parties regarding the District’s
approval of a rate increase and the responsibility for costs associated with an
alleged discharge of sewage at the District’s facility, the parties filed competing
requests for declaratory judgment. In November, the parties filed competing
motions for summary judgment. At the hearing on those motions, the trial
court confirmed that the parties agreed the Agreement controlled and asked
them, “But why isn’t this going to arbitration as laid out in [the Agreement]?”
Tr. Vol. II at 28. The Town argued that the parties had waived arbitration “by
participation in these proceedings” and that the Arbitration Provision was
“invalid” and “defective.” Id. at 29. The District represented that it had
“discussed the possibility of” filing a motion to compel arbitration and decided
to instead “follow through with [its] own [declaratory judgment] action.” Id.
[5] In January 2024, the trial court denied the parties’ motions for summary
judgment because it determined that the Agreement required the parties to
arbitrate their disputes. The trial court thus ordered “the parties [to] engage in
arbitration as required by the Agreement.” Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 3. On
the Town’s motion, the trial court certified that order for interlocutory appeal;
this court dismissed the ensuing appeal without prejudice. The parties then
proceeded to arbitration, and in January 2025, the arbitrator issued its award.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 3 of 7 The Town then filed a motion challenging that award, and the trial court
affirmed it, entering judgment consistent therewith. This appeal ensued.1
Discussion and Decision The Trial Court Erred by Sua Sponte Ordering the Parties to Arbitration
[6] The Town argues that the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering the parties to
participate in arbitration. We review a trial court’s decision to compel
arbitration de novo. Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind.
2021) (citing Med. Realty Assocs., LLC v. D.A. Dodd, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 871 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010)).
[7] Indiana’s Uniform Arbitration Act authorizes our trial courts to recognize and
enforce arbitration agreements. Ind. Code §§ 34-57-2-1 to -22.2 Such
agreements are contracts, so Indiana contract law principles apply. Carmel
Operator, 160 N.E.3d at 521–22. Generally, a court will enforce an arbitration
agreement unless (1) that agreement is “illegal or against public policy,” id. at
1 Both parties fail to support numerous statements of fact throughout their briefs with citations to the Record, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) and 46(A)(8)(a). We remind the parties that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). 2 On July 1, 2026, a new version of Indiana Code section 34-57-2-1 will go into effect, but the amendment does not alter the substance of that section. Compare Ind. Code § 34-57-2-1 (effective July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2026), with 2026 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 115-2026 § 82 (West) (updating cross reference in subsection (b)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 4 of 7 521; or (2) a party seeking to compel arbitration has waived its right to do so,
ISP.com LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ind. 2004).
[8] The Town specifically argues that the trial court could not sua sponte order
arbitration because both parties waived their right to enforce the Arbitration
Provision. Contracting parties may waive arbitration, Theising, 805 N.E.2d at
776, and such waiver will be presumed when a party chooses to “proceed before
a nonarbitral tribunal” to resolve a contractual dispute, Prof’l Constr., Inc. v.
Historic Walnut Square, LLC, 224 N.E.3d 352, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995)).
[9] Here, both parties chose to file their complaints in the trial court and proceed
before the trial court instead of enforcing the Arbitration Provision. At no time
prior to the trial court’s arbitration order did either party seek to enforce the
Agreement arbitration provision. In fact, the District represented that it had
considered filing a motion to compel arbitration but decided not to. On these
facts, it is clear that both parties waived the Arbitration Provision.
[10] Because the parties unequivocally waived their agreement to arbitrate their
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Town of Macy, Indiana, May 22 2026, 9:24 am
Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
Nyona South Mud Lake Conservancy District, Appellee-Defendant
May 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-2583 Appeal from the Fulton Superior Court The Honorable Gregory L. Heller, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 25D01-2305-PL-000287
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges May and Mathias concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 1 of 7 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] The Town of Macy, Indiana (the “Town”), contracted with the Nyona South
Mud Lake Conservancy District (the “District”) for wastewater treatment.
Several years later, both parties filed for declaratory judgment regarding their
rights under their agreement, and they both filed motions for summary
judgment to that effect. The trial court denied the motions and instead ordered
the parties to arbitration. The Town now appeals, raising several issues, one of
which is dispositive: Whether the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering the
parties to arbitrate their claims.
[2] Because we conclude the trial court erred by ordering arbitration, we reverse
and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In October 2010, the Town and the District executed a wastewater treatment
agreement (the “Agreement”) whereby the District would receive and process
sewage from the Town at the District’s treatment facility in exchange for a
lump sum plus a fixed rate that could be intermittently adjusted by the District.
The Agreement also included the following arbitration provision (the
“Arbitration Provision”):
In the event any dispute should arise between the parties to this Agreement as to any terms or conditions thereof, including any dispute as to amounts payable hereunder, the District and Town
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 2 of 7 shall agree upon an arbitrator who shall hear and resolve said dispute and whose decision shall be final and binding upon both parties.
Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 36.
[4] In mid-2023, after disputes arose between the parties regarding the District’s
approval of a rate increase and the responsibility for costs associated with an
alleged discharge of sewage at the District’s facility, the parties filed competing
requests for declaratory judgment. In November, the parties filed competing
motions for summary judgment. At the hearing on those motions, the trial
court confirmed that the parties agreed the Agreement controlled and asked
them, “But why isn’t this going to arbitration as laid out in [the Agreement]?”
Tr. Vol. II at 28. The Town argued that the parties had waived arbitration “by
participation in these proceedings” and that the Arbitration Provision was
“invalid” and “defective.” Id. at 29. The District represented that it had
“discussed the possibility of” filing a motion to compel arbitration and decided
to instead “follow through with [its] own [declaratory judgment] action.” Id.
[5] In January 2024, the trial court denied the parties’ motions for summary
judgment because it determined that the Agreement required the parties to
arbitrate their disputes. The trial court thus ordered “the parties [to] engage in
arbitration as required by the Agreement.” Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 3. On
the Town’s motion, the trial court certified that order for interlocutory appeal;
this court dismissed the ensuing appeal without prejudice. The parties then
proceeded to arbitration, and in January 2025, the arbitrator issued its award.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 3 of 7 The Town then filed a motion challenging that award, and the trial court
affirmed it, entering judgment consistent therewith. This appeal ensued.1
Discussion and Decision The Trial Court Erred by Sua Sponte Ordering the Parties to Arbitration
[6] The Town argues that the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering the parties to
participate in arbitration. We review a trial court’s decision to compel
arbitration de novo. Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind.
2021) (citing Med. Realty Assocs., LLC v. D.A. Dodd, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 871 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010)).
[7] Indiana’s Uniform Arbitration Act authorizes our trial courts to recognize and
enforce arbitration agreements. Ind. Code §§ 34-57-2-1 to -22.2 Such
agreements are contracts, so Indiana contract law principles apply. Carmel
Operator, 160 N.E.3d at 521–22. Generally, a court will enforce an arbitration
agreement unless (1) that agreement is “illegal or against public policy,” id. at
1 Both parties fail to support numerous statements of fact throughout their briefs with citations to the Record, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) and 46(A)(8)(a). We remind the parties that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). 2 On July 1, 2026, a new version of Indiana Code section 34-57-2-1 will go into effect, but the amendment does not alter the substance of that section. Compare Ind. Code § 34-57-2-1 (effective July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2026), with 2026 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 115-2026 § 82 (West) (updating cross reference in subsection (b)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 4 of 7 521; or (2) a party seeking to compel arbitration has waived its right to do so,
ISP.com LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ind. 2004).
[8] The Town specifically argues that the trial court could not sua sponte order
arbitration because both parties waived their right to enforce the Arbitration
Provision. Contracting parties may waive arbitration, Theising, 805 N.E.2d at
776, and such waiver will be presumed when a party chooses to “proceed before
a nonarbitral tribunal” to resolve a contractual dispute, Prof’l Constr., Inc. v.
Historic Walnut Square, LLC, 224 N.E.3d 352, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995)).
[9] Here, both parties chose to file their complaints in the trial court and proceed
before the trial court instead of enforcing the Arbitration Provision. At no time
prior to the trial court’s arbitration order did either party seek to enforce the
Agreement arbitration provision. In fact, the District represented that it had
considered filing a motion to compel arbitration but decided not to. On these
facts, it is clear that both parties waived the Arbitration Provision.
[10] Because the parties unequivocally waived their agreement to arbitrate their
disputes in this case, the trial court erred by ordering the matter to arbitration.
See JK Harris & Co., LLC v. Sandlin, 942 N.E.2d 875, 884–85 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (rejecting party’s argument that trial court “was required to affirmatively
protect its contractual interests” in arbitration), trans. denied; Auto. Mechcs. Local
701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740, 747
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 5 of 7 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding district court could not enforce arbitration clause
when “litigants turn[ed] their back on their right to enforce” it), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Rodgers-Rouzier v. Am. Queen Steamboat Operating Co., LLC, 104
F.4th 978 (7th Cir. 2024); Wein v. Morris, 944 A.2d 642, 648–49 (N.J. 2008)
(holding parties’ “unequivocal waiver” of arbitration provision prohibited trial
court from enforcing said provision); Marzano v. Proficio Mortg. Ventures, LLC,
942 F. Supp. 2d 781, 798 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“District courts should not sua sponte
enforce arbitration clauses.”); I.C. §§ 34-57-2-1(a), -2, -3(a) (providing that
arbitration may only be initiated by contracting parties, those in privity with
them, or a third-party specifically designated to do so); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (same);
Conn Appliances Inc. v. Powers, 417 P.3d 390, 393 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018)
(determining trial court “erred by ordering the parties to arbitration in the
absence of a motion by a party”). Furthermore, it is apparent that the trial
court only denied the parties’ summary judgment motions because it ordered
them to arbitrate the disputes identified by those motions.
[11] Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s orders denying the parties’
summary judgment motions, ordering the matter to arbitration, and affirming
the arbitrator’s award. We remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate
those orders and to consider the merits of the parties’ summary judgment
motions.
[12] Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 6 of 7 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Bryce Runkle Peru, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Joseph W. Eddingfield Wabash, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2583 | May 22, 2026 Page 7 of 7