Town of Iowa Water & Sewer v. Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Co

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedMarch 22, 2024
Docket2:22-cv-02300
StatusUnknown

This text of Town of Iowa Water & Sewer v. Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Co (Town of Iowa Water & Sewer v. Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Co) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of Iowa Water & Sewer v. Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Co, (W.D. La. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

TOWN OF IOWA WATER & SEWER CASE NO. 2:22-CV-02300

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

TOKIO MARINE SPECIALTY MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO INSURANCE CO

MEMORANDUM RULING Before the Court is a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” (Doc. 17) filed by Plaintiff, Town of Iowa (“Iowa”) who moves for an order finding that Defendant, Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Company’s (“Tokio”) policy of insurance provides coverage for wind damage to the Iowa’s oxidation pond grid baffle system caused by Hurricanes Laura and Delta. FACTUAL STATEMENT Iowa owns the wastewater treatment facility in Iowa, Louisiana.1 Tokio issued a policy of insurance during the relevant time period, which policy specified certain Locations and Buildings.2 On August 27, 2020, and October 9, 2020, Hurricanes Laura and Delta made landfall and Iowa’s baffle/grid system was damaged beyond repair and had to be replaced.3

1 Tokio disputes this fact considering that Iowa did not submit any summary judgment evidence to establish ownership of the undefined “wastewater treatment facility.” 2 Doc. 17-3, pp. 5-6; Doc. 17-4, p. 5. 3 Tokio disputes this as Iowa has submitted no summary judgment evidence for this statement of fact. Specifically, Tokio remarks that there is no evidence of damage, or a cause of damage presented for the undefined “baffle grid system.” Defendant’s exhibit 1, ¶ ¶ 20-31. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The party moving for summary judgment is initially responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). The court must deny the motion for summary judgment if the movant fails to meet this

burden. Id. If the movant makes this showing, however, the burden then shifts to the non- moving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quotations omitted). This requires more than mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings. Instead, the

nonmovant must submit “significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted). A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on

a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Iowa submitted a claim for damages to the grid baffle system, however, Tokio has denied coverage for the damage because it considered the grid baffle system as “mobile equipment.” Iowa argues that it is not “mobile equipment” because it is permanently attached to the levee on the north and south sides of the oxidation pond. Additionally, Tokio claims that the policy excludes coverage for any body of water, and because the grid system is partially in the water, it is not a covered risk. Finally, Tokio argues that Iowa is not the real party-in-interest because Iowa received a grant from FEMA to cover the cost of the grid baffle system. Tokio presents the following table of Locations and Buildings, which it identifies as being insured under the policy:

LOC # BLD # ADDRESS BLD LIMIT CONTENTS DESCRIPTION OF LIMIT OPERATIONS 001 001 106 South Kinney Ave $1,300 $1,500 Chlorination RM 001 002 106 South Kinney Ave $4,550 $4,895 Filter Plant 001 003 106 South Kinney Ave $8,100 $2,000 Wearhouse [sic] 001 004 106 South Kinney Ave $400 $0 Aux Pump Shed 001 005 106 South Kinney Ave $75,000 $0 H2O Treat Plant 001 006 106 South Kinney Ave $1,500,000 $0 Tanks, Bins, Silos 001 007 106 South Kinney Ave $350,000 $0 Filter System 001 008 106 South Kinney Ave $182,718 $0 BKWSH Rec System 001 009 106 South Kinney Ave $172,800 $0 Control 001 010 106 South Kinney Ave $50,000 $0 Maintenance 001 011 106 South Kinney Ave $83,104 $0 H2O Treat Plant 001 012 106 South Kinney Ave $46,768 $0 Standby Gener 001 013 106 South Kinney Ave $46,800 $0 Standby Gener 002 001 610 Railroad Ave $600,000 $0 Lift Stations 002 002 610 Railroad Ave $1,500,000 $0 Baffle System Aerators/Blwrs 003 001 Various locations $25,000 $0 Fire Hydrants throughout the system Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court sitting in

diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the forum state. Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1991). Louisiana law provides that an insurance policy is a contract and that its provisions are construed using the general rules of contract interpretation in the Louisiana Civil Code. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Superior Labor Svcs., Inc., 179 F.Supp.3d 656, 675 (E.D. La. 2016). The words of the policy are given their generally prevailing meaning and “interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given

the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.” Coleman v. Sch. Bd. of Richland Par., 418 F.3d 511, 516–17 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 2047, 2050). Ambiguities in the policy must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Id. at 517. The court resolves an ambiguity by asking “how a reasonable insurance policy purchaser would construe the clause at the time the insurance contract was entered.” Id. Insurance policies

are to be liberally construed in favor of coverage. Capital Bank & Trust Company v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. Of U.S., 542 So.2d 494, 496 (La. 1989). Ambiguities must be resolved by determining how a reasonable insured would have construed the clause at the time the policy was entered into. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609, 610-11 (La. 1989). It is not the insurer’s intent that is relevant to the interpretation of the policy, but

rather how the words would be understood by a reasonable person in the shoes of the insured. Dawson Farms, LLC v. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 794 So.2d 949, 952 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/1/01). The policy must be read as a layman would have read it, not an insurance expert. Id. FEMA grant Tokio suggests that Iowa seeks recovery for damage that it has already been paid by

FEMA.

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Related

Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan
45 F.3d 951 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
Brumfield v. Hollins
551 F.3d 322 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
304 U.S. 64 (Supreme Court, 1938)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hari Aum, L.L.C. v. First Guaranty Bank
714 F.3d 274 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOCIETY OF US
542 So. 2d 494 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1989)
Breland v. Schilling
550 So. 2d 609 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1989)
Dawson Farms, LLC v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
794 So. 2d 949 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2001)
Hanover Insurance Co. v. Superior Labor Services, Inc.
179 F. Supp. 3d 656 (E.D. Louisiana, 2016)
Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
928 F.2d 679 (Fifth Circuit, 1991)

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Town of Iowa Water & Sewer v. Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Co, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/town-of-iowa-water-sewer-v-tokio-marine-specialty-insurance-co-lawd-2024.