Towle v. State of Maine

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 14, 2011
DocketKENcr-10-380thru382
StatusUnpublished

This text of Towle v. State of Maine (Towle v. State of Maine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Towle v. State of Maine, (Me. Super. Ct. 2011).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. Docket No.: 10-CR-380 10-CR-381 10-CR-382 0~N- tZt-rJ- 7f'i/:2oJ; Donna Towle, a/k/a, Donna Harris,

Petitioner DECISION AND ORDER v.

State of Maine,

Respondent

In these post-conviction actions, Petitioner asks the Court to vacate or strike

certain convictions upon which the State relies to enhance two pending charges against

her. In particular, Petitioner contends that the convictions used to enhance a current

operating under the influence charge to an Aggravating Criminal OUI (Class B), and to

enhance a pending operating after revocation charge to a Class C offense are

unconstitutional.

Factual Background

On May 2, 2001, Petitioner pled guilty to an information by which the State

charged Criminal QUI (Class C) and Operating after Revocation (Class C). The State

charged the QUI as a Class C due to three prior QUI offenses (AUGDC-CR-00-1029,

AUGDC-CR-00-1344, and WATDC-CR-92-2840).

In February 2010, the State charged Petitioner by way of an indictment with a

Class B OUI, based in part on the Class C OUI conviction in May 2001 (WATDC-CR- 01-773). Through the same indictment, the State charged Petitioner with a Class C

Operating after Revocation, which was enhanced to a Class C due to three prior OUI

convictions (AUGDC-CR-00-1029, AUGDC-CR-00-1344, and WATDC-CR-92-2840).

Petitioner maintains that she did not have the benefit of legal counsel at the time

of her pleas to the OUI charges in the Augusta and Waterville District Courts. In

addition, Petitioner asserts that her counsel at the May 2001 plea was ineffective because

her counsel did not investigate whether Petitioner had legal counsel when she pled to the

prior OUI charges. Petitioner also contends that because she did not have counsel when

she pled to the OUI charges in the Augusta and Waterville District Courts, the OUI

convictions cannot be used to enhance the pending operating after revocation charge to a

Class C.

Discussion

A. Class C OUI Conviction (WATDC-CR-01-773)

Petitioner challenges the validity of the Class C OUI conviction by which

conviction the allegation in Count I of the pending Indictment (AUGSC-CR-09-1015)

has been enhanced to a Class B QUI. In particular, Petitioner argues that she received

ineffective assistance of counsel at the time she entered her plea on May 2, 2001, and,

therefore, the Class C conviction cannot serve as the basis for the enhanced charge. 1

Whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-part

inquiry by the Court. First, the Court must assess "whether there has been serious

incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance ... below

1 Petitioner also argues that the services of a lawyer for the day are insufficient to satisfy a person's constitutional right to counsel. The Law Court recently rejected this argument. See State v. Philip G. Galarneau, 2011 ME 60, ~m 8-9,-- A.3d --. The mere fact that a lawyer for the day represented Petitioner at the time of her plea to the Class C OUI does not constitute a denial of Petitioner's constitutional right to counsel. !d. what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney ...." Francis v. State, 2007 ME

148, ~ 4, 938 A.2d 10, 11 (quoting, McGowan v. State, 2006 ME 16, ~ 11, 894 A.2d 493,

496-97). The Court then is required to determine "whether the attorney's performance

'likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground or defense' or

'likely affected the outcome of the [proceeding].'" Francis, 2007 ME 148, ~ 4, 938 A.2d

at 11 (quoting, McGowan, 2006 ME 16, ~~ 11-13,894 A.2d at 497). Petitioner has the

burden of proving both prongs. McGowan, 2006 ME 16, ~ 12, 894 A.2d at 497 (citing,

State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ~ 15,699 A.2d 1139, 1143).

At the hearing, Petitioner conceded that she has little independent memory of the

May 2, 2001, proceeding at which she pled guilty to the Class C QUI. She does recall,

however, meeting with the lawyer for the day, and that the lawyer informed her that the

plea offer, which included a period of incarceration of 10 months, was a good deal. She

said that she agreed with that assessment.

The lawyer for the day, Thomas Tilton, also has very little, if any, memory of the

2001 meeting with Petitioner and the subsequent court appearance. He testified as to his

normal practice when he serves as lawyer for the day. More specifically, Attorney Tilton

testified that as the lawyer for the day, he typically advises each defendant charged with a

felony offense not to plea to the charge at the initial appearance. Because he lacks a

memory of his conversation with Petitioner, Attorney Tilton could not refute Petitioner's

testimony that Attorney Tilton said that the proposed plea offer was a good deal.

Attorney Tilton also testified that in the event a defendant wishes to plea at the

initial appearance on a felony, he reviews with the defendant the Rule 11 process, the

waiver of indictment that would be required, and the rights that the defendant would be required to waive. In this case, Petitioner signed a waiver of indictment, and signed a

written Acknowledgement of Rights, which sets forth Petitioner's basic constitutional

and procedural rights relevant to a plea. Neither party presented any evidence to

establish whether Attorney Tilton and Petitioner discussed the circumstances of the prior

OUI convictions by which the offense to which she pled was enhanced to a Class C OUI.Z

After consideration of all of the evidence, the Court concludes that Petitioner has

failed to establish that Attorney Tilton's representation fell "below what might be

expected from an ordinary fallible attorney .. .."Francis, 2007 ME 148, ~ 4, 938 A.2d at

11 (quoting, McGowan, 2006 ME 16, ~ 11, 894 A.2d at 496-97). Petitioner's sole

evidence regarding the services provided by Attorney Tilton is her testimony as to

Attorney Tilton's view of the plea offer. Not insignificantly, because she has very little

memory of her discussions with Attorney Tilton or the May 2001 court proceeding,

Petitioner was unable to identify the specific ways in which Attorney Tilton's

representation was substandard. Although Petitioner maintains that Attorney Tilton did

not investigate the circumstances of the prior OUI convictions, in part because of her lack

of memory, and in part because of the absence of a transcript or recording of the court

proceeding, she is unable to present the Court with any reliable evidence to support her

contention that they did not discuss the issue. Furthermore, there is no evidence upon

which the Court could conclude that Petitioner would have decided not to plea if

Attorney Tilton had discussed the issue with her. In fact, given Petitioner's favorable

2 Upon questioning by Petitioner's attorney, Attorney Tilton testified that had he been retained or appointed to represent Petitioner beyond the initial appearance, he would have investigated the circumstances of the prior QUI convictions. This testimony does not, however, establish that he did not discuss the subject with Petitioner before her initial appearance. view of the plea offer, Petitioner might have chosen to plea to the charge regardless of the

information and advice provided by Attorney Tilton.

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Related

Scott v. Illinois
440 U.S. 367 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Nichols v. United States
511 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Francis v. State
2007 ME 148 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2007)
State v. Brewer
1997 ME 177 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
State v. Cook
1998 ME 40 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
McGowan v. State
2006 ME 16 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2006)
State v. Watson
2006 ME 80 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2006)
State v. Galarneau
2011 ME 60 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2011)
State v. Maloney
2001 ME 140 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)

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