Torres v. Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedDecember 18, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-01501
StatusUnknown

This text of Torres v. Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc. (Torres v. Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torres v. Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc., (N.D. Ohio 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

DAHIANNA TORRES, ef al., ) CASENO. 1:19 CV 1501 Plaintiffs, Vv. JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT DINO PALMERI SALONS, INC., +, MEMORANDUM OPINION ) AND ORDER Defendants. )

This matter is before the Court on the Named Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification, Expedited Opt-In Discovery, and Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs. (ECF #6). Defendants filed a partial opposition to the motion, and Plaintiffs filed a Reply. (ECF #18, 23). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED with conditions.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Named Plaintiffs, Dahianna Torres, Chelsea Amata, and Katie Kauble, brought this action on behalf of themselves and “all others similarly situated,” claiming that Defendants, Dino

Palmieri and Dino Palmieri Salons Inc., (“Dino Palmieri”) had policies and practices in place which resulted in violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Dino Palmieri did not pay its hourly, non-exempt employees wages for time spent attending mandatory training classes, and that this violated minimum wage and overtime pay requirements under the Act. In addition, Plaintiffs claim that Dino Palmieri took deductions from employee pay when they did not sell a minimum amount of product, and that these deductions effectively lowered Plaintiffs pay below the minimum wage required under the FLSA. The currently pending motion seeks to conditionally certify this action as a collective action for both of these claims, and asks the Court to impose approved procedures for notifying all putative plaintiffs of their right to opt-in to this collective action.

II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) seeks to provide “specific minimum protections to individual workers” and to ensure that each covered worker receives a “fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981). The Act allows one or more employees to bring an enforcement action on their own behalf and as a representative for other similarly situated employees. 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Many courts within and without the Sixth Circuit have adopted a two-stage process for determining whether an FLSA action should proceed as a collective action. See, e.g., Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544, 547 (6" Cir. 2006). In this process, the Court determines based on the complaint

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and some modest factual allegations, whether there is a colorable basis for their claim that the putative class is “similarly situated” with regard to plausibly alleged claims. If so, the Court generally permits opt-in notification and additional discovery. The parties agree that this standard is “fairly lenient” and typically results is conditional certification of the class for purposes of notification. At this stage, the existence of significant individualized issues does not preclude conditional certification. See, White v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 363, 367 (E.D. Tenn. 2006). In any case, the statutory standard for bringing a collective action under the FLSA is that the opt-in plaintiffs must be “similarly situated,” and it should not generally rely on any assessment of the merits of the case. See, O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enter., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6" Cir. 2009); Creely v. HCR ManorCore, Inc., 789 F.Supp.2d 819 (2011) at 826. This does not mean they must be identical, but the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the putative class is similarly situated with regard to the claims asserted. Both parties agree that this case should be conditionally certified as a collective action. They have minor disagreements, however, on how the class(es) should be defined. The scope of a conditional class is within the Court’s sound discretion. Jn re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 351 (6" cir. 2002). Trial courts, therefore, may narrow the scope of proposed classes that have been too broadly defined by the representative Plaintiffs. See, e.g, Gomez v. ERMC Property Memt., Co., LEC, 2014 WL 1513945, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2004); Engel v. Burlington Coat Fact. Direct Corp., 2013 WL 2417979, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2013). The Court finds that the following class definitions appropriately address the Plaintiffs’ claims, at this conditional stage of certification, while taking into account the legal limitations of

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such claims’: Class One: All former and current stylists (including trainees and cosmetologists) employed by Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc., who attended training classes anytime from [three years, four months and nine days from the date of this order]* through the present, but were not paid at least minimum wage for any workweek’ during which those classes occurred. Class Two: All former and current stylists (including trainees and cosmetologists) employed by Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc. from [three years, four months and nine days from the date of this order] through present, who had money deducted from their pay for fees (including “training fees”) or for charge backs related to the amount of product they sold, which individually or in combination caused their pay to drop below minimum wage for any workweek. Within a week of this Order, Defendants shall provide the Representative Plaintiffs with While the following definitions do not include all of the limitations sought by Defendants, the Court finds that many of the requested limitations are better addressed as potential defenses at a later stage in the litigation. The statute of limitations for these claims is three years. 29 U.S.C. §255(a). The parties, however, entered into a tolling agreement from February 18, 2019 through June 27, 2019 which extends the class period by four months and nine days. Plaintiffs argument that the Complaint includes common law claims with a longer statute of limitations is not relevant to the determination of this motion which seeks conditional certification for a collective action under the FLSA. State law class issues will not be incorporated into the FLSA collective action certification and notice. Courts calculate minimum wage on a workweek basis, not on an hour-by-hour or day-by- day basis under the FLSA. See, generally, In re Amazon.com, Inc. Fulfillment Center FLSA and Wage and Hour Litigation, 905 F.3d 387, 406 (6" Cir. 2018); see also, U.S. Dept. Of Labor y. Cole Ent., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 780 (6" Cir. 1995); McDowell v. Purolator Courier Corp., 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14072 (E.D. Ky January 29, 1982); United States v. Klinghoffer Brothers Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). -4-

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