Torres v. Paredes

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 6, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00448
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EUCEBIO TORRES, Case No.: 22-cv-448-JES-JLB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14 OFFICER G. PAREDES, et al.,

15 Defendants. ECF No. 17 16 Defendants C. Valencia; S. Moore; R. Madden; Y. Castillo; G. Paredes; and T. 17 Carranza filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on 18 various grounds, including failure to state a claim as to Defendant C. Valencia in the first 19 cause of action; failure to state a claim for supervisory liability as to all Defendants in the 20 second cause of action; and failure to state a claim as to Defendants G. Paredes and C. 21 Valencia in the fourth cause of action. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS 22 IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 23 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 24 Plaintiff was an inmate at Centinela State Prison (“CDCR-CEN”). In 2020, inmates 25 who were once segregated at sensitive needs yards and housed separately were being 26 commingled with general population inmates in the MSF Program (“Facility E”). FAC ¶ 27 24. On October 29, 2020, Plaintiff along with two other inmates were transferred from 28 1 Facility A, a general population program to Facility E. FAC ¶¶ 2, 23-24. During the 2 transfer process, the three men were informed of the program expectations and were then 3 placed in temporary holding cells in an unnamed sergeant’s office. FAC ¶¶ 23-27. While 4 in the holding cell, the unnamed transporting officers asked Plaintiff and the two other 5 inmates, “are you guys going to win the fight?” FAC ¶ 28. Then the unnamed 6 transporting officers and the unnamed sergeant commented that MSF inmates were 7 taking over general population as some form of retaliation for past events. FAC ¶ 28. The 8 unnamed officers and the unnamed sergeant elaborated further and said that if Plaintiff 9 and his fellow general population inmates win their respective fights, general population 10 would be down by one fight. FAC ¶ 29. Plaintiff’s group of three was instructed by the 11 unnamed transporting officers and unnamed supervising sergeant that “they had to make 12 the general population look good.” FAC ¶ 29. 13 Plaintiff and his two fellow general population inmates were sent individually into 14 Facility E and prior to Plaintiff entering Facility E, he was told by one of the unnamed 15 transporting officers that Plaintiff had to “come through with a win.” FAC ¶¶ 30-31. 16 When Plaintiff arrived at Facility E, he was transferred to Defendant Paredes’ custody 17 and as soon as Plaintiff arrived at Facility E, he saw a group of four male inmates in a 18 circle, awaiting his arrival. FAC ¶¶ 32-33. The four inmates were shirtless and wearing 19 hand wraps. FAC ¶ 33. As Plaintiff put down his property, one of the four inmates, 20 inmate Ballez, moved closer to Plaintiff, his body language “threatening,” and yelled at 21 Plaintiff, “are you staying,” and if you are staying, “fuck GP!” FAC ¶ 34. Inmate Ballez 22 then punched Plaintiff on the side of his head and a second inmate hit Plaintiff. FAC ¶ 34. 23 Plaintiff then fell to the floor and covered his face and head and remained there in a fetal 24 position during the attack on him by the group of four inmates. FAC ¶ 34. During the 25 incident, Defendant Paredes and the unnamed transporting officers stood and watched 26 and did not attempt to intervene. FAC ¶ 35. 27 Plaintiff was initially taken to the prison medical facility and after an examination 28 it was determined that Plaintiff should be seen at a medical facility outside of the prison 1 complex, so Plaintiff was taken to Pioneer Hospital in Centinela and was transported by 2 ambulance to the University of California San Diego Hospital (“UCSD”). FAC ¶ 36. 3 Plaintiff was hospitalized at UCSD for approximately two weeks and underwent several 4 surgeries to his face. FAC ¶ 37. After his release from UCSD, Plaintiff was returned to 5 CDCR-CEN and alleges that “in order to cover up Defendants’ wrongful actions, 6 Defendant Paredes prepared and submitted a fabricated rules violation report accusing 7 Plaintiff of a battery on a prisoner.” FAC ¶ 39. 8 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Paredes made “no mention of Mr. Torres’ injuries 9 or how Mr. Torres sustained the serious injuries that required emergency medical 10 treatment, multiple surgeries, hospitalization, and post-discharge medical treatment.” 11 FAC ¶ 39. Plaintiff then alleges that Sergeant Valencia “concealed his knowledge about 12 and involvement in the incident … [and] failed to submit a supplemental report about the 13 incident and approved the fabricated rules violation report authored by Defendant 14 Paredes.” FAC ¶ 40. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Valencia “participated in and 15 knew about or should have known about the violence that was planned, instigated, 16 encouraged, and facilitated by certain correctional officers under his supervision.” Comp. 17 ¶ 6. 18 Plaintiff also alleges that Facility Captain T. Carranza classified a “falsified rules 19 violation report authored by Defendant Paredes in connection with the … attack on Mr. 20 Torres … [as] Captain Carranza failed to initiate a full and proper inquiry into the 21 incident.” FAC ¶ 41. Based on the rules violation report (“RVR”), Plaintiff received a 22 punishment of confinement to quarters for 10 days and a 90-day loss of good time credit, 23 which extended his incarceration at CDCR-CEN. FAC 42. Plaintiff was released from 24 custody in December of 2021. FAC ¶ 43. Plaintiff sustained multiple injuries to his face 25 and head, including several fractures and suffers from frequent headaches, sensitivity to 26 light and sound, blurred vision, periodic bouts of dizziness and balance issues, and 27 drainage of blood from his mouth during sleep. FAC ¶ 44. 28 1 In his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paredes, Valencia and 2 Doe 1 through Doe 5 acted jointly and in concert with one another to deprive Plaintiff of 3 his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to 4 the violence in Facility E and failing to prevent harm to Plaintiff. FAC ¶¶ 54-57. Further, 5 Defendants maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff on fabricated evidence and punished him by 6 extending his incarceration and confining him to his quarters. ¶ 58. In his second cause of 7 action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Valencia, Carranza, Castillo, Madden, Moore and 8 Doe 6 through Doe 10 deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under the Eighth 9 Amendment under supervisory liability. FAC ¶¶ 64-66. Plaintiff alleges that “prior 10 incidents of excessive force and violence against inmates caused by the wrongful conduct 11 of CDCR-CEN officers were reported or otherwise brought to the attention of the 12 command staff at CDCR-CEN … [but] its supervisors and command staff failed to take 13 appropriate corrective action to remedy such violations.” FAC ¶ 67. In his third cause of 14 action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paredes, Valencia, Castillo and Doe 1 through 15 Doe 10 deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by 16 “manufacturing false evidence against Plaintiff.” FAC ¶¶ 75-77. In his fourth cause of 17 action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paredes, Valencia and Doe 1 through Doe 5 18 violated the Bane Act. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 21 claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 22 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). A court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the 23 complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the 24 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–338 (9th Cir. 1996). 25 However, a court need not accept conclusory allegations as true, but “examine whether 26 conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” 27 Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). “Threadbare recitals of the 28 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a 2 complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). 4 A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw 5 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 6 556 U.S. at 678. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff 7 must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 9 requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 10 unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility 11 requires pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations, which rise above the mere 12 conceivability or possibility of unlawful conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the 14 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To comply 15 with Rule 8, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the 16 defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 17 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Factual allegations must 18 be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 19 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 20 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s 21 framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 679. 22 When a complaint fails to state a claim as set forth above, a plaintiff may seek 23 leave to amend to cure its deficiencies. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court 24 should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In 25 deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the court considers the following factors: the 26 presence or absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure 27 deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility 28 1 of the proposed amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); DCD Programs, 2 Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. First Cause of Action 5 Defendant argues that the first cause of action should be dismissed as to Defendant 6 C. Valencia because he was not present during the incident on October 29, 2020, and the 7 ten-day confinement to quarters and 90 days loss of good time credits do not support an 8 Eighth Amendment violation. 9 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 10 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 11 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 12 allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 13 United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 14 acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. County of 15 Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 17 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 18 perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the 19 plaintiff complains].” Leer v. Murphy 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) quoting Johnson 20 v. Duffy 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). The inquiry into causation must be 21 individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 22 whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. Id. 23 Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment 24 under a deliberate indifference theory. A prisoner can state a section 1983 claim against 25 prison personnel under the eighth amendment by establishing that the prison personnel 26 acted with “deliberate indifference” in creating the condition that violates the eighth 27 amendment. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633, See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 28 1986). The “deliberate indifference” standard requires proving some degree of 1 “individual culpability," but does not require proof of an express intent to punish. Berg, 2 supra, citing Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354-1355 (9th Cir. 1985). When 3 inmates seek to hold an individual defendant personally liable for damages, the causation 4 inquiry between the deliberate indifference and the eighth amendment deprivation must 5 be more refined. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. In order to resolve this causation issue, we must 6 take a very individualized approach which accounts for the duties, discretion, and means 7 of each defendant, the prisoner must establish individual fault. Berg, 794 F.2d at 460. The 8 prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s deliberate 9 indifference. Id. at 460-461. 10 The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect inmates from 11 violence at the hands of other inmates. Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) 12 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). A prison official violates the 13 Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, 14 objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately 15 indifferent to the inmate's safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 16 Plaintiff’s FAC spans 21 pages and in those pages, he recounts the details 17 surrounding the incident on October 29, 2020, while being transferred from Facility A to 18 Facility E. He recites the actions of several unnamed detention officers, an unnamed 19 sergeant, and Defendant Paredes. However, Plaintiff does not describe with any degree of 20 specificity the actions of Defendant Valencia in moving him from Facility A to Facility 21 E. In fact, Plaintiff only mentions Defendant Valencia twice in the FAC. Plaintiff alleges 22 that Sergeant Valencia “participated in and knew about or should have known about the 23 violence that was planned, instigated, encouraged, and facilitated by certain correctional 24 officers under his supervision.” FAC ¶ 6. Further, Plaintiff alleges that “Sergeant 25 Valencia concealed his knowledge about and involvement in the incident. Sergeant 26 Valencia failed to submit a supplemental report about the incident and approved the 27 fabricated rules violation report authored by Defendant Paredes.” FAC ¶ 40. In the 28 remainder of the FAC, there is no other reference to Sergeant Valencia’s individual 1 actions that led to the incident on October 29, 2020. Plaintiff does not allege that 2 Sergeant Valencia was present on October 29, 2020, and does not allege any specific 3 facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 4 existed, and that Sergeant Valencia was aware of such risk. See Farmer, supra. 5 In his response to the motion to dismiss this cause of action, Plaintiff argues that 6 the references to an unnamed sergeant in paragraphs 23-31 of his complaint were in fact a 7 reference to Sergeant Valencia and that the Court should draw that inference since 8 Sergeant Valencia is the only sergeant mentioned in the complaint. The Court does not 9 believe that is an appropriate inference to draw from the complaint. As argued in 10 Defendant’s reply brief, Plaintiff does not assert that Defendant Valencia was a Facility A 11 sergeant, much less the one on duty during his transfer to Facility E. The only references 12 specifically to Sergeant Valencia in the FAC in paragraphs 6 and 40 mentioned above are 13 threadbare and conclusory. They do not state any specific actions or nonaction taken by 14 Sergeant Valencia. Without more than the information stated in paragraphs 6 and 40 in 15 the FAC, the Court cannot draw the inference suggested by Plaintiff. A plaintiff must 16 allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved 17 in the deprivation of his civil rights. Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal 18 involvement of the defendant. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.1980). 19 Plaintiff also alleges an Eighth Amendment violation because Defendants Valencia 20 and Paredes “maliciously prosecuted [him] based on fabricated evidence, and punished 21 [him] by extending his incarceration and by confining him to his quarters,” in the 22 issuance of an RVR. FAC ¶¶ 41, 58. “A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to 23 be free from wrongfully issued disciplinary reports.” Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 24 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997). Plaintiff cannot pursue an Eighth Amendment claim against 25 Defendant Valencia based on the alleged falsified RVR as the alleged injuries do not 26 constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 27 For those reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the first cause of 28 action against Defendant Valencia without prejudice. 1 B. Second Cause of Action – Supervisory Liability 2 Defendant argues that the second cause of action should be dismissed in its entirety 3 because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support supervisory liability, even under a 4 deliberate indifference standard. Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s claim fails because 5 Plaintiff failed to allege any specific facts as to each individual defendant’s deliberate 6 indifference and instead made conclusory statements. 7 A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists either 8 (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient 9 causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 10 violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989). “[A] plaintiff must show 11 the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. 12 “The requisite causal connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts 13 by others, or by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the 14 supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 15 constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207–1208 (9th Cir.2011) (internal 16 citations omitted) (quoting Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 17 (9th Cir.2001)). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own 18 culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for 19 his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless 20 or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1208 (citations omitted). 21 Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendant’s in the second cause of action 22 were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation and instead argues that 23 there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the 24 constitutional violation. In regard to Defendants Valencia, T. Carranza, Y. Castillo, R. 25 Madden, S. Moore, Plaintiff listed the same identical statement that each of these 26 Defendants “knew about or should have known about the violence that was planned, 27 instigated, encouraged, and facilitated by certain correctional officers under [their] 28 supervision.” FAC ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. In his second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that 1 the “brutal attack on Plaintiff Torres was not the first incident involving the use of 2 excessive force against an inmate that occurred with the knowledge, connivance, 3 approval, ratification, encouragement, or involvement of CDCR-CEN officers.” FAC ¶ 4 66. Further, Plaintiff alleges there were prior incidents of excessive force and violence 5 against inmates caused by the wrongful conduct of CDCR-CEN officers that were 6 reported or otherwise brought to the attention of the command staff at CDCR-CEN. But 7 the supervisors and command staff failed to take appropriate corrective action to remedy 8 such violations. FAC ¶ 67. 9 Plaintiff does not allege any specific incidents of excessive force or violent assaults 10 committed by inmates that occurred prior to October 29, 2020. Plaintiff does not allege 11 when these prior incidents occurred or how these prior incidents were reported or 12 otherwise brought to the attention of command staff at CDCR-CEN. Plaintiff does not 13 allege with any degree of specificity how each of the defendants had knowledge or 14 should have known about prior incidents of violence. Further, Plaintiff does not allege 15 whether those prior incidents of violence were committed by other inmates or by 16 correctional officers. Without any specific facts alleged, Plaintiff fails to show a causal 17 connection between the defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct and the constitutional 18 violation. The facts alleged in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 67 are vague and conclusory 19 and fail to state a cause of action. 20 For those reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the second cause of 21 action in its entirety without prejudice. 22 C. Fourth Cause of Action – Bane Act 23 Defendant argues that the fourth cause of action alleging a violation of California 24 Civil Code Section 52.1 should be dismissed in its entirety or at least against Defendant 25 Valencia because Valencia was not present during the incident on October 29, 2020. 26 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendants Paredes or Valencia 27 used violence or threats of violence to interfere with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 28 1 Cal. Civ. Code Sec 52.1 provides a right to relief when someone “interferes by 2 threats, intimidation, or coercion … with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 3 individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the 4 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California].” Cal. Gov’t Code § 52.1. To 5 prevail on a § 52.1 claim, a plaintiff must therefore prove (1) a violation of a 6 constitutional or statutory right (2) by intimidation, threats or coercion. Rodriguez v. 7 County of Los Angeles, 96 F. Supp. 3d 990, 998 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2014) (citing 8 Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App.4th 1230, 1242 (2007)). A Bane Act 9 claim is allowed to proceed as long as the claim relies on a proper constitutional claim. 10 Parra v. Hernandez, 2009 WL3818376, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009). 11 Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is based on an alleged violation of his Eighth and 12 Fourteenth Amendment rights and Article 1, Sections 7 and 17 of the California 13 Constitution. Because as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a 14 constitutional violation against Defendant Valencia, the Bane Act claim against 15 Defendant Valencia is dismissed without prejudice. Defendant Paredes does not 16 challenge the constitutional violation alleged against him in the first cause of action. For 17 that reason, the Court finds Plaintiff did sufficiently allege a constitutional violation 18 against Defendant Paredes. 19 For those reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the fourth cause of 20 action against Defendant Valencia and DENIES the motion to dismiss the fourth cause of 21 action against Defendant Paredes. 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / l IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the 3 || first cause of action against Defendant Valencia, the second cause of action in its entirety 4 the fourth cause of action against Defendant Valencia. The Court DENIES the 5 || Motion to Dismiss the fourth cause of action against Defendant Paredes. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: June 6, 2023 J . 8 Jan SA A . ? Honorable James E. Sunmons, Jr. 10 Unites States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28