Torrey v. Toledo Portland Cement Co.

122 N.W. 614, 158 Mich. 348, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 712
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 4, 1909
DocketDocket No. 92
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 122 N.W. 614 (Torrey v. Toledo Portland Cement Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torrey v. Toledo Portland Cement Co., 122 N.W. 614, 158 Mich. 348, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 712 (Mich. 1909).

Opinion

Grant, J.

Defendant Watts demurred to the bill of complaint in this case. His demurrer wás overfilled. He appealed to this court. The action of the court below was sustained, and the case remanded for the framing of issue and hearing upon the merits. 150 Mich. 86 (113 N. W. 580). The hearing has been had and the bill dismissed as to defendants Watts and Cooley, and a decree rendered against defendant Van Valkenburg for $7,600. Complainants have appealed.

To the statement of the case in the former opinion should be added that the bill alleged that in the annual report of the corporation it was stated “the amount of capital stock actually paid in in property is $90,000;” that this was false and a part of the fraudulent scheme to deceive those who might and who did subsequently subscribe, [350]*350otherwise the statement there made is a sufficient statement for this opinion. The allegations of the bill are in the main sustained by the proofs. The Michigan secretary and treasurer were only nominally such officers. An assistant secretary and assistant treasurer were elected in Toledo, and the entire duty of these offices were by resolution imposed upon them. There were indications of marl upon the lands described in the bill, and options from several owners of such lands were obtained by defendant Cooley through the advice of Van Valkenburg. The options were taken in the name of Cooley at a price of $1 each. These options covered 800 acres of land, and the price to be paid, if the lands were taken, was about $20,000. The right to take any portion thereof and to pay proportionately was secured by the options. These options were obtained for the purpose of forming a corporation to manufacture cement. They were subsequently assigned to three of the nine promoters and organizers. They (nine in number) met, organized the corporation with a capital stock of $500,000, issued as fully paid. Seven subscribed for 500 shares of stock each, and two for 750 shares each. The three paid nothing for the assignments by Cooley to them. The articles of association stated that $50,000 of the capital stock had been paid in at the date thereof, being *L0 per cent, of the capital stock. The entire nine elected themselves directors, with defendant Watts as president. The directors, or some of them, advanced money sufficient to pay the State fee for filing the articles of incorporation. This money was subsequently refunded to them out of moneys received from the sale of stock thereafter sold to other parties. The promoters retained for themselves as paid-up stock 9,000 shares, of the par value of $90,000. The three who had an assignment of the options from Cooley, together with an option from himself for some land of his own, were to receive $35,000 in addition to their stock, when the title to the lands should be obtained. The rest of the stock was to be returned into the treasury as treasury stock and sold at par. Each of [351]*351the promoters selling any stock was to receive 10 per cent, thereof as a compensation for selling. Cooley claims that he was to receive his 500 shares for securing the options. The options were never assigned to the corporation, although there is evidence that they were present at one of the meetings of stockholders. The options were apparently ignored in finally obtaining the title to the lands purchased. In all 234J acres were purchased at an expense of $9,880, and not all of this was covered by the options. A committee, of which defendant Watts was chairman, reported that the committee had rejected certain options and bought certain other pieces; that Rochford, Butler, and Van Valkenburg, the assignees of Cooley, have never assigned or delivered to the company an option given them by Cooley; and that they found in the company’s archives certain options running not to the company, but nine of them to Charles M. Cooley, and one to Van Valkenburg, and all assigned to Rochford, Van Valkenburg and Butler. They further report that they had to go direct to the owners of these lands to purchase, as there was nothing to prevent the owners from denying any rights on the part of the company. Defendant Watts admits that he did not tell “ anybody about this $90,000 stock matter. I didn’t do it because I didn’t want to. I didn’t think it would make a favorable report.”

Mr. Wehrle, the agent for the Arbuckle-Ryan Company, who contracted to sell the cement company a large amount of machinery, testified that Dr. Watts told.him that—

“The $500,000 of stock was to be sold and was being sold, and at that time there was practically $200,000 of stock sold, and that the entire proceeds of the $500,000 of stock sold went into the plant, less a commission of 10 per cent. I asked him whether any promotion stock had been issued, and he said that not one dollar, nor would there be, — that the entire $500,000 would go into the plant.”

In the prospectus issued by these promoters they stated:

[352]*352“We have purchased 800 acres of land near Manches-' ter, Washtenaw county, Mich. * * * The stock is all common. There is no preferred stock, as we consider one man’s dollar as good as any other man’s. Every dollar paid in for stock will be used to further the best interests of the company in buildings, equipments, operating expenses. * * * We have for sale a limited amount of stock, and each purchaser of stock will enter the company on the same footing as all other stockholders, as we have no preferred stock.”

As soon as it became known that $90,000 of the stock had been retained by the original promoters and organizers without the payment of a dollar therefor, that in addition $35,000 was to be paid for the purchase of the land, and that none of the capital stock had been paid in except upon the basis of the value of the options, it became impossible to obtain further subscriptions. The directors sought then to bond the company for a large amount of money, but it was impossible to float the bonds except for the small amount above stated.

We need not pursue further the transactions of these promoters and organizers, including the defendants, nor the efforts made to float the enterprise after it was launched. The judge found that—

“ The relation of the so-called promoters or original stockholders towards all of the parties interested must be regarded as fiduciary.”

He further held that—

“They may have been mistaken as to their legal rights and obligations; but I do not think they were dishonest or dishonorable in their plans and purposes. * * * If there was concealment or deception or fraud, such conduct would vitiate the whole transaction. The view which I have taken of this case does not render it necessary for me to pass decisively upon these questions.”

The court entered a decree holding that—

“The office of secretary and treasurer of the company and the duties and functions of each were usurped by alleged assistants secretary and treasurer; that its books, [353]*353papers, accounts, credits, statements, assets, and funds were improperly and unlawfully kept away from the State of Michigan, and at Toledo, State of Ohio,” and that the abuse of the defendant’s corporate powers and such a violation of the law of its being operated as a forfeiture of its franchise, and appointed a receiver, and authorized the sale of the company’s property.

The decree contains other provisions not necessary to mention.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
122 N.W. 614, 158 Mich. 348, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 712, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/torrey-v-toledo-portland-cement-co-mich-1909.