1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 TYLER JORDAN TORRES, Case No.: 3:19-CV-02182-CAB-RBB
7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 8 v. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
9 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, LEI-CHALA WILSON, [Doc. Nos. 15, 20] 10 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 11 DONALD MEEKS, FRANCES MINTON, 12 Defendants. 13
14 This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss by (1) the County of San Diego 15 and Lei-Chala Wilson, and (2) Donald Meeks and Frances Minton. For the reasons below, 16 the motions are granted and Plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are dismissed with 17 prejudice. 18 I. Background1 19 On September 26, 2012, following a jury trial, Plaintiff was convicted of one count 20 of Trying to Prevent or Deter an Executive Officer from Performing a Lawful Duty by 21 Violence or Threat of Violence in violation of California Penal Code section 69 and two 22 counts of Assault by Means of Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury in violation of 23 California Penal Code section 245(a)(1). [Doc. No. 20–3 at 6, 8, 10.] Plaintiff’s conviction 24
25 26 1 Defendant Officers’ request for judicial notice is proper, and Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 20-3.] As such, this Court takes judicial notice of the public record documents relating to Plaintiff’s 27 2012 conviction. [Id.] See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record’ without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 28 1 followed from his arrest after a physical altercation with San Diego Police Officers Donald 2 Meeks and Frances Minton (together, the “Defendant Officers”) on December 15, 2011. 3 [Doc. No. 1. at 2, 8.] On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of nine 4 years and four months in prison. [Id. at 2; Doc. No. 20-3 at 12-13.] Plaintiff was 5 resentenced on June 19, 2019, and was paroled on July 6, 2019. [Doc. No. 1 at 2.] 6 On November 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action against the 7 Defendant Officers, the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), the County of San Diego 8 (the “County”), and his counsel at his criminal trial, Lei-Chala Wilson. [Doc. No. 1.] 9 Plaintiff alleges that during the December 15, 2011 altercation, the Defendant Officers used 10 illegal force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. [Id. at 8.] Furthermore, Plaintiff 11 alleges that the SDPD violated his Eighth Amendment Rights by pushing, kicking, and 12 punching him while he was in handcuffs. [Id. at 18.] The complaint alleges that Wilson 13 and the County violated his Sixth Amendment Rights by not providing effective assistance 14 counsel during his state court case. [Id. at 2.] 15 Defendants Wilson and the County filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them 16 [Doc. No. 15], and Defendants Meeks and Minton filed a separate motion to dismiss the 17 claims against them [Doc. No. 20]. The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court 18 deems them suitable for submission without oral argument. 19 II. Legal Standards 20 The familiar standards on a motion to dismiss apply here. To survive a motion to 21 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 22 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 23 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, 24 the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 25 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire 26 & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). On the 27 other hand, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 28 allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation 1 marks omitted). Nor is the Court “required to accept as true allegations that contradict 2 exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or 3 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 4 inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 5 citation omitted). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non- 6 conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 7 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 8 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 9 Plaintiff is appearing pro se. [Doc. No. 1.] The allegations in a complaint prepared 10 and filed pro se are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 11 lawyers . . . .” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, “[p]ro se litigants 12 must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 13 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted). 14 III. Discussion 15 The complaint attempts to assert claims directly for constitutional violations. 16 However, “a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right does not have a 17 direct cause of action under the United States Constitution but must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). In the 19 motions to dismiss, the moving defendants assume Plaintiff intended to assert his claims 20 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff does not dispute this in his opposition briefs. [Doc. 21 No. 15-1 at 12; Doc. No. 20-1 at 9; Doc. No. 26 at 3.] Accordingly, the Court will evaluate 22 Plaintiff’s claims as if they were alleged under § 1983. 23 Both motions to dismiss argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Section 24 1983 is silent on a statute of limitations. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 25 1999). As such, the length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is determined by 26 “the law of the State in which the cause of action arose.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 27 387 (2007). There is no dispute that California’s two-year statute of limitations for 28 personal injury claims applies here. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Wilson v. Hayes, 228 1 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2017); [Doc. No. 24 at 3; Doc. No. 26 at 2]. The only 2 dispute is when the statute began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims. 3 Plaintiff’s only argument for why his claims are not time-barred is that his claims do 4 not accrue until he stops being injured by the alleged wrongful conduct of the various 5 defendants. [Doc. No. 24 at 3; Doc. No. 26 at 2.] Under federal law, however, a claim 6 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of 7 the action.” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991–92. Because, as discussed below, Plaintiff knew 8 of the injuries he suffered as a result of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing more than two 9 years before he filed this lawsuit, his claims against the moving defendants are all time- 10 barred. 11 A.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 TYLER JORDAN TORRES, Case No.: 3:19-CV-02182-CAB-RBB
7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 8 v. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
9 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, LEI-CHALA WILSON, [Doc. Nos. 15, 20] 10 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 11 DONALD MEEKS, FRANCES MINTON, 12 Defendants. 13
14 This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss by (1) the County of San Diego 15 and Lei-Chala Wilson, and (2) Donald Meeks and Frances Minton. For the reasons below, 16 the motions are granted and Plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are dismissed with 17 prejudice. 18 I. Background1 19 On September 26, 2012, following a jury trial, Plaintiff was convicted of one count 20 of Trying to Prevent or Deter an Executive Officer from Performing a Lawful Duty by 21 Violence or Threat of Violence in violation of California Penal Code section 69 and two 22 counts of Assault by Means of Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury in violation of 23 California Penal Code section 245(a)(1). [Doc. No. 20–3 at 6, 8, 10.] Plaintiff’s conviction 24
25 26 1 Defendant Officers’ request for judicial notice is proper, and Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 20-3.] As such, this Court takes judicial notice of the public record documents relating to Plaintiff’s 27 2012 conviction. [Id.] See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record’ without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 28 1 followed from his arrest after a physical altercation with San Diego Police Officers Donald 2 Meeks and Frances Minton (together, the “Defendant Officers”) on December 15, 2011. 3 [Doc. No. 1. at 2, 8.] On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of nine 4 years and four months in prison. [Id. at 2; Doc. No. 20-3 at 12-13.] Plaintiff was 5 resentenced on June 19, 2019, and was paroled on July 6, 2019. [Doc. No. 1 at 2.] 6 On November 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action against the 7 Defendant Officers, the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), the County of San Diego 8 (the “County”), and his counsel at his criminal trial, Lei-Chala Wilson. [Doc. No. 1.] 9 Plaintiff alleges that during the December 15, 2011 altercation, the Defendant Officers used 10 illegal force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. [Id. at 8.] Furthermore, Plaintiff 11 alleges that the SDPD violated his Eighth Amendment Rights by pushing, kicking, and 12 punching him while he was in handcuffs. [Id. at 18.] The complaint alleges that Wilson 13 and the County violated his Sixth Amendment Rights by not providing effective assistance 14 counsel during his state court case. [Id. at 2.] 15 Defendants Wilson and the County filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them 16 [Doc. No. 15], and Defendants Meeks and Minton filed a separate motion to dismiss the 17 claims against them [Doc. No. 20]. The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court 18 deems them suitable for submission without oral argument. 19 II. Legal Standards 20 The familiar standards on a motion to dismiss apply here. To survive a motion to 21 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 22 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 23 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, 24 the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 25 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire 26 & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). On the 27 other hand, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 28 allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation 1 marks omitted). Nor is the Court “required to accept as true allegations that contradict 2 exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or 3 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 4 inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 5 citation omitted). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non- 6 conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 7 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 8 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 9 Plaintiff is appearing pro se. [Doc. No. 1.] The allegations in a complaint prepared 10 and filed pro se are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 11 lawyers . . . .” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, “[p]ro se litigants 12 must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 13 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted). 14 III. Discussion 15 The complaint attempts to assert claims directly for constitutional violations. 16 However, “a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right does not have a 17 direct cause of action under the United States Constitution but must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). In the 19 motions to dismiss, the moving defendants assume Plaintiff intended to assert his claims 20 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff does not dispute this in his opposition briefs. [Doc. 21 No. 15-1 at 12; Doc. No. 20-1 at 9; Doc. No. 26 at 3.] Accordingly, the Court will evaluate 22 Plaintiff’s claims as if they were alleged under § 1983. 23 Both motions to dismiss argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Section 24 1983 is silent on a statute of limitations. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 25 1999). As such, the length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is determined by 26 “the law of the State in which the cause of action arose.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 27 387 (2007). There is no dispute that California’s two-year statute of limitations for 28 personal injury claims applies here. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Wilson v. Hayes, 228 1 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2017); [Doc. No. 24 at 3; Doc. No. 26 at 2]. The only 2 dispute is when the statute began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims. 3 Plaintiff’s only argument for why his claims are not time-barred is that his claims do 4 not accrue until he stops being injured by the alleged wrongful conduct of the various 5 defendants. [Doc. No. 24 at 3; Doc. No. 26 at 2.] Under federal law, however, a claim 6 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of 7 the action.” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991–92. Because, as discussed below, Plaintiff knew 8 of the injuries he suffered as a result of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing more than two 9 years before he filed this lawsuit, his claims against the moving defendants are all time- 10 barred. 11 A. Claim Against Defendants Wilson and the County 12 Plaintiff alleges that Wilson and the County violated his Sixth Amendment right to 13 effective assistance of counsel based on Wilson’s representation of Plaintiff during his 14 criminal trial in state court in 2012. [Doc. No. 1 at 2.] Putting aside the various other 15 deficiencies of a § 1983 claim premised on ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the 16 complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was aware of the actions constituting Wilson’s alleged 17 ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial, and that any injury to Plaintiff as a result 18 of Ms. Wilson’s alleged ineffective assistance began no later than when Plaintiff was 19 convicted in 2012. [Id.] Plaintiff does not argue for any tolling of the statute of limitations, 20 and the Court is unaware of any tolling that would bring Plaintiff’s claim against Wilson 21 and the County within the two-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, this claim is time- 22 barred. 23 B. Claim Against the Defendant Officers 24 Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Officers used “illegal force” in the encounter that 25 concluded with Plaintiff’s arrest on December 15, 2011, and that the officers then lied 26 about the encounter during the legal proceedings and trial that resulted in Plaintiff’s 27 conviction in 2012. [Id. at 8.] Plaintiff filed the complaint more than seven years later on 28 November 15, 2019. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff does not (and cannot) allege or argue that he 1 || was unaware of any injury resulting from the Defendant Officers’ alleged wrongdoing until 2 ||some date within two years of when he filed this lawsuit. Any claim arising out of the 3 || officers’ alleged wrongdoing accrued no later than the date on which Plaintiff was 4 ||convicted in 2012. As with the claims against Wilson and the County, Plaintiff does not 5 || argue for any tolling of the statute of limitations, and the Court is unaware of any tolling 6 || that would bring Plaintiffs claim against the Defendant Officers with the two-year statute 7 || of limitations. Accordingly, this claim is time-barred as well. 8 IV. Conclusion 9 Because the claims against the moving defendants are time-barred, the Court need 10 address the other arguments for dismissal raised in the motions. No amendment to the 11 |;}complaint could bring Plaintiff's claims within the two-year statute of limitations. 12 || Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed by (1) the County 13 |}and Lei-Chala Wilson, and (2) Officers Donald Meeks and Frances Minton, are 14 GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against these defendants are DISMISSED WITH 15 || PREJUDICE. 16 It further ORDERED that Plaintiff must SHOW CAUSE on or before August 31, 17 2020, why his remaining claim against the San Diego Police Department for violation of 18 Eighth Amendment rights [Doc. No. 1 at 18] should not be dismissed for lack of 19 || prosecution. 20 It is SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: July 29, 2020 € Z 22 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28