Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau
Opinion
State of Vermont
Superior Court—Environmental Division
====================================================================== ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
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Town of Fairfax vs. Leon Beliveau Docket No. 274-11-08 Vtec (Municipal Enforcement)
Title: Motion to Stay – Pending Appeal (Filing No. 29) Filed: May 3, 2012 Filed By: Defendant Leon Beliveau Response filed on 5/14/12 and 5/15/12 by Plaintiff Town of Fairfax Reply filed on 5/25/12 Defendant Leon Beliveau
___ Granted X Denied ___ Other
This matter is an enforcement action brought by the Town of Fairfax (the Town) against Defendant Leon Beliveau (Defendant) for an alleged change of use of 1166 Main Street, Fairfax, Vermont from a single-family dwelling to a rooming and boarding house without first obtaining a zoning permit as required by the Town of Fairfax Zoning Bylaws (the Bylaws). In a September 2, 2011 Decision, this Court concluded that Defendant was violating the Bylaws, and in a subsequent October 24, 2011 Injunctive Order, this Court required the following:
Defendant Leon Beliveau shall immediately cease the use of the property at 1166 Main Street in the Town of Fairfax, Vermont, as a rooming and boarding house, as that term is defined in the Zoning Bylaws, and shall return the use of the property to that of a single-family dwelling, as that term is defined in the Zoning Bylaws, until or unless he obtains a zoning permit for the change of use from that of a single-family dwelling.
This injunction was incorporated and repeated in this Court’s March 30, 2012 Decision and Judgment Order assigning penalties for Defendant’s violation. Remaining for resolution was a Motion for Contempt filed by the Town against Defendant for alleged non-compliance with the original injunctive order.
Defendant appealed the Environmental Division’s March 30, 2012 Decision and Judgment Order to the Vermont Supreme Court on April 13, 2012. On May, 3, 2012, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 62(d)(1) and V.R.A.P. 8(a), Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Pending Appeal with the Environmental Division. The Motion to Stay asks that the Environmental Division stay the injunctive relief pending the outcome of Defendant’s appeal to the Supreme Court. The motion also asks that the Town’s Motion for Contempt be stayed.
Town of Fairfax vs. Beliveau, No. 274-11-08 Vtec (EO on Mot. for Stay) (07-24-12) Pg. 2 of 4
At the request of the Environmental Division, the Supreme Court placed the appeal on waiting status and remanded jurisdiction to the Environmental Division for consideration of the Motion to Stay.
We understand Defendant’s motion to request a stay of the monetary penalties and injunctive relief imposed by this Court’s March 30, 2012 Decision and Judgment Order as well as to stay our consideration of the Motion for Contempt. The Town opposes the pending Motion for Stay. Both parties filed memoranda in support of their positions and the Court heard oral argument on July 18, 2012.
Pursuant to Section 5(e) of the Vermont Rules of Environmental Court Proceedings, when a decision appealed from is not automatically stayed, this Court, on its own or upon the motion of a party, may issue a stay when it is “necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.” V.R.E.C.P. 5(e); cf. V.R.C.P. 62(d)(2). In determining whether the equities weigh in favor of issuing a stay, we consider: (1) whether the appealing party has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether denying the stay will cause irreparable harm to the moving party, (3) whether the issuance of the stay will substantially harm other parties, and (4) whether the stay would serve the best interests of the public. See In re Allen Road Land Co., Nos. 62-4-11 Vtec and 63-4-11 Vtec, slip op. at 5 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. July 6, 2011) (Durkin, J.); In re Search Warrants, 2011 VT 88, ¶ 2 (mem.).
Turning to the first factor, Defendant Beliveau argues that there is a strong likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of the Supreme Court appeal because he will be able to show either that his use of 1166 Main Street was not that of a rooming and boarding house or that the Bylaws are unconstitutionally vague in their regulation of rooming and boarding houses. Defendant’s principal argument is that his rental arrangements with his tenants are “at will” rather than for a fixed period, thus removing them from the definition of rooming and boarding house. Rooming and boarding houses are defined within the Bylaws as “[a]n owner occupied residence where a person or persons, for a fixed period of time, are supplied with and charged for meals or sleeping accommodations or both.” Bylaws, Appendix B (emphasis added). Defendant asserts that the type of tenancy he established is a pure question of law, and that the Vermont Supreme Court is likely to rule in his favor in interpreting the Bylaws.
We disagree. The question here involves a mix of facts and law, but turns principally on the facts. In its September 2, 2011 Decision, this Court concluded that the undisputed facts showed that Defendant made oral rental agreements with his tenants for fixed month-to-month terms. Defendant has not provided us with convincing evidence showing that our prior conclusion was erroneous.
Defendant’s second argument is equally unlikely to succeed. Also within the September 2, 2011 Decision this Court concluded that the Bylaws were not unconstitutionally vague. Defendant has failed to provide the Court with any specific arguments addressing how the Bylaws are vague. Consequently, we are unconvinced that either of Defendant’s legal theories demonstrate that he has a strong likelihood of succeeding in his appeal of the March 30, 2012 Order.
When analyzing the second factor, whether the moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied, we ask if the moving party has “made a case that such injuries are
Town of Fairfax vs. Beliveau, No. 274-11-08 Vtec (EO on Mot. for Stay) (07-24-12) Pg. 3 of 4
likely and if [the moving party] would have an adequate remedy at law, should the injuries they allege actually occur.” Allen Road Land Co., Nos. 62-4-11 Vtec and 63-4-11 Vtec, slip op. at 6. Defendant argues that he is suffering, and will continue to suffer, an irreparable injury if a stay is not granted because he has had to cease using 1166 Main Street as his residence. We find this claim unsupportable because the injunctive relief requires 1166 Main Street to be returned to a single-family dwelling, thereby allowing Defendant to use 1166 Main Street as his residence.
Defendant also argues that compliance with the Court’s March 30, 2012 Decision and Judgment Order would force him to ask his tenants to leave the property and, in doing so, would cause him to incur an unrecoverable financial loss. Again, we find this claim unsupportable. It is possible for Defendant to comply with the injunctive order and retain tenants—he can modify the use of the subject property so that it is that of a single-family dwelling. Further, while the question of whether Defendant could qualify for a permit to use the dwelling as a rooming and boarding house is not before the Court, Defendant has not convinced us that he would not be able to qualify should he apply. As such, we conclude that Defendant has not made a case that he has or will suffer an irreparable injury if his request for a stay is denied.
The third factor that we consider is whether granting the stay will substantially harm other parties. Defendant argues that because there is no public health hazard or risk involved with his use, granting a stay of the injunction will not harm others.
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