Torres v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 160, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CARLOS TORRES, § § No. 160, 2025 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID Nos. 2408013717, 2309014333, STATE OF DELAWARE, § 2410012740 & 2408013463 (N) § Appellee. §

Submitted: October 1, 2025 Decided: November 17, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the

record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On February 17, 2025, Carlos Torres resolved multiple criminal cases

by pleading guilty to second-degree assault, first-degree reckless endangering,

possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a felony (“PDWDCF”),

disregarding a police signal, suffocation, and third-degree assault. The charges arose

from: (i) an August 2024 incident in which Torres punched a friend and threatened

to shoot him, drove his car directly at police officers arriving on the crime scene,

fled from police, and crashed his car into another person’s vehicle (Cr. ID Nos. 2408013717 & 2408013463); (ii) a July 2024 incident in which he punched a woman

(Cr. ID No. 2410012740); and (iii) an October 2023 incident in which he suffocated

his girlfriend (Cr. ID No. 230914333). As part of the plea agreement, the parties

agreed to recommend thirty-four years of Level V incarceration, suspended after ten

years for decreasing levels of supervision. The State also agreed not to seek habitual

offender sentencing.

(2) On March 21, 2025, the Superior Court found multiple aggravating

factors and imposed the following sentence: (i) for second-degree assault, effective

August 26, 2024, eight years of level V incarceration, suspended after four years for

one year of Level III probation; (ii) for first-degree reckless endangering, five years

of Level V incarceration, suspended after four years for one year of Level III

probation; (iii) for PDWDCF, ten years of Level V incarceration, suspended after

five years for one year of Level III probation; (iv) for disregarding a police signal,

two years of Level V incarceration, suspended after one year for one year of Level

III probation; (v) for suffocation, eight years of Level V incarceration, suspended

after four years for one year of Level III supervision; and (vii) for third-degree

assault, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III

probation This appeal followed.

(3) On appeal, Torres’s counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and a motion to

withdraw under Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful

2 examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Counsel

informed Torres of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the

motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.

(4) Counsel also informed Torres of his right to identify any points he

wished this Court to consider on appeal. Torres has not provided points for this

Court’s consideration. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has

moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.

(5) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief

under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a

conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii)

conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally

devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an

adversary presentation.1

(6) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that

Torres’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.

We also are satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the

record and the law and has properly determined that Torres could not raise a

meritorious claim on appeal.

1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996).

3 (7) We note, however, that the March 21, 2025 sentencing order contains

a clerical error in the sentence for disregarding a police signal. At sentencing, the

Superior Court sentenced Torres to two years of Level V incarceration, suspended

after one year for one year of Level III probation. The sentencing order, however,

describes the sentence for disregarding a police signal as two years of Level V

incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation.

(8) “Federal courts have consistently held that when there is a direct

conflict between an unambiguous oral pronouncement of a sentence and the written

judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.”2 This Court has not adopted the

federal rule, but has recognized that “Delaware statutory and case law authorize

sentence correction for errors resulting from ‘oversight or omission.’”3 The Superior

Court may, at any time, correct “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other

parts of the records and errors in the record arising from oversight of omission.” 4

We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, but remand this matter to the

Superior Court for correction of the clerical error in the March 21, 2025 sentencing

order.

2 Bland v. State, 911 A.2d 802, 2006 WL 2960050, at *1 (Del. Oct. 17, 2006) (TABLE) (citing United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1991)). 3 Bland, 2006 WL 2960050, at *1 (citing Guyer v. State, 453 A.2d 462, 464 (Del. 1982) and citing and quoting Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 36). See also 11 Del. C. § 4501 (“In a criminal case, judgment shall not be reversed for any clerical misprision or formal defect, if the record contains substantial ground for judgment.”). 4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 36.

4 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot. The matter is hereby

REMANDED to the Superior Court for correction of the clerical error in the March

21, 2025 sentencing order. Jurisdiction is not retained.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice