NUMBER 13-15-00348-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
TOTAL E&P USA, INC., Appellant,
v.
MO-VAC SERVICES COMPANY, INC., Appellee.
On appeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides This case is before us for a second time. The underlying suit arose from appellant
Total E&P USA, Inc.’s (Total) 2005 decision to award a multi-year oil field services
contract to Pool Well Services, Co. a/k/a Nabors Well Services (Pool), instead of to
appellee Mo-Vac Services Company, Inc. (Mo-Vac). Mo-Vac eventually sued Total and
Pool alleging various claims under tort and contract theories. In 2009, a jury found in
favor of Mo-Vac on each of its claims. The final judgment awarded $750,000 in damages to Mo-Vac, and it provided in part that Total and Pool were jointly and severally liable to
Mo-Vac for $433,912.50 in attorneys’ fees.
On appeal, we reversed the judgment with respect to each of Mo-Vac’s claims
except its claim for breach of confidentiality agreement against Total. Total E&P USA,
Inc. v. Mo-Vac Serv. Co., No. 13-10-00021-CV, 2012 WL 3612505, at **3–8 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi Aug. 23, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we reversed the
entire damages award except for the jury’s $100,000 award associated with the breach
of confidentiality agreement claim. Id. at *10. We also reversed the award of attorneys’
fees and remanded to the trial court “to determine the amount of fees earned with respect
to” that specific claim. Id.
Following a new trial on remand solely on the issue of attorneys’ fees, a jury
awarded Mo-Vac $370,375 in fees attributable to the trial work associated with the breach
of confidentiality agreement claim. The jury also found that Mo-Vac was entitled to
prospective, conditional appellate attorneys’ fees as follows: $25,000 for an appeal in
this Court; $5,000 for a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court; $12,000 for
briefing on the merits at the Texas Supreme Court; and $8,000 for representation “through
oral argument and the completion of proceedings” at the Texas Supreme Court. The trial
court rendered judgment on the verdicts.
By two issues now on appeal, Total argues that the trial court erred in awarding
$420,375 in trial and appellate attorneys’ fees to Mo-Vac, contending that: (1) the trial
court erred in allowing Mo-Vac’s counsel to ask Total’s counsel about fees he charged in
an unrelated case; and (2) the fee award was excessive and supported by insufficient
2 evidence. We affirm.1
I. TESTIMONY REGARDING UNRELATED CASE
By its first issue, Total asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
Mo-Vac’s counsel to question and elicit testimony from Total’s lead trial and appellate
counsel, Edmundo O. Ramirez, regarding expert testimony Ramirez gave about
attorneys’ fees in an unrelated case. Total argues that Ramirez’s testimony was irrelevant
and prejudicial, and should not have been allowed by the trial court.
A. Standard of Review
Evidentiary rulings are committed to the trial court’s sound discretion. See U-Haul
Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. 2012). A trial court abuses its discretion
when it acts without regard for guiding rules or principles. Id.
B. Discussion
Evidence is “relevant”—and therefore generally admissible—if it has “any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and
“the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402. But a trial
court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. R.
403.
First, the record shows that before trial, Total designated two expert witnesses on
the issue of the reasonableness and necessity of attorneys’ fees in this case: Ramirez;
1 Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
3 and attorney Raymond L. Thomas. The record further shows that Mo-Vac designated its
own trial and appellate counsel, Adrian R. Martinez and Alberto T. Garcia, as well as
Ramirez to serve as its expert witnesses on the issue of the reasonableness and
necessity of the attorneys’ fees in this case.
At the new trial on attorneys’ fees, Mo-Vac called Ramirez as its first witness.2
Mo-Vac’s counsel proceeded to ask Ramirez about a trial which took place several years
prior at which Ramirez testified as an expert on attorneys’ fees. Ramirez confirmed that
the prior case was a breach of contract action concerning “the distribution rights of
Playboy magazine in Mexico” and that he was paid by Playboy of North America to serve
as an expert in that matter (the Playboy case). After Mo-Vac attempted to ask Ramirez
about what he charged in that previous case, Total objected on relevance grounds, and
the trial court sustained the objection. The following colloquy then occurred:
Q. [Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Now, were you also in that case testifying about reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees?
A. [Ramirez] Correct. That’s standard.
Q. Okay. And with respect to whose fees were you giving an opinion about in reasonable and necessary fee?
A. I was giving as to Playboy North America’s lawyers, and their fees.
Q. And how many lawyers were there?
A. There was an army.
Q. Okay. Is that five? Is that 20? Is that—
A. That case was tried twice. It went up on appeal,
2 Before the new trial on remand, Total filed a notice designating Ramirez and Ray Thomas as expert witnesses on attorneys’ fees. Mo-Vac designated its lead trial and appellate counsel, Adrian Martinez, along with Alberto Garcia and Ramirez as expert witnesses on attorneys’ fees.
4 came down. They hired more lawyers. I don’t recall the exact number of lawyers. But probably anywhere in the two different cases, anywhere from 15 to 20 lawyers involved.
Q. Okay. And did you give testimony about what is a reasonable fee for those 15 or 20 lawyers?
[Total’s counsel]: Your Honor, I will object to relevance. Mr. Ramirez is not being—we’re not putting him on the stand as an expert as to attorneys’ fees in this case. So I think it is irrelevant.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: I designated Mr. Ramirez as an expert. He designated himself as an expert. He is an expert based on his qualifications. Whether he chooses to say, I’m testifying as an expert or not is irrelevant. He is an expert because he has specialized knowledge that will assist the jury. And if he’s testified as an expert in other cases, I’d like to know what his opinions are there to judge them against the credibility of whatever opinions he might give here. So it’s relevant to the credibility and experience.
[Total’s counsel]: We’re not putting him on as an expert on attorneys’ fees. Mr. Ramirez explained earlier, it was only in case Mr. Thomas was not available. Mr. Thomas is here. We are not offering him. If we did offer him, then he could be cross examined on that. But he’s putting him on, so we are not—
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Your Honor, I designated Mr. Ramirez as an expert because he is an expert on attorneys’ fees. So I designated him as an expert. And I haven’t withdrawn that designation.
THE COURT: The objection is at this time sustained, Counsel.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Okay.
Q. [Mo-Vac’s counsel] Now, Mr. Ramirez, you said that the Playboy case, just like this case, was appealed?
A. Yeah. But that was—I came in after the fact.
5 Q. Right. In the second trial you testified as an expert in the Playboy case?
A. Correct.
Q. Just like you’re testifying as an expert in the second trial in this case?
A. I’m not testifying as an expert in this case. You can say that all you want to, but that’s—
Q. Well, I’ve designated you as an expert.
A. Thank you for that. But that’s not my role in this trial.
Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Ramirez, isn’t it true that in the Playboy case, Playboy US recovered $410,000 for their breach of contract case?
[Total’s counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, to relevance. Once again, Mr. Ramirez is not giving an opinion, an expert opinion. And [Mo-Vac’s counsel] is forcing him to essentially.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Just asking if it’s true that that’s what the jury recovered in the Playboy case.
[Total’s counsel]: It is not relevant because he is not an expert on attorneys’ fees.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Your Honor, again, with all due respect, as Your Honor knows, and Counsel knows as well, what determines whether somebody is an expert is not their self-designation, but if they have experience, training and education.
THE COURT: What was your question, [Mo-Vac’s counsel]?
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Isn’t it true that in the Playboy case, Playboy US recovered $410,000 for their breach of contract case?
[Total’s counsel]: I don’t know how those facts are relevant here.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: Your Honor, we have an agreed Jury Charge that
6 has been filed. The parties agree that the eight factors from the Arthur Anderson case and Texas Supreme Court case says the amount of recovery is relevant to the amount of attorneys’ fees. I’m going to ask him, my next question is: Didn’t you testify that the lawyers should recover more than $2 million in attorneys’ fees, when all they recovered was $400,000?
[Total’s counsel]: Your Honor, he’s trying to cross—apologize.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: So—I’m sorry.
[Total’s counsel]: Go ahead.
[Mo-Vac’s counsel]: So I will ask him: Why is it okay in the Playboy case when you testified, but it is not okay here? It goes to the expert witnesses’ credibility.
[Total’s counsel]: But he’s cross-examining him when he hasn’t given an opinion as to this case. So it is improper and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Well, I will overrule the objection.
Ramirez then conceded that he had testified in the Playboy case that $2,180,000
was a reasonable amount for Playboy of North America’s attorneys’ fees, even though
the jury eventually awarded only $410,000 in damages. However, he asserted that the
Playboy case “is extremely different from this case.” In particular, Ramirez noted that
Playboy of North America initially sought to recover “like $28 million” for various contract-
based causes of action; that it was also defending several claims; and that “there was no
jury award” yet made in that case at the time he gave his expert testimony.
Throughout his testimony, Ramirez insisted that he was not testifying as an expert
as to the reasonableness of Total’s attorneys’ fees, and he stated that he had no opinion
7 as to whether the amount charged by Total’s counsel was reasonable.3
On appeal, Total contends that Mo-Vac’s “sole purpose in calling Mr. Ramirez as
an expert at trial was to introduce evidence through impeachment that would otherwise
be inadmissible”—specifically, evidence regarding the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded
in the unrelated Playboy case. It cites case law establishing that, when the
reasonableness of a prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees is at issue, the amount of fees
incurred by the non-prevailing party is irrelevant. See Duininck Bros., Inc. v. Howe
Precast, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-441, 2008 WL 4411641, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2008) (mem.
op. & order) (holding that evidence of defendants’ attorneys’ fees is not probative as to
whether plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees are reasonable); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Crowley,
899 S.W.2d 399, 403–404 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding) (holding that
relator’s billing records were “patently irrelevant,” and therefore not discoverable, where
sole issue was whether real party in interest’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable).
In response, Mo-Vac argues that its line of questioning was relevant because it
bore on the issue of Ramirez’s credibility as an expert. See TEX. R. EVID. 607 (“Any party,
including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.”); TEX. R.
EVID. 611(b) (“A witness may be cross-examined on any relevant matter, including
credibility.”). We agree with Mo-Vac.
Relevancy permits inquiry into the witness's interest, bias, motives, inclinations,
and prejudices. Hogue v. Kroger Store No. 107, 875 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Despite Ramirez’s repeated assertions in his
3 Ramirez conceded that, as counsel for Total, he designated himself as an expert witness on attorneys’ fees. However, he stated that he did so only so that he would be able to testify in the event that his retained attorneys’ fees expert, Thomas, was unavailable to testify.
8 testimony that he was not an expert in this case, the record shows that he designated
himself as an expert as a contingency if attorney Thomas was unavailable to serve as
Total’s expert. Nevertheless, these statements alone did not remove Ramirez’s status as
an expert. As a result, Mo-Vac was within the bounds of relevancy to inquire about
Ramirez’s testimony regarding attorneys’ fees in a previous case, dealing with a similar
subject matter, and tried in the same venue as the present case. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Total’s relevancy
objection. See id.
Total further argues that even if relevant, Mo-Vac’s questioning of Ramirez was
prejudicial because it was asked “solely for the purpose of introducing otherwise improper
evidence through impeachment.” As we stated, a trial court may exclude relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. We have already
concluded that Mo-Vac’s questioning was relevant, and the record shows that Mo-Vac
questioned Ramirez to impeach his credibility as it pertained to his challenge of the
reasonableness and necessity of Mo-Vac’s attorneys’ fees in this case. Therefore, we
disagree with Total that this line of questioning, even if relevant, was substantially
outweighed by any of the reasons articulated in rule of evidence 403. As a result, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
Lastly, even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Ramirez’s testimony, such admission was harmless. As a general rule, error in the
admission of testimony is deemed harmless and is waived if the objecting party
9 subsequently permits the same or similar evidence to be introduced without objection.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 907 (Tex. 2004). Here, similar
questioning regarding the Playboy case took place with Total’s expert, Raymond L.
Thomas, without objection from Total. As a result, error, if any, related to Ramirez’s
testimony was rendered harmless. See id.
We overrule Total’s first issue.
II. EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY
By its second issue, Total asserts that the jury’s award of attorneys’ fees in this
case was grossly excessive and supported by legally and factually insufficient evidence.
When an appellant, such as Total, attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse
finding on an issue for which it did not have the burden of proof, the appellant must
demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Editorial Caballero,
S.A. de C.V. v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 318, 328 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2012, pet. denied) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005)). Such
a no-evidence challenge will be sustained only if: (1) there is a complete absence of
evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving
weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove
a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively
the opposite of a vital fact. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. In conducting a legal
sufficiency review, we review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
the jury’s verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it, crediting
10 favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless
reasonable jurors could not. Editorial Caballero, 359 S.W.3d at 329.
In reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge to a jury finding on an issue on which
the appellant, such as Total, did not have the burden of proof, we consider and weigh all
of the evidence and set aside the verdict only if the evidence that supports the jury finding
is so weak as to make the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. at 329 (citing
Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)). We must examine both the evidence
supporting and that contrary to the judgment. Id. Additionally, the jury is the sole judge
of witnesses’ credibility, and it may choose to believe one witness over another; a
reviewing court may not impose its own opinion to the contrary. Id.
The standard of review for an excessive damages complaint is factual sufficiency
of the evidence. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. 1998). Thus,
the court of appeals should employ the same test for determining excessive damages as
for any factual sufficiency question. Id.
1. Sufficiency of Fee Award under El Apple
Total first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s award of
attorneys’ fees because Mo-Vac’s attorney failed to provide the jury with sufficient
documentation supporting his work in this case.
A party applying for an award of attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method bears
the burden of documenting the hours expended on the litigation and the value of those
hours. El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2012). The starting point for
determining a lodestar fee award is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
11 litigation. Id. at 762. The party who bears the burden of proof should include into
evidence the basic facts underlying the lodestar, which are: (1) the nature of the work;
(2) who performed the services and their rate; (3) approximately when the services were
performed; and (4) the number of hours worked. See id. at 763. An attorney could, of
course, testify to these details, but in all but the simplest cases, the attorney would
probably have to refer to some type of record or documentation to provide this information.
Id. When there is an expectation that the lodestar method will be used to calculate fees,
attorneys should document their time much as they would for their own clients, that is,
contemporaneous billing records or other documentation recorded reasonably close to
the time when the work is performed. Id. Building on the holding in El Apple, the Texas
Supreme Court later held that bare testimony from an attorney, absent written records of
itemized times, tasks, and rates charged, amounted to insufficient evidence to prove
reasonable attorneys’ fees under lodestar. See City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d
731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam).
Total argues that the level of evidence and testimony provided by Mo-Vac’s
attorney, Adrian Martinez, regarding his fees, was comparable to the attorney who
testified in City of Laredo. We disagree. In City of Laredo, the court held that an attorney
who estimated his total hours worked on a case by multiplying the number of weeks of
“active employment” on the case by a “factor of six,” which represented the average hours
per week he worked on the case was insufficient under El Apple’s lodestar method of
proof. Id. Furthermore, the court went on to express that its “puzzlement” deepened in
that case upon finding out that the attorney “did not make any record of his time in the
case or prepare any bills or invoices” and apparently did not how much he was owed in
12 this case until the time of trial. Id. The City of Laredo court also held that the attorneys’
testimony that he spent “a lot of time getting ready for the lawsuit,” conducted “a lot of
legal research,” visited the premises “many, many, many, many times,” and spent
“countless” hours on motions and depositions did not comply with what is required under
El Apple. Id.
Mo-Vac’s attorney’s evidentiary proof of fees in this case is significantly more
robust than the attorney in the City of Laredo case. First, the trial court admitted Mo-
Vac’s Exhibit 9, a 22-page written spreadsheet of specific dates, hours, and billing rate
entries of numerous legal tasks performed by Martinez’s law firm in the underlying case
from March 2006 until May 2009. Specifically, Martinez testified that of all the time billed
in Mo Vac’s Exhibit 9 from March 2006 until he was deposed on February 27, 2009, “40
percent of that time” was spent prosecuting Mo-Vac’s breach-of-confidentiality-
agreement cause of action, or 257.25 total hours. Following his deposition, Martinez
testified that he spent “about 1,639.25” hours in trial preparation and in trial itself for all of
the underlying causes of action. Of those 1,639.25 hours, “90 percent” of that time was
spent “to advance and prosecute the breach of confidentiality claim,” or 1,481.50 hours.
In sum, Martinez testified that the total trial time equaled 1,738.75 hours. Lastly, Martinez
testified that in his opinion, he would be required to spend 125 hours to work on an appeal
in this case. In the end, Martinez testified that his total billable hours in this case, including
appellate work, amounted to 1,863.75 hours.
After reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and
indulging every reasonable inference that would support it, crediting favorable evidence
if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors
13 could not, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s award.
See El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 761–63; Editorial Caballero, 359 S.W.3d at 329; see also
City of Laredo, 414 S.W.3d at 736. Furthermore, after considering and weighing all of the
evidence supporting and contrary to the judgment, we cannot conclude that the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict in this case is so weak as to make the verdict clearly wrong
and manifestly unjust. See Editorial Caballero, 359 S.W.3d at 329.
1. Excessiveness of Fee
Total next argues that the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded in this case of
$420,375 were “unreasonable and grossly disproportionate, under the particular facts of
this case.”
A factfinder should consider the following factors when considering the
reasonableness of a fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.
14 Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) (citing
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2,
subtit. G app. A, State Bar Rules, Art. X, § 9).
Total argues that the surviving cause of action in this case (breach of confidentiality
agreement) was “only a small part of the much larger overall case” and thus, the jury’s
award was excessive. Total cites two cases for support. The first is Smith v. Patrick W.Y.
Tam Trust. 296 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Tex. 2009). In Smith, the Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust (the
Trust) sued Smith for breach of a lease agreement and sought damages in excess of
$200,000 and attorney’s fees of $47,438.75. See id. The jury awarded the Trust $65,000
in damages and nothing in attorney’s fees. See id. The trial court rendered judgment
that the Trust receive $65,000 in damages and rendered judgment notwithstanding the
verdict awarding the Trust $7,500 in attorney’s fees up to trial and up to $15,000 in
attorney’s fees for success at various stages of appeal. See id. The court of appeals
vacated the $7,500 in attorney’s fees and rendered judgment for $47,438.75 in damages.
Id. On petition for review, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’
judgment and remanded for a new trial on attorney’s fees. See id. at 548–49. The Texas
Supreme Court explained that although a jury “could have rationally concluded that, in
light of the amount involved and the results obtained, a reasonable fee award was less
than the full amount sought, no evidence supported the jury’s refusal to award any
attorney’s fees.” Id. at 548. We find Smith inapplicable and distinguishable. Unlike in
Smith, controverted evidence was put forth before the jury, and the jury awarded a fee
15 less than what Mo-Vac sought (nearly $900,000) but more than what Total’s expert
believed was a reasonable fee ($40,000).
The next case Total relies upon is Whythe II Corp. v. Stone. 342 S.W.3d 96 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied). Stone concerned a fee dispute between Stone, a
lawyer, and his former client, Whythe. See id. at 101. Stone intervened in a lawsuit
between Whythe and its insurance company in order to collect his fee. See id. at 102. A
jury ultimately awarded Stone attorney’s fees of $314,420, with additional fees in the
event of future appeals for Stone’s suit for breach of contract against Whythe. See id.
Stone represented Whythe under a contingent-fee agreement and received an attorney’s
fee awarded based upon a percentage of the attorney fee award that Stone obtained in
the underlying insurance litigation. See id. at 108. The Beaumont court noted that while
Stone’s lead counsel testified as to the extent of time put forth in the underlying litigation,
but he “did not try to determine a reasonable fee based upon an hourly rate” and based
his request for attorney’s fees solely on the percentage of the contingency-fee agreement.
Id. at 107–08. The court held that the jury’s fee award was excessive under the Arthur
Andersen factors because the evidence presented in the case did not “provide sufficient
justification for shifting the entire amount of the contingent fee to Wythe.” Id. at 108. We
likewise find Stone distinguishable based upon the record.
The record in this case shows that in addition to testifying about his experience
and skills as an attorney, Martinez testified to spending 1,738.75 hours of trial work solely
for the breach of confidentiality agreement cause of action. This amount of time, including
a description of the specific tasks accomplished and the amount billed per hour, was
documented and admitted into evidence. Martinez further testified to the length and
16 extent of his work in this case, including thousands of pages of documents he reviewed
in preparation for the trial. The record also indicates that Martinez billed Mo-Vac $250
per hour, but Martinez testified at trial that a reasonable hourly rate for his work was $500
based upon his experience and skill of being a 35-year licensed lawyer.
Attorney Thomas testified on Total’s behalf that based on his opinion after
reviewing the record in this case, he did not believe that Martinez expended as much time
on the breach of confidentiality agreement cause of action as he testified. Thomas further
testified that $250 per hour is a reasonable fee for Martinez’s services in this case, and
stated that it was “cheap” for the quality and caliber of the representation that Mo-Vac
received in this case. Lastly, Thomas opined that based upon the agreement between
Mo-Vac and Martinez’s law firm, and the total damages award of $100,000 on the breach
of confidentiality agreement claim, $40,000 was a reasonable attorneys’ fee award in this
case.
The jury’s award of $370,375 of attorneys’ fees associated with the trial work in
this case, plus $50,000 in conditional appellate fees was within the range of reasonable
fees suggested by both parties. Using Martinez’s figure of 1,738.75 hours of trial work
multiplied by his suggested reasonable hourly rate of $500, his total requested fee for trial
work totals: $869,375.00. Using Martinez’s total-trial-hours figure multiplied by $250 per
hour rate billed to Mo-Vac, Martinez’s fee totals: $434,687.50. Thomas suggested a
reasonable fee of $40,000. The jury awarded a figure less than those suggested by Mo-
Vac, but more than the suggestion made by Total.
After considering and weighing all of the evidence supporting and contrary to the
judgment, we cannot conclude that the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict in this case
17 is so weak as to make the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Editorial
Caballero, 359 S.W.3d at 329; Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 406; see also Arthur Andersen, 945
S.W.2d at 818.
2. Summary
We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
jury’s award of attorneys’ fees in this case. We overrule Total’s second issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA M. BENAVIDES, Justice
Delivered and filed the 27th day of July, 2017.