Town of Eunice v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co.

66 So. 257, 135 La. 882, 1914 La. LEXIS 1859
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 29, 1914
DocketNo. 19859
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 66 So. 257 (Town of Eunice v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of Eunice v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co., 66 So. 257, 135 La. 882, 1914 La. LEXIS 1859 (La. 1914).

Opinion

MONROE, O. J.

Defendant prosecutes this appeal from a verdict and judgment decreeing the expropriation of a strip of land, measuring 72x280 feet, across its right of way, for the extension of “Park avenue,’ in the town of Eunice, and awarding it $500, “for land and all damages.” Plaintiff has answered the appeal, and prays that the award be decreased to $250. The strip which is sought to be expropriated is designated, on the subjoined “sketch” (made up from several blueprints, etc., offered in evidence, and sufficiently accurate for purposes of illustration), as “Proposed St.,” and, as may be seen, extends from “Public Grounds’ (which include part of First street), on the west, to “block 88,” on the east.

It appears from the evidence that the site upon which the town of Eunice was thereafter located was surveyed in 1894, and included‘’a tract of land 1% miles square, and that, according to the plat, which was recorded in September, 1894, the intersection of Park avenue and the railway right of way is the center from which the town extends for three-quarters of a mile towards each of the four points of the compass, the avenue running east and west and the railway right of way, north and south, that each of the avenues and streets of the town measures 70 feet in width, with the exception of Park avenue, which is 150 feet wide, and East street, which is 80 feet wide, and that the right of way is 280 feet in width. East street, it will be observed, between Laurel and Maple avenues, lies immediately to the eastward of, and adjoins, blocks 88 and 89, which are 100 feet in width and are parallel with and adjoin the right of way, having been laid off with a view to the establish[886]*886ment of industrial enterprises. According to the original plat, there was no opening from West Eunice into East street, between Laurel and Maple avenues (a distance of 2,670 feet), save Oak avenue, and there was no openin'g from East street into East Eunice, save North street, the western terminus of which was the east line of block 88. The existence of the narrow passage lying to the southward of, and parallel with, North street is somewhat apocryphal, and, though it is shown that there is an appearance of a “Newly Cut Road” at the place indicated on the sketch, it is not altogether clear that the cutting was done by, or with, the approval of the owner of the land, or that the land has been dedicated to the public. It will be observed, also, that there is no public passage through the right of way, between Laurel and Oak avenues (a distance of 1,490 feet), from West Eunice, even so far as block 88, which is occupied by industrial and mercantile establishments, etc., including feed stores, ice factory, iron works, grocery stores, etc., though it appears that defendant permits and facilitates the passing of persons and vehicles in either direction, across its right of way, along the route indicated by the dotted line, running between the north end of its “Depot” and the south end of its “Platform.”

Defendant derives title to the right of way in question from an act of donation inter vivos, of date January 10, 1895, in which the consideration is said to have been the facts that, by reason of the location and construction of defendant’s road, pursuant to agreement, the donor had been enabled to lay oft into squares and lots, and to sell at an advanced price, an unproductive body of land “now * * * styled * * * the town of Eunice,” and counsel for defendant make the statements, which appears to be well founded, “that, but for the building of a branch line by defendant from its main line, from Midland Junction to the town site, there would have been no town of Eunice,” and, “as the railroad was the mother of the town, it was laid off so as to fructify and grow around the terminals granted to the railroad company.”

They, however, contend that, though under its power of eminent domain, plaintiff may lay out and open streets and expropriate private property for that purpose,, and, though, as a general proposition, it might open a street across the right of way and tracks of a railroad company, there is a well-defined exception to the exercise of the power last mentioned, which is that, in the absence of express legislation, a municipal corporation cannot open a street across a railroad company's terminal grounds, station, or yard when to do so would be to destroy or impair the usefulness of the same. It is also said that the purpose of the present attempt is to facilitate a rival railroad company, which has been given possession-of East street, and now wishes to establish a depot upon certain lots, in block 88, which it has acquired, and which adjoin, on the north side, the strip of land which it is proposed to expropriate. In the alternative, it is said that $500 is an insufficient amount to compensate the loss and damage which defendant will sustain as the result of the expropriation.

Eight witnesses, including the mayor and alderman, the town engineer, superintendent of waterworks, and business men were examined as witnesses for plaintiff. Thirteen witnesses, including defendant’s superintendent, one or two assistant engineers, right of way agent, train conductor, together with several business men, were examined as witnesses on behalf of defendant. According to the consensus of the testimony, Eunice has a population of about 2,000, most of whom reside on the west side of defendant's right of way, though there are said to be 10 [888]*888or 15 white families and quite a number of negroes living upon the east side, and two or three “additions” to the town have been laid oft on that side. The two principal business streets are Park avenue and Second street, and the center of business is, probably, about the corner of Second street and Walnut avenue. It is shown that a petition, signed by more than 70 citizens, requesting the extension of Park avenue, as proposed, was presented to the mayor and council, and that they thereupon passed an ordinance providing that the proper steps should be taken to that end. We are satisfied from the testimony that the interests of the citizens as a body demand that a passage should be opened across the right of way in question, at some point between Laurel and Oak avenues, and we find nothing to the contrary that is entitled to serious consideration. The only question, in that connection, then, is whether it would be better to extend Park avenue or Ash avenue, which is one square below. The argument in favor of Park avenue is that it is the widest and most central in the town, that it is the second business thoroughfare, and is nearer to the business, as well as the geographical, center of the town than Ash avenue, and that it lies midway between Laurel and Oak avenues, which are already so extended, whereas Ash avenue is 1,190 feet below Laurel and 300 feet above Oak. The main objection urged by defendant is that the extension of Park avenue in such proximity to the south end of its depot will render the handling of its business at that 'point dangerous, will subject it to the necessity of changing the positions of its depot and cotton platform, and will require the erection of a water crane (in addition to the tank), and hence that the case falls within the exception, rather than the rule, with respect to the exercise by plaintiff of the power of eminent domain.

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Bluebook (online)
66 So. 257, 135 La. 882, 1914 La. LEXIS 1859, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/town-of-eunice-v-louisiana-western-ry-co-la-1914.