Town of Acworth v. Fall Mountain Regional School District

857 A.2d 1265, 151 N.H. 399, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 161
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire
DecidedSeptember 2, 2004
DocketNo. 2003-791
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 857 A.2d 1265 (Town of Acworth v. Fall Mountain Regional School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of Acworth v. Fall Mountain Regional School District, 857 A.2d 1265, 151 N.H. 399, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 161 (N.H. 2004).

Opinion

Nadeau, J.

The petitioners, the Towns of Acworth, Alstead and Langdon, appeal from the Superior Court’s (Morrill, J.) denial of their petition to declare an amendment to the articles of agreement of the respondent, the Fall Mountain Regional School District (FMRSD), unlawful. We affirm.

The FMRSD is a cooperative school district consisting of the towns of Acworth, Alstead, Langdon, Charlestown and Walpole. It was formed in 1966 pursuant to Laws 1963, 258:1, now codified at RSA 195:18 (Supp. 2003), which governs the organization of cooperative school districts formed after June 30,1963. See Winnacunnet Coop. Sch. Dist. v. Town of Seabrook, 148 N.H. 519, 521 (2002).

The challenged amendment to the FMRSD’s articles of agreement, the “Unified Article,” reapportions the FMRSD’s operating and capital expenses among member towns. Before the Unified Article the FMRSD’s articles of agreement apportioned operating expenses based upon average daily pupil membership, and allocated capital expenses based upon [401]*401average daily pupil membership and equalized valuation. Under the Unified Article all operating expenses of the high school continue to be apportioned annually based upon average daily pupil membership. After fiscal year 2002-2003 (the first year of operation under the Article), however, most operating expenses for kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8) are assigned to each member town according to the number of K-8 pupils residing there; all K-8 capital expenses are assigned to the member towns that incurred them. As the business administrator for the FMRSD testified, for most K-8 expenses the Unified Article obliges member towns to pay for what they use.

The Unified Article defines capital expenses as “the acquisition of land, the construction of new schools or additional square footage added to existing schools.” See RSA 195:18, III(g). The Unified Article classifies operating expenses as “direct” or “shared.” Direct costs are “directly attributable” to the member towns. The Unified Article lists shared costs under one of six different formulas or “methods” for apportioning them.

The Unified Article requires the FMRSD business administrator, superintendent and school board to certify to the State Department of Education (DOE) “that the proposed budget for each ensuing fiscal year has been apportioned in compliance with the methods agreed to in the[] Unified ArtieleO.” Additionally, pursuant to the Unified Article, the school board and school administration annually must: (1) “[r]eview all line items to determine if they will need to be deleted or moved into another method”; (2) “[a]dd any new line items to the budget and assign as appropriate”; and (3) “[a]djust apportionment percentages as appropriate” in three of the six apportionment methods.

The narrow issue before us is whether the Unified Article is lawful. To resolve this appeal, we must interpret the State’s cooperative school district law, RSA chapter 195. As statutory interpretation involves a question of law, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Craftsbury Co. v. Assurance Co. of America, 149 N.H. 717, 719 (2003).

This court is the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Steir v. Girl Scouts of the U.S.A., 150 N.H. 212, 214 (2003). We first examine the language of the statute, and where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. When a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent. Id. We do not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to incorporate in the statute. Id. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id.

[402]*402The petitioners first argue that the Unified Article frustrates the purpose of RSA chapter 195. They assert that the law’s “obvious purpose” was to “provide sufficient financial resources to support all the students in the cooperative and to insure that no individual school district has to rely on its own financial resources to provide education to its students.” The Unified Article violates this purpose, they contend, because “with the exception of about 25% of the operating expenses for elementary students, the individual towns of Fall Mountain are in the same position financially with respect to their elementary students as they would be in if they had never joined the cooperative.”

The petitioners misstate the law’s purpose. The stated purpose of RSA chapter 195 is to “increase educational opportunities within the state by encouraging the formation of cooperative school districts.” RSA 195:2,1(a) (1999). The legislature expected each cooperative school district to “[b]e a natural social and economic region,” “[h]ave an adequate minimum taxable valuation,” and “[h]ave a number of pupils sufficient to permit the efficient use of school facilities within the district and to provide improved instruction.” Id. The petitioners do not assert that the Unified Article violates these legislative objectives.

The petitioners next argue that the Unified Article violates RSA 195:18, UI(i). This provision requires a cooperative school district’s articles of agreement to include “[t]he method by which the articles ... may be amended with approval of the board; except that no amendment may permit secession of territory.” RSA 195:18, III(i). It also sets forth the procedure for reviewing a cooperative district’s apportionment formulas:

The provisions adopted under either subparagraph (e) or (g) above may be subject to review pursuant to an article for that purpose duly inserted in the warrant for a district meeting which may be held at any time after the expiration of the 5-year period measured from the date of the first annual meeting. If the apportionment formula for a cooperative school district has been duly changed, the basis for the apportionment of all such costs may be subject to review pursuant to an article for that purpose duly inserted in the warrant for a district meeting which may be held at any time after the expiration of the 5-year period measured from the date of the meeting at which the last change was made to the cost apportionment. However, such provisions may be amended at any time in order to permit the enlargement of a cooperative school district or an increase in the number of .grades for which the cooperative school district shall be responsible.

[403]*403Id. Subparagraph (e) of RSA 195:18, III concerns “[t]he method of apportioning” a cooperative school district’s operating expenses. Subparagraph (g) of RSA 195:18, III concerns “[t]he method of apportioning” a cooperative school district’s capital expenses.

The petitioners rely also upon RSA 195:14, I(c) (1999), which requires the commissioner of revenue administration to certify “the total amount to be apportioned among the pre-existing school districts.” They argue that the phrase “all such costs” in RSA 195:18, III(i) and the reference to the “total amount to be apportioned” in RSA 195:14, 1(c) evinces legislative intent that all of a cooperative school district’s operating and capital expenses be shared by all member towns pursuant to a set formula.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Schiavi v. City of Rochester
880 A.2d 428 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2005)
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Seacoast Harley-Davidson, Inc.
877 A.2d 211 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
857 A.2d 1265, 151 N.H. 399, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/town-of-acworth-v-fall-mountain-regional-school-district-nh-2004.