COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, Fulton and Lorish Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
TORREY RASHAD WHITLOW MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1477-23-1 JUDGE LISA M. LORISH DECEMBER 10, 2024 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Tonya Henderson-Stith, Judge
(Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Tanner M. Russo, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Torrey Whitlow brings several challenges to his convictions for second-degree murder,
malicious wounding, using a firearm in the commission of a felony, and discharging a firearm in
public resulting in bodily injury. Whitlow argues that the evidence is insufficient to support these
convictions, that the court abused its discretion by refusing his proposed jury instructions, and that
the court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to strike a juror for cause. We find no
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). BACKGROUND1
Whitlow was tried by a jury for the murder of Lois and Maurice Bailey, for the aggravated
malicious wounding of Tyrell Bailey, and for using a firearm in connection with those offenses.
What follows is a summary of the evidence presented at trial.
Eric Conners heard an argument outside of his home around 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. When he
looked through his open front door, he saw several people arguing and fist fighting on the other side
of the street, about four houses down. “[A] lady in a blue shirt,” later identified as Lois Bailey, was
trying to break up the fight. This first fight eventually ended, but Conners heard it resume around
5:00 or 5:30 p.m.
When Conners looked outside this time, he saw a man in a black T-shirt arguing with a man
wearing a white T-shirt. The man in the black shirt was later identified as Maurice Bailey, Lois’s
son. The argument soon “turned physical” and “fists were . . . thrown.” Conners thought Maurice
“was getting the better of the other gentleman” until two or three other males in white T-shirts
approached and “ganged up” on Maurice, punching and kicking him and “kind of working him over
for a while.” Maurice eventually broke away and “ended up in the middle of the street.” By that
time, Conners was standing in his front yard for a better view of the fight.
While Maurice was in the street, one of the men wearing a white T-shirt “got on top of him,
mounted him, and just started delivering some . . . pretty tough blows.” This man was “short [and]
stocky” and had a weight advantage over Maurice. Conners heard the sound of “fists hitting [a
man’s] face,” and Maurice was soon unconscious. The man in the white T-shirt then “dismounted,”
pulled a gun from behind his waistband and “started firing.” He first shot at Lois, hitting her twice.
Next, he “fired a couple other shots off in another direction.” He then returned to where Maurice
1 We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). -2- lay unconscious and shot him in the head. Conners saw the assailant in the white T-shirt then
“casually” walk down the road, enter a red Ford pickup truck, and drive away. Maurice and Lois
both ultimately died from their gunshot wounds.
Sergeant David Lefleur of the Norfolk Police Department lived on the same street as
Conners. Whitlow lived in the same neighborhood. Lefleur knew Whitlow “[t]hrough interactions
in the neighborhood.” Lefleur had broken up a fight near Whitlow’s house earlier on the day of the
shootings. Later that afternoon, Lefleur was home on his back deck when he heard a “volley of
gunshots.” He ran outside and saw Maurice and Lois lying in the street. Whitlow was standing
over Maurice in a “shooter stance.” Whitlow scanned the area before turning and walking toward
his house. While Lefleur was trying to help Lois, he saw Whitlow drive away in a red pickup truck.
Maurice’s brother, Tyrell Bailey, testified at trial as a direct witness to what occurred that
day. Bailey testified about the earlier fist fight that Conners overheard, and then about the second
fight that ended in the murders. Bailey was also hit by a shot, suffering a graze wound to the head.
Bailey testified that Whitlow fired at him first, striking him in the head, before shooting Lois and
Maurice. He identified Whitlow as the shooter and testified that only Whitlow had a firearm.
Later that day, Isaiah Johnson (Isaiah) saw a red pickup truck speed down his street and park
in front of his house. Two men wearing white shirts got out of the truck and ran toward Isaiah’s
house. One of the men, who was “heavier-set” than the other, “put something in [a] bush.” The
two men then fled out of Isaiah’s view, leaving the red truck parked in front of his house. Isaiah
reported the incident to the police.
Hampton Police Department Senior Forensic Specialist Brandi Johnson photographed the
crime scene and recovered eight .40 caliber cartridge casings and two bullet fragments from the
roadway. Six of the cartridge casings were found closer to Lois, and two were found near Maurice.
Officer Johnson did not recover any firearms at the scene but found a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson
-3- pistol hidden in the bushes near Isaiah’s house. Forensic Scientist Christopher Luckie later testified
that bullets recovered from Maurice and Lois during their autopsies and the bullet fragments and
cartridge casings recovered at the crime scene had been fired from the firearm found in the bushes at
Isaiah’s house.
Whitlow’s brother, Trevaris, testified in Whitlow’s defense. Trevaris testified that he was in
his yard on the day of the offenses when Whitney Bailey and her brother “Zebo” Bailey walked by.
Trevaris argued with Whitney and Zebo after they gave him an “intimidating look.” Whitney and
Zebo left but later returned with their brother, Demetrius Bailey, leading to a fight between the three
Bailey siblings and Trevaris and his brother, Theo. The Bailey siblings returned home after the
fight. Sometime later, however, Maurice and Tyrell approached Trevaris’s house. According to
Trevaris, Maurice started another “full-blown fight.” As Trevaris “was getting the best” of Maurice,
Tyrell “jumped in” and struck Trevaris on the back of the head with a gun. When Trevaris
capitulated, Maurice and Tyrell left.
Trevaris and a cousin later walked to Lois’s house to talk to her and encountered Lois and
Tyrell. Trevaris “swung on” Tyrell after he saw a “firearm in [Tyrell’s] front waistband.”
According to Trevaris, Tyrell twice attempted to pull the firearm from his waistband during the
melee. At one point, Trevaris saw “Maurice running across the street” carrying what looked like a
firearm. He later saw a firearm slide along the ground. “[S]econds later,” he “heard shots fired.”
He looked up, “heard another shot,” and saw Maurice “collapse.” He then turned around and saw
Whitlow for the first time during the fight.
Whitlow testified that he arrived home around 5:00 p.m. After learning that Trevaris had
been injured earlier in the day and “hear[ing] an argument down the street,” he walked toward the
Bailey residence armed with a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber firearm. While Whitlow watched the
fight between Trevaris and Tyrell, Lois struck him in the back of the head with a metal object. As
-4- he fell to the ground, he saw a gun “skirting the street,” and Maurice “going for it,” so he reached
for his own gun and shot Maurice. He did not remember much else, as he was “dazed and
confused” for days after the shooting, had a “massive headache,” and suffered “from short-term
memory” loss. He claimed that he shot Maurice to protect himself and his family because Maurice
was trying to grab the firearm. He denied putting the Smith & Wesson firearm in the bushes at
Isaiah’s house. He claimed he did not know how Lois got shot.
After considering this evidence, the jury convicted Whitlow of murdering Maurice and
Lois, maliciously wounding Tyrell, discharging a firearm in public resulting in bodily injury, and
three counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
During the trial, the court made several rulings that are relevant to this appeal. First, the
court denied Whitlow’s motion to strike the charges against him. Whitlow made such a motion
after the Commonwealth rested, arguing that “a lot of people” had not “been able to identify
specifically the shooter.” He argued, “[W]e have three white T-shirts. We’re not quite sure which
one is which, and that in and of itself is a compounding element that should not be put forward to
the jury.” The trial court denied the motion to strike. Whitlow then renewed the same motion after
his presentation of evidence without adding any additional argument, and the trial court denied
the renewed motion
Next, the court rejected three of Whitlow’s proposed jury instructions. The
Commonwealth objected to each. The first proposed instruction defined “justifiable homicide.”
The second sought to instruct the jury that “a person who reasonably believes that another
intends to attack him for the purposes of killing him has a right to arm himself.” And the third
was a proposed instruction addressing eyewitness identification.
Finally, the court struck Juror 20 for cause. Whitlow’s jury panel was the same panel that
had been summoned for jury service the week before when the same prosecutor and same defense
-5- counsel tried an earlier case. Juror 20 was struck for cause from the earlier venire after she said
that she could not be fair and impartial to the Commonwealth because of stories told by her
mother-in-law, a sheriff’s deputy who transported prisoners.
During voir dire at Whitlow’s trial, Juror 20 stated that she had witnessed “family
domestic violence.” When asked if she believed that experience would affect her ability to be
fair and impartial, Juror 20 said, “Possibly.” She also told the court that her “mother-in-law
[was] one of the sheriff deputies [who] work[ed] at the annex and transfer[red] the prisoners to
and from the courthouse.” Defense counsel asked if this would impact Juror 20’s ability to be
fair and impartial, and she responded, “No.”
During individual voir dire, the prosecutor asked Juror 20 about the statement she had
made the week before that she could “[not] be fair and impartial to the Commonwealth in sitting
for the jury.” After Juror 20 confirmed that she had made that statement, the prosecutor asked
“[i]s that still the same today?” and Juror 20 said “I don’t believe so.” When asked “[w]hat has
changed in the matter of a week,” Juror 20 said “The way the questions were presented from the
Commonwealth versus the defense” and that “today it was the defense instead over the
Commonwealth’s questioning, the way it was presented.” Juror 20 affirmed “I can be fair. I’m
just trying to make a comparison of why there was a difference. I can be fair.”
Juror 20 also confirmed that she had stated that the stories her mother-in-law had told her
about transporting prisoners would affect her partiality. The prosecutor asked: “I assume that
that’s not changed in the last week as well?” Juror 20 responded: “Correct.” The prosecutor
asked whether that factor would affect her ability to be fair and impartial during Whitlow’s trial,
and Juror 20 replied: “I’m not going to be seeing her in this timeframe while that’s going on, but
if I do and she has stories about her inmates, I am not sure what she would present and I don’t
know how it would affect my point of view in that scenario.” Defense counsel then asked Juror
-6- 20 if she could separate her mother-in-law’s stories from the evidence, and Juror 20 responded,
“Right. Correct. I would.”
The Commonwealth moved to strike Juror 20 for cause, arguing that there was no reason
to believe that “anything could have occurred that would change in a week other than her
answers,” that Juror 20 could not be rehabilitated, and “that at this point in time she can’t be fair
and impartial.” Whitlow opposed the motion to strike, arguing that Juror 20 had been
rehabilitated when she affirmed that she would remain neutral and separate the stories she heard
from her mother-in-law from the evidence presented at trial. He insisted that she could be fair
and impartial “based on her testimony today.” The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to strike Juror 20 for cause.
Whitlow appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Whitlow argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
because he “merely acted in self-defense,” or “in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation.”
But he did not make that argument to the trial court. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time
of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.”
Rule 5A:18. This Court “will not consider an argument on appeal that was not presented to the trial
court.” Mollenhauer v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 318, 329 (2021). “[T]he same argument must
have been raised, with specificity, at trial before it can be considered on appeal.” Pulley v.
Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 104, 125 (2021) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App.
625, 637 (2011)). The primary reason for requiring a contemporaneous objection is to allow
opposing counsel and the trial court a fair opportunity to address the challenge and prevent
-7- unnecessary appeals and retrials. Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743-44 (2019). “Not
just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely—so that the trial judge would know
the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Id. at 743 (quoting Dickerson v.
Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).
Whitlow argued in his first motion to strike only that the evidence failed to prove that he
was the shooter, and he did not add any new arguments when he renewed his motion to strike.
Whitlow also did not move to set aside the verdict. While he mentioned self-defense in his closing
argument, that is not sufficient to preserve his self-defense claim on appeal because he was tried by
a jury. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 481 (1991) (en banc) (a closing argument
does not preserve a sufficiency claim because it “is addressed to the jury, not the trial judge, and
does not require the trial judge to rule on the evidence as a matter of law”).
Therefore, he failed to preserve his sufficiency challenge for appeal. Whitlow does not
invoke any of the exceptions to Rule 5A:18, and we do not raise them sua sponte. Spanos v. Taylor,
76 Va. App. 810, 827-28 (2023).
II. Jury Instructions
Whitlow argues that the trial court erred by refusing his proposed jury instructions on
justifiable homicide, the right to arm oneself, and eyewitness identification. “A trial court ‘has
broad discretion over whether to give or deny proposed jury instructions.’” Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 149, 166 (2023) (quoting Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 92,
129 (2014)). “A reviewing court’s responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is ‘to see that the
law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly
raises.’” Fahringer v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 208, 211 (2019) (quoting Darnell v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488 (1988)). “[W]hile a defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case, such an instruction must be supported by ‘[m]ore than a scintilla
-8- of evidence.’” Mayberry v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 93, 101 (2016) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 255 (1990)). “The weight of the credible
evidence that will amount to more than a mere scintilla . . . is a matter to be resolved on a
case-by-case basis.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Woolridge v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App.
339, 348 (1999)). “Upon review, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
proponent of the instruction.” Id.
Justifiable Homicide
Whitlow asserts that the trial court erred by refusing his proposed jury instruction on
justifiable homicide, which he told the trial court was “directly quoted” from this Court’s decision in
Lynn v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 336 (1998). That said, the record on appeal does not include
the proffered instruction. “[T]he judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the
burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether
the lower court has erred in the respect complained of.” Green v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 524,
534 (2015) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 630, 635 (1993)). Without the proposed
instruction in the record, we cannot determine whether it accurately stated the law.
But we can conclude that the instruction the trial court gave properly instructed the jury on
justifiable homicide. “Justifiable homicide in self-defense occurs [when] a person, without any
fault on his part in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, kills another under reasonable
apprehension of death or great bodily harm to himself.” Lynn, 27 Va. App. at 353 (alteration in
original) (quoting Bailey v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 92, 96 (1958)). The trial court gave the
following instruction:
If you believe that the defendant was without fault in provoking or bringing on the fight/difficulty, and you further believe that:
(l) he reasonably feared, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm; and
-9- (2) he used no more force, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, than was reasonably necessary to protect himself from the perceived harm, then he acted in self-defense, and you shall find the defendant not guilty.
Jury Instr. 22. The trial court’s instruction tracks the definition of justifiable homicide from Lynn.
“[A] court may exercise its discretion and properly exclude an instruction that both correctly states
the law and is supported by the evidence when other ‘granted instructions fully and fairly cover’ the
relevant principle of law.” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 256 (2013) (quoting Daniels v.
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 460, 466 (2008)). Even assuming without deciding that Whitlow’s
proposed jury instruction accurately defined justifiable homicide, the trial court properly instructed
the jury on that principle of law and did not abuse its discretion in refusing a duplicative instruction.
The Right to Arm Oneself
Whitlow proffered Virginia Criminal Model Jury Instruction 52.520 on the right to arm
oneself:
A person who reasonably believes that another intends to attack him for the purpose of killing him or doing him serious bodily harm has a right to arm himself for his own necessary self-protection. In such a case, no inference of malice can be drawn from the fact that he armed himself.
Whitlow argued that “a number of pieces of testimony were indicative” that he “had access to
information,” leading him to believe that he might be attacked and suffer death or serious bodily
harm before arming himself. The Commonwealth objected to the instruction, arguing that Whitlow
did not testify to any facts supporting such a belief; he testified that he was a mere “bystander at the
scene.” The Commonwealth maintains on appeal that there was no evidence that Whitlow armed
himself after developing a reasonable fear of being attacked or killed. We agree with the
Commonwealth.
Whitlow testified that he arrived home around 5:00 p.m. and learned of the incident between
Trevaris and the Baileys. Although he observed unspecified injuries on Trevaris, he did not ask - 10 - about them and was not sure “exactly what[] [was] going on,” indicating that he was not present
during the earlier fight. Later, he heard an argument down the street and walked toward Lois’s
house armed with the Smith & Wesson. He testified that he then merely watched the fight between
Trevaris and Tyrell until he was attacked from behind and saw Maurice lunging for a gun. These
facts, even viewed in the light most favorable to Whitlow, did not indicate that he reasonably
believed that “another intend[ed] to attack him for the purpose of killing him or doing him serious
bodily harm” before he armed himself. Rather, the evidence he presented suggested that he brought
the weapon to an argument that did not involve him. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Whitlow’s proposed instruction was not supported by even a scintilla
of evidence.
Eyewitness Identification
Whitlow also challenges the trial court’s refusal of his proposed jury instruction covering
“eyewitness identification,” which tracks Virginia Criminal Model Instruction No. 2.800. Whitlow
asserts that his proposed instruction correctly stated the law, was supported by more than a scintilla
of evidence, and covered all the issues “which the evidence fairly raise[d].” At the same time, the
trial court did instruct the jury with Criminal Model Instruction No. 2.500:
You are the judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. You may consider the appearance and manner of the witnesses on the stand, their intelligence, their opportunity for knowing the truth and for having observed the things about which they testified, their interest in the outcome of the case, their bias, and, if any have been shown, their prior inconsistent statements, or whether they have knowingly testified untruthfully as to any material fact in the case.
You may not arbitrarily disregard believable testimony of a witness. However, after you have considered all the evidence in the case, then you may accept or discard all or part of the testimony of a witness as you think proper.
You are entitled to use your common sense in judging any testimony. From these things and all the other circumstances of the case, you - 11 - may determine which witnesses are more believable and weigh their testimony accordingly.
Jury Instr. 4.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has rejected similar arguments advocating for the
“eyewitness identification” model instruction when Criminal Model Instruction No. 2.500 was
given to the jury. In Payne v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 855, 867-71 (2016), the Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on eyewitness testimony in part because
Criminal Model Instruction No. 2.500 already adequately covered all the issues raised in the
proposed instruction. Indeed, the Court found that the proposed eyewitness instruction’s added
specificity “counseled against its use.” Id. at 871. And in Watson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 197,
210 (2019), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give Criminal Model Instruction
No. 2.800—the same instruction Whitlow offers in this case. The Court held that the trial court
properly “instructed the jury on its role as the judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses,
and the weight of the evidence,” making the refused instruction unnecessary, even though it
correctly stated the law and was supported by the evidence. Id.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on its role as the judges of the facts, the credibility of
the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. And it provided the jury with guidelines as to how to
judge witness credibility. The given instruction governing the credibility of witnesses as a whole
adequately covered the point addressed in Whitlow’s proposed instruction on eyewitness testimony,
and the jury “is presumed to have followed the instructions of the trial court.” Tizon v.
Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 1, 14 n.5 (2012) (quoting Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 169
(2012)). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing a lengthy and
complicated instruction on eyewitness credibility.
- 12 - III. The trial court did not err in striking Juror 20 for cause.
Whitlow asserts that the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to strike
Juror 20 for cause because there was no basis for doing so. “The right to be tried by an impartial
jury is guaranteed under both the United States and Virginia Constitutions.” Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 22 (2012). Thus, “[e]very prospective juror must stand indifferent
to the cause.” Id. at 23; see also Code § 8.01-358 (providing counsel the right to ask witnesses “any
relevant question” that helps “ascertain . . . bias or prejudice” and requiring a court to replace a juror
who “does not stand indifferent in the cause”). “If there be a reasonable doubt whether the juror
possesses these qualifications, that doubt is sufficient to insure his exclusion.” Taylor, 61 Va. App.
at 22 (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 (1976)). “It is well settled that ‘[i]f [a
juror] has any interest in the cause, or is related to either party, or has expressed or formed any
opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, he is excluded by the law.’” Northcraft v.
Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 563, 588 (2023) (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting
Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 42 (2020)). We apply these principles “strictly,” “and
when a prospective juror equivocates about whether he or she has formed a fixed opinion, the
prospective juror should be stricken by the trial court.” Taylor, 61 Va. App. at 23; see also
Rule 3A:14 (requiring voir dire to determine whether any prospective juror “[h]as a bias or
prejudice against the Commonwealth or the accused” (emphasis added)). “Thus, ‘the test of
impartiality is whether the venireperson can lay aside the preconceived views and render a verdict
based solely on the law and evidence presented at trial.’” Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58
Va. App. 55, 61 (2011) (quoting Cressell v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761 (2000)).
Whitlow argues that Juror 20 was impartial. The “question of juror impartiality is one of
fact.” Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436, 454 (2023). We give great deference to the trial
court on this matter because it “is in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror’s
- 13 - responses during voir dire indicate that the juror would be prevented from or impaired in
performing the duties of a juror as required by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”
Keepers, 72 Va. App. at 42-43 (quoting Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115 (2001)).
In assessing a juror’s impartiality, “[t]he trial court must weigh the meaning of the answers
given in light of the phrasing of the questions posed, the inflections, tone, and tenor of the dialogue,
and the general demeanor of the prospective juror.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 448,
455 (2017) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65 (1978)). We will not disturb
“the trial court’s exercise of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for cause . . . unless manifest
error appears in the record” because, unlike us, the trial court can “observe and evaluate the
apparent sincerity, conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first-hand.”
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 191 (2004)). “In conducting our review we
consider the juror’s entire voir dire, not merely isolated statements.” Ramos v. Commonwealth, 71
Va. App. 150, 157 (2019) (quoting DeLeon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 409, 412-13 (2002)).
Whitlow does not claim that anyone seated on the jury was biased against him. Still,
assuming without deciding that Whitlow’s right to an impartial jury was implicated by striking Juror
20 for cause, we conclude that the trial court did not err. The voir dire, viewed in its entirety, shows
that only a week earlier, Juror 20 stated she could not be fair and impartial to the Commonwealth
and that her impartiality would be affected by stories her mother-in-law had told her about
transporting prisoners. Although Juror 20 stated at Whitlow’s trial that she could be impartial, the
trial court was in the best position to assess that claim. The trial court had the opportunity to hear
her answers and consider her demeanor, her tone, and the tenor of her dialogue with the attorneys to
assess her sincerity and determine whether she could remain a fair and impartial juror. Taylor, 67
Va. App. at 455. Moreover, Juror 20 indicated that her mother-in-law’s stories potentially could
affect her point of view and that her ability to be fair and impartial might “possibly” be affected by
- 14 - her previous exposure to domestic violence. Because no manifest error appears in the record, we
will not disturb the trial court’s decision on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The evidence fairly supported the jury’s verdict. And that verdict was rendered after the
jury had received full and proper instructions from the trial court. We also find no error in the
trial court’s decision to strike Juror 20 for cause. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
- 15 -