TORREY v. PARRISH

District Court, N.D. Florida·Decided December 4, 2024·No. 4:24-cv-00267·Unknown

Opinion

Page 1 of 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION MICHAEL A. TORREY, DOC # P44879, Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 4:24cv267-AW-MAF CAPTAIN PARRISH, et al., Defendants. _________________________/

O R D E R Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights case in early July 2024 by filing a § 1983 complaint, ECF No. 1, and an in forma

pauperis motion, ECF No. 2, which was granted on July 9, 2024. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff was required to pay an initial partial filing fee of $11.00. Id. Although Plaintiff requested, and was granted, an extension of time in

which to comply, the docket did not reflect payment was received and a Report and Recommendation was entered on November 15, 2024, ECF No. 9, recommending dismissal for failure to prosecute. Page 2 of 9 On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed an objection to that Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff explains that the $11.00 fee was

mailed to this Court, and received on October 21, 2024. Id. Plaintiff provided a USPS tracking number, which the Court verified. Contact was then made with the Clerk’s Office and the missing filing fee has now been located. Because the assessed fee has been paid, ECF No. 11, the Report

and Recommendation, ECF No. 9, is vacated. Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, has now been reviewed as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff complains about events which

transpired at Apalachee Correctional Institution in August of 2020. Id. at 7. He alleges that during a search, he was subjected to an unnecessary and excessive use of force, improperly carried outside the dormitory by four officers, who then intentionally dropped him face down to the ground. Id.

His personal property was removed from his cell and placed in the hallway for “whoever to steal.” Id. at 8. Although Plaintiff’s facts generally are sufficient to state a claim, there

are two problems which must be corrected before service will be directed. Plaintiff is provided an opportunity to submit an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies identified below. Case No. 4:24cv267-AW-MAF Page 3 of 9 First, Plaintiff sues two named Defendants, Gullett and Parrish, as well as three John Doe correctional officers. ECF No. 1 at 4. However,

Plaintiff sues the Defendants in their official capacities only. Id. at 2-3. A civil rights complaint brought against a state official in his individual capacity seeks “to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-1687, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)). “Official-capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165-66, 105 S. Ct. at 3105 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, n.55, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 1978)). However, to proceed with an

official-capacity action, the governmental entity can only be held liable under § 1983 “when the entity itself is a ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S. Ct. at 3105 (quoting Polk

Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)). Put simply, official capacity claims are appropriate when challenging a policy of the Department of Corrections, but are not Case No. 4:24cv267-AW-MAF Page 4 of 9 appropriate when alleging the actions of an officer who allegedly violated a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable official-capacity claim because his complaint makes clear that the Defendants “improperly carried” him, suggesting they violated a policy of the Department of Corrections. In that case, that entity’s “policy or custom” was not followed and, thus, a

department policy did not play a part in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff cannot sue the Defendants in their official capacities if these are the facts.

Another reason Plaintiff cannot sue these Defendants in their official capacities is because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the Defendants. Absent limited exceptions, the State of Florida and its agencies are immune from suit in this Court by force of the Eleventh

Amendment. Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 169, 105 S.Ct. at 3107 (reiterating that “absent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the

Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court”). A § 1983 lawsuit against State officials sued for damages in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Case No. 4:24cv267-AW-MAF Page 5 of 9 The second deficiency with Plaintiff’s complaint is his apparent Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for the loss of property. The

Supreme Court has made clear that if an inmate’s personal property was taken and not returned because of a defendant's negligence, there can be no finding of an unconstitutional deprivation of property. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed.2d 662 (1986).

Moreover, when property is intentionally taken, the claim is still foreclosed. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1916-17, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981), “and its progeny hold that a deprivation of liberty or

property is not cognizable under Section 1983 when a state’s post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim’s procedural due process rights.”1 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L.

Ed. 2d 393 (1984)). [A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete 1 This aspect of Parratt was not overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Case No. 4:24cv267-AW-MAF Page 6 of 9 until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S. Ct. at 3204 (footnote omitted); see also Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (observing that

there is a remedy under Florida law for law enforcement’s seizure or retention of personal property); Holt v. Givens, 757 F. App'x 915, 922 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding no due process claim because the State of Alabama provided adequate postdeprivation remedies). When a state court

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TORREY v. PARRISH, (N.D. Fla. 2024).

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