Tottleben v. Illinois State Police Officer

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 21, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-00499
StatusUnknown

This text of Tottleben v. Illinois State Police Officer (Tottleben v. Illinois State Police Officer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tottleben v. Illinois State Police Officer, (S.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DWAYNE TOTTLEBEN, #450526,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-00499-SPM

v.

ILLINOIS STATE POLICE OFFICER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge: Plaintiff Dwayne Tottleben, who is currently incarcerated at St. Clair County Jail, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tottleben claims he was shot in the back while unarmed by an Illinois State Police Officer. (Doc. 1). He seeks monetary damages. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must first screen prisoner complaints and filter out non-meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). COMPLAINT Tottleben alleges that around late September or early October 2020 he was shot by an Illinois State Police Officer in the upper right area of his back. (Doc. 1). He claims that he did not have a firearm and he had “put [his] hands up” at the time he was shot. DISCUSSION Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate a single count: Count 1: Fourth Amendment claim against John Doe Illinois State Police Officer for using unreasonable force against Tottleben.

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.1 “A seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment is unreasonable if it is accomplished through the use of excessive force.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F. 3d 526, 541 (7th Cir. 2009). To state a claim for excessive force, a plaintiff must allege that police officers used force that was not objectively reasonable. See Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F. 3d 956, 861 (7th Cir. 2010), 624 F.3d at 861–62; Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F. 3d 725, 732 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Tottleben has sufficiently pled that the excessive force used against him was objectively unreasonable, as he claims he was shot in the back with his hands in the air and unarmed. Count 1 will proceed against John Doe, Illinois State Police Officer. IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNKNOWN DEFENDANT Tottleben will be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against the unknown officer. The Court will refer to the Illinois State Police Officer as “John Doe.”2 This defendant must, however, be

identified with particularity before service of the Complaint can be made. Tottleben will have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to ascertain his identity. Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 832.

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 2 For clarity, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to modify Defendant’s name as follows: John Doe, Illinois State Police Officer. The Director of the Illinois State Police, Brendan Kelly, will be added as a defendant in this action, in his official capacity only, and shall be responsible for responding to discovery aimed at identifying this unknown defendant. Guidelines for discovery will be set at a later date. Once the name of this unknown defendant is discovered, Tottleben must file a motion to substitute the newly

identified defendant in place of the generic designation in the case caption and throughout the Complaint. MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL Tottleben has filed a motion asking the Court to recruit counsel on his behalf. (Doc. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” When faced with a motion for recruitment of counsel the Court applies a two part test: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Tottleben states that, in an attempt to recruit counsel on his own, he has written a dozen

lawyers. This statement, without names, addresses, or copies of letters, is not sufficient information for the Court to determine if he has made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own, and so, Tottleben has failed to meet his threshold burden of making a “reasonable attempt” to secure counsel. See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the motion is denied. Should he choose to move for recruitment of counsel at a later date, the Court directs Tottleben to include in the motion the names and address of at least three attorneys he has contacted, and if available, attach the letters from the attorneys who declined representation. DISPOSITION For the reasons stated, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to Section

1915A. COUNT 1 will proceed against John Doe, Illinois State Police Officer. The Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 2) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to add Brendan Kelly, the Director of the Illinois State Police, as a defendant in his official capacity only for the purpose of identifying the John Doe defendant.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Kelly (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is directed to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kelly need not answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint as he is only in this case for the purpose of identifying the John Doe defendant. He must only enter his appearance and will receive further instructions on discovery at a later date.

Service shall not be made on the unknown defendant, John Doe, until such time as Tottleben has identified him by name in a properly filed motion for substitution. Tottleben is ADVISED that it is his ultimately responsibility to provide the Court with the name and service address for this individual. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant John Doe, once identified, need only respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

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Related

Santiago v. Walls
599 F.3d 749 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Crittenden v. Ayers
624 F.3d 943 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Karen Fitzgerald v. M. Santoro
707 F.3d 725 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Pruitt v. Mote
503 F.3d 647 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Gonzalez v. City of Elgin
578 F.3d 526 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)

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