Tower & Sons v. United States

11 Ct. Cust. 157, 1921 WL 1230, 1921 CCPA LEXIS 49
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals·Decided November 21, 1921·No. No. 2111·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

MaRtiN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The merchandise now in question was invoiced as “ boiled cider,” and was described by the appraiser as “boiled cider (concentrated apple juice) of the consistency of sirup.”

The collector classified it for duty as a fruit juice or fruit sirup under paragraph 247 of the tariff act of 1913. The paragraph reads as follows:

247. Cherry juice and prune juice, or prune wine, and other fruit juices, and fruit sirup, not specially provided for in this section, containing no alcohol or not more than 18 per centum of alcohol, 70 cents per gallon; if containing more than 18 per centum of alcohol, 70 cents per gallon and in addition thereto $2.07 per proof gallon on the alcohol contained therein.

The importers protested, claiming an assessment of the article as cider under the eo nomine provision of paragraph 202 of the act, which reads as follows:

202. Cider, 2 cents per gallon.

[159] The protest was submitted to the Board of General Appraisers and was overruled. The importers have appealed from that decision.

It seems to be conceded that the importation is dutiable either as cider under the latter provision above copied or as fruit juice or fruit sirup under the former one. And in case it be found that the article responds to both enumerations, it can hardly be doubted that the eo nomine provision for cider should prevail over the descriptive one for fruit juice or fruit sirup.

The principle is well established that in determining the classification of goods an eo nomine designation must, unless a legislative intent to the contrary is clearly indicated, be preferred to terms of general description and to enumerations which are broader in scope and less specific.—Smith, J., in Brown & Co. v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 415; T. D. 35977).

The issue, therefore, is reduced to a single question, to wit, whether the present article is included within the enumeration of cider ” in paragraph 202, supra.

The importation consists of apple juice, which has been boiled down to about one-fifth of its original volume, having now a consistency like thin maple sirup, containing no foreign ingredient, and having suffered no chemical change whatever, except possibly a negligible alteration of its sugar content, such as is unavoidable in the operation. Its present consistency prevents its use as a beverage, but it may be restored to that use by simply adding water to it, and that is one of the recognized and considerable uses of the importation in domestic trade. The article is largely used in the manufacture of apple butter and to some extent for culinary purposes. It contains in concentrated form all of the elements and qualities of raw cider, except that it will not naturally ferment. Whether it would naturally become vinegar if diluted does not appear from the record.

The contention of the importers before the board was twofold: First, that for many years next preceding the enactment of the foregoing provisions, cider was definitely, uniformly, and generally known in the commerce of this country, according to its condition, as sweet cider, hard cider, boiled cider, etc., and that the present article was thus commercially designated as one kind of cider, namely, boiled cider; and, secondly, that by reason of its characteristics the present article responds in fact to the enumeration of cider as commonly understood in this country.

The board overruled both branches of the importers’ contention, discussing the latter at some length, but dismissing the former with the following observation only:

The fact that it is designated boiled cider, thus retaining the original name, in no way convinces us that it should be classified as cider. It should be considered as though it had been imported under a name entirely different and in no way suggesting its origin.

[160] In this conclusion we think that the board erred, for if the importation had received a commercial designation in this country as a kind of cider, and if that fact sufficiently appeared from the testimony, we think that such a designation should control the assessment of the article, since the enumeration of cider in paragraph 202, supra, contains no terms of limitation.

The authoritative rule upon this subject is laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hedden v. Richard (149 U. S., 346, 348) in these words:

With regard to the language of commerce, the general rule laid down by this court is that it must be construed, when used in laws imposing duties on importations of goods, and particularly when employed in the denomination of articles, according to the commercial understanding of the terms used.—United States v. One hundred and twelve casks of sugar (8 Pet., 277) ; Elliott v. Swartwout (10 Pet., 137). While it is true that “language will be presumed to have the same meaning in commerce that it has in ordinary use, unless the contrary is shown ” (Swan v. Arthur, 103 U. S., 597, 598), yet “ the commercial designation of an article among traders and importers, where such designation is clearly established, fixes its character for the purpose of the tariff laws; * * * a specific designation eo nomine must prevail over general terms, and a commercial designation is the standard by which the dutiable character of the article is fixed.”—Arthur v. Lahey (96 U. S., 112, 113, 114). This rule is equally applicable where a term is confined in its meaning, not merely to commerce, but to a particular trade, and in such case also the presumption is that the term was used in its trade signification.

In Maddock v. Magone (152 U. S., 368, 371) the proof necessary to establish such a commercial designation is defined as follows:

Necessarily the commercial designation is the result of established usage in commerce and trade, and such usage, to affect a general enactment, must be definite, uniform, and general, and not partial, local, or personal;

In the present case the importers undertook to prove a commercial designation of the importation as a kind of cider, to wit, boiled cider. In support of that claim, witness Glen M. Oyer testified as follows:

Q. How is this merchandise known and designated in trade? — A. Boiled cider.
$ $ * s¡s 4: sjt *
Q. Now, state whether or not on and immediately prior to October 3, 1913, there was a recognized article of trade and commerce known as boiled cider?— A. There was.
Q. Was the designation boiled cider generally and uniformly used- prior to that time? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether or not the merchandise in question would be included or excluded from the commercial designation of' boiled cider? — A. It would be boiled cider..
Q. It would be included? — A. Yes, sir.
* * $ * * * *
Q. Mr. Oyer, is not cider commonly known as sweet cider, as hard cider, or as boiled cider, as the case may be? — A. Yes, sir.

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Tower & Sons v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. 157, 1921 WL 1230, 1921 CCPA LEXIS 49 (ccpa 1921).

11 Ct. Cust. 157 (Tower & Sons v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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