Touch v. Master Unit Die

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: January 5, 1995
• Docket: 94-1676
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1676
                                      NAN TOUCH,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                           MASTER UNIT DIE PRODUCTS, INC.,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                          v.

                     TRUEBLOOD, INC., a/k/a MODDRN, INC., ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Stahl,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

             Mark A. McCormack, with whom Law Offices of Mark A. McCormack was
             _________________            ________________________________
        on brief for appellant.
             Lenahan O'Connell, with whom O'Connell and O'Connell was on brief
             _________________            _______________________
        for appellee.
                                 ____________________

                                   January 5, 1995
                                 ____________________



CYR, Circuit  Judge.  Defendant and  third-party plain-
                    CYR, Circuit  Judge
                         ______________

          tiff  Master Unit  Die Products,  Inc. ("MUD"),  appeals from  an

          adverse  judgment  dismissing  its cross-claim  for  contribution

          against appellees P.H. Trueblood Corporation and  Trueblood, Inc.

          (collectively:    "Trueblood").    As the  findings  of  fact and

          conclusions  of law entered by  the district court  do not permit

          reliable appellate review, see  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a),  we vacate
                                     ___

          its judgment and remand for further proceedings.  

I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

In 1966,  Trueblood designed, manufactured, and  sold a

          plastic-molding press  designed so that end-users  could affix to

          its movable shuttle  table two "quick-change"  frames.  Once  the

          press  was equipped  with the  required quick-change  frames (not

          manufactured by Trueblood) and  each frame was fitted with  a die

          containing an  injectable mold, the press  would inject liquified

          plastic  into one die-mold;  and after the  shuttle table shifted

          the first frame off to one side, the press would inject liquified

          plastic into the  die-mold on  the second frame.   From  recessed

          holes in the shuttle table surface, the press triggered a "knock-

          out" plate built into the sidelined frame which thrust up through

          the filled  die-mold, thereby  ejecting and purging  the hardened

          plastic part from the work area.  After the ejection was complet-

          ed, the shuttle table shifted the frame containing the empty die-

          mold  back  into a  central position  for  the next  injection of



plastic,  while the press shifted and "knocked out" the twin die-

          mold in the same manner.  

                    The console which housed the controls for the Trueblood

          press was located within  arm's length of the press  operator and

          had  three settings.   In  the "off"  mode, the  press would  not

          operate.   In "automatic" mode, the  press automatically repeated

          the  entire  cycle of  functions described  above, but  the press

          operator was required to use both hands to push two widely-spaced
                                       ____

          buttons on  the console,  which meant  that the  operator's hands

          could  not be inserted into the injection or ejection areas while

          the press was  in operation.   In the  "hand" mode, however,  the

          press operator  could  perform  each  function in  the  cycle  by

          manually depressing  one console panel button  for each function,
                                                         ___ ____ ________

          leaving  the operator with one  free hand.   Moreover, when first
                                          ____ ____

          switched  from "off"  to "hand,"  the press  automatically "recy-

          cled,"  thereby thrusting  into  the ejection  area any  knockout

          plate then  in position.   The "hand" mode was  designed to allow

          the press operator to  insert an implement through an  opening in

          the  quick-change frame  to dislodge a  jammed knockout  plate or

          plastic  part,  while  manually  triggering  the  "eject"  button

          located on the control console.

                    By early October 1989, an unaltered Trueblood press had

          come  into   the  possession   of  Styletek,  Inc.,   in  Lowell,

          Massachusetts, fitted with  two quick-change frames designed  and

          manufactured by appellant  MUD.   On October  11, 1989,  Styletek

          employee Nan  Touch  was operating  the  Trueblood press  in  the

3



"automatic" mode  when one  of  the MUD  frame's knockout  plates

          became jammed  in the  "up" position.   With  his left hand,  Nan

          Touch reached through an opening (1.4" high x  5.25" wide) in the

          front of the jammed frame to dislodge a part stuck in a die-mold,

          at the  same time using his  right hand to change  the press from

          "automatic"  to "off" to "hand" mode.   At this point, the jammed

          knockout plate  "recycled" and amputated portions  of two fingers

          on Nan Touch's left hand.

                    In  June  1992,  Nan Touch  instituted  this  diversity

          action  against MUD  in the  District of  Massachusetts, alleging

          negligence, breach of warranty, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106,  
                                          ___

          2-314, and unfair  trade practices,  see Mass. Gen.  L. Ann.  ch.
                                               ___

          93A, in the design, manufacture, and sale of frames incorporating

          an  opening large enough  to permit a press  operator to insert a

          hand into  the ejection  area during  operation.   MUD  impleaded

          Trueblood as a third-party defendant, Mass Gen. L. Ann. ch. 231B,

             1 (contribution  among joint  tortfeasors), alleging  that the

          "one-handed" design of  the press and its  automatic recycling of

          the knockout mechanism upon  transition into "hand" mode contrib-

          uted to Nan  Touch's injury.   Prior to trial, Nan  Touch settled

          with MUD.  

                    MUD's  third-party  complaint for  contribution against

          Trueblood was tried  to the court.  The  district court found for

          Trueblood  and entered  the following  findings of fact  and con-

          clusions of law:  

                    As to the defectiveness of the molding press,
                    MUD  has  failed to  establish  that two-hand

                                          4



operation was the  industry standard for  the
                                       ________ ________
                    manufacturing of mechanical power  presses in
                                                               __
                    1966.   While  Trueblood's molding  press may
                    ____
                    very  well violate  current day  OSHA regula-
                                        _______ ___       _______
                    tions, it would  be unfair  to impose  modern
                    _____               ______
                    standards  on the practices  of nearly thirty
                    years ago.  Accordingly, the Court finds that
                    the  molding  press  was not  defective  when
                                             ___  _________  ____
                    manufactured . . . . 
                    ____________

          Nan Touch v. Master Unit Die Prods., Inc., No. 92-11493-EFH, slip
          _________    ____________________________

          op. at 3 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994) (emphasis added).  

II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

We  review interpretations  of state  law de  novo, see
                                                              __  ____  ___

          Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1991), and
          ____________________    _______

          findings of fact for clear  error, see Interstate Commerce Comm'n
                                             ___ __________________________

          v. Holmes Transp.,  Inc., 983  F.2d 1122, 1129  (1st Cir.  1993).
             _____________________

          MUD maintains  that the  district court misapplied  the Massachu-

          setts  law governing claims for breach of warranty based in tort,

          or  relied on implicit findings  of fact unsupported  by the evi-

          dence.  We do not  reach the merits of these contentions,  for we

          conclude that  the district court ruling  is insufficiently clear

          to  enable effective appellate review.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
                                                  ___

          ("In  all actions tried upon  the facts without a jury  . . . the

          court shall  find the  facts specially  and state  separately its

          conclusions of law . . . .").           Under  applicable  Massa-

          chusetts  product liability  law, negligence-based  claims differ

          markedly  from tort-based  claims  for breach  of warranty.   The

          factfinder confronted with  a negligence-based product  liability

                                          5



claim  focuses on whether the conduct of the designer or manufac-
                                        _______        ________    ________

          turer  reveals a  failure "to  use reasonable  care to  eliminate
          _____

          foreseeable dangers which subject a user to an  unreasonable risk

          of injury."  Colter  v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d  1305, 1313
                       ______     _________________

          (Mass. 1989).  Consequently, evidence that the defendant designer

          or manufacturer  met  the  pertinent  industry  safety  standards

          prevailing at the time  of manufacture would be  material, albeit
          __________ __ ___ ____  __ ___________           ________

          nondispositive, evidence  that the  defendant was  not negligent,
                          ________                           ___

          even though  its product's design  might not comport  with safety

          criteria later embraced by the industry. 

                    By contrast,  a breach of warranty  claim arising under

          Massachusetts tort law is founded on strict liability principles,
                                               ______

          see Mass. Gen. L.  Ann. ch. 106,   2-314; Restatement (Second) of
          ___                                       ___________ ___________

          Torts   402A cmt. c. (1965), and focuses exclusively "'on whether
          _____

          the product  [is] defective and unreasonably dangerous and not on
              _______                     ____________ _________     ___ __

          the [actual]  conduct of the user  or the seller.'"   Colter, 525
          ___ ________  _______ __ ___ ____  __ ___ ______      ______

          N.E.2d at 1313  (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see  Back v.
                                                               ___  ____

          Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d  964, 968-70 (Mass. 1978).   Because the
          ____________

          breach of  warranty inquiry  is  not concerned  with the  reason-

          ableness of the  designer/manufacturer's conduct, see  Correia v.
                                                   _______  ___  _______

          Firestone Tire & Rubber  Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040  (Mass. 1983)
          ____________________________

          (explaining  that defendant may be  liable for breach of warranty

          even  if he "[took] all  reasonable measures to  make his product

          safe"), compliance  with "state of  the art" safety  standards at
                                                                         __

          the  time the product was designed or manufactured is usually im-
          ___  ____ ___ _______ ___ ________ __ ____________ __ _______ ___

          material.   See, e.g., Hayes  v. Ariens Co.,  462 N.E.2d 273, 277
          ________    ___  ____  _____     __________

6



(Mass. 1984).  Instead, the factfinder may rely on the failure of

          the product to conform to  present-day safety standards in deter-
                                     ___________

          mining whether it is "unreasonably dangerous," under a  breach of

          warranty  analysis, even though the  risk against which the post-

          design  or  post-manufacture  safety  standard  was  intended  to

          protect was  unknown or not reasonably discoverable by the defen-

          dant prior to the sale of the product.  See id. (defendant may be
                                                  ___ ___

          liable for  breach of  warranty "regardless of  the knowledge  of

          risks that he actually had or reasonably should have had when the

          sale took place").  

                    Moreover,  although  nonconformance with  a present-day
                                                                ___________

          safety  standard would be relevant evidence,  it would not compel
                                                                     ______

          the trier of  fact to find  the product "unreasonably  dangerous"
                                                   ____________

          per se, see, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st
          ___ __  ___  ____  _______    _____________

          Cir.  1991)  (OSHA  regulations do  not  preempt  state  tort law

          principles), cert. denied, 112  S. Ct. 993 (1992).   Indeed, even
                       _____ ______

          the  incorporation of a  design feature currently  perceived as a

          dangerous condition  might be  found "reasonable" in  the circum-

          stances, based on the factfinder's application of the traditional

          risk/utility balancing test to the particular product.  See Back,
                                                                  ___ ____

          378  N.E.2d  at  970  (listing  the  factors  to  be  weighed  in

          determining whether particular product is unreasonably dangerous,
                                         _______    ____________

          including  "'the gravity of  the danger  posed by  the challenged

          design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechani-

          cal feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost

          of  an  improved design,  and  the  adverse  consequences to  the

7



product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative

          design'") (citation omitted). 

                    Viewed against  the applicable principles  of Massachu-

          setts law, the findings entered by the district court are plainly

          deficient.   The equivocal observation  that "Trueblood's molding

          press may  very well violate  current day OSHA  regulations" pro-
                ___  ____ ____ _______

          scribing one-handed presses, coupled with the court's negligence-

          based  assessment that "MUD has failed to establish that two-hand

          operation  was the  industry  standard for  the manufacturing  of
                              ________  ________

          mechanical  power presses  in  1966," strongly  suggest that  the
                                     __  ____

          district court viewed any such OSHA violation as simply immateri-

          al to Trueblood's liability.  On the contrary, a finding that the

          Trueblood press contravened the 1992 OSHA standards, a matter all

          but conceded by  the parties,  clearly would be  material to  the

          ultimate factual  determination whether the press  was "unreason-

          ably dangerous," and hence gave rise to a breach of warranty.  

                    On  the other hand, such a finding would not compel the
                                                                 ______

          conclusion that the Trueblood press was  "unreasonably dangerous"

          per se.   Yet  the  district court's  observation concerning  the
          ___ __

          "unfairness" of  applying the  1992 OSHA  standards to  a product

          manufactured  in 1966, see supra p. 5, strongly suggests that the
                                 ___ _____

          district court perceived a  need to forefend against just  such a

          "compelled"  conclusion.  But  see Cosme  v. Whitin  Mach. Works,
                                    ___  ___ _____     ____________________

          Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Mass. 1994) (contrasting Connecticut's
          ____

          ten-year statute of repose after sale,  and noting that Massachu-

          setts  breach  of warranty  claims  are  not rendered  defeasible

8



simply  by the  passage  of time).    In addition,  the  district

          court's free-form "unfairness" exception, especially in reference

          to  a durable product  like the Trueblood  press, is  out of step

          with  the  purpose and  policy  of the  strict  product liability

          principles upon  which breach  of warranty liability  is founded.

          See Colter,  525 N.E.2d at  1313 n.13 ("'[P]ublic  policy demands
          ___ ______

          that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intend-

          ed for consumption  be placed upon those who market  them, and be

          treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance

          can  be obtained;  and  that the  consumer  of such  products  is

          entitled  to the maximum of  protection at the  hands of someone,

          and the  proper persons  to afford it  are those  who market  the

          products.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts   402A cmt. c.
                       _______ _____________________________

          (1965))).

                    Finally, we  can discern no indication  in the district

          court ruling as  to how,  or whether,  the required  risk/utility

          balancing was  performed to  determine if the  one-handed control

          feature  made  the press  "unreasonably"  dangerous.   The  court
                                     ____________

          neither cites to apposite Massachusetts case law, nor adverts  to

          any  risk/utility  balancing  test  component,  even  though  MUD

          introduced  evidence that  Trueblood had  available     at slight

          additional  cost       feasible,  "safer"  design   alternatives.

          Trueblood  countered with  evidence that  one-handed control  was

          essential  to permit a press operator to insert an implement into
                                                __ ______ __ _________

          the work  area to  unjam  a knockout  plate, and  that  it was  a

          "reasonably"  safe design  provided  the manufacturers  of quick-

9



change frames  did not  incorporate  an opening  large enough  to

          accommodate  the operator's hand.   We in no  sense suggest which
                                      ____

          (if either)  evidentiary proffer  should be credited,  but simply

          emphasize that  appellate  review is  utterly impracticable  when

          neither  the conclusions of  law which guided  the district court

          ruling,  nor  the  findings of  fact  essential  to  a principled

          decision  under  the applicable  law,  are  discernible from  its

          decision. 

                    As we  have stressed repeatedly  in the past,  the Rule

          52(a) requirements  that facts  be stated specially,  and conclu-

          sions  of law separately, impose on the trial court an obligation

          to  ensure  that its  ratio decidendi  is  set forth  with enough
                                _____ _________

          clarity  to  enable a  reviewing  court reliably  to  perform its

          function;  namely, to review the  conclusions of law  de novo and
                                                                __ ____

          the  essential  findings of  fact for  clear  error.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Thermo Electron Corp.  v. Schiavone Constr.  Co., 958 F.2d  1158,
          _____________________     ______________________

          1160  (1st Cir. 1992);  Peckham v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co.,
                                  _______    _____________________________

          895  F.2d 830, 842 (1st Cir. 1990); Applewood Landscape & Nursery
                                              _____________________________

          Co.  v. Hollingsworth,  884  F.2d  1502,  1503 (1st  Cir.  1989);
          ___     _____________

          Pearson v.  Fair, 808 F.2d 163, 165-66 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (per
          _______     ____

          curiam) (explaining  that Rule 52(a) is  "mandatory, not precato-

          ry")  (citing  Commissioner  v.  Duberstein, 363  U.S.  278,  292
                         ____________      __________

          (1960));  Boston and Maine Corp.  v. First Nat'l  Bank of Boston,
                    ______________________     ___________________________

          618 F.2d 137, 143 (1st Cir. 1980); see also 9 Charles A. Wright &
                                             ___ ____

          Arthur R. Miller, Federal  Practice and Procedure   2571,  at 679
                            _______________________________

          (1971) (collecting cases).  

10



The  parties urge  us  to salvage  the present  appeal.

          Each  proposes  plausible  interpretations of  the  evidence  and

          conclusions of law favorable to itself.  But neither has met with

          notable  success  in  divining  the  district  court's  essential

          findings  of fact  and predicate  conclusions of  law.   We note,

          further, that although all  responsibility under Rule 52(a) rests

          with  the trial judge, and the burden  is not an onerous one, see
                                                                        ___

          Fed.  R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment)

          (requiring "brief, definite, pertinent  findings" with "no neces-

          sity for  over-elaboration"), counsel might have  avoided the un-

          necessary expense  and delay  occasioned in  this case  simply by

          submitting a timely request for reconsideration based on the need

          for  adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required

          by  Rule 52(a).   As neither  party sought  reconsideration under

          Rule 52(a), each shall bear its own costs on appeal.

                    The district court  judgment is vacated.   The case  is
                    _______________________________________________________

          remanded for further  proceedings consistent  with this  opinion.
          _________________________________________________________________

          Each party shall bear its own costs. 
          ___________________________________

11