Torres v. Diaz

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 24, 2020
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01964
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDUARDO TORRES, Case No.: 19-cv-01964-LAB-JLB

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 13 v. MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS

14 RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

15 Respondents. [ECF Nos. 2; 3; 4; 5; 13; 18] 16 17 Petitioner Eduardo Torres is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 18 on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 19 (ECF Nos. 1; 9.) Presently before the Court are several miscellaneous motions filed by 20 Petitioner: (1) Request for Evidentiary Hearing (ECF No. 5); (2) Request for Appointment 21 of Counsel (ECF No. 2); (3) Request for Provision of Missing/Withheld State Court 22 Discovery (ECF No. 3); (4) Request for Expansion of the Record (ECF No. 4); (5) “In- 23 Camera Request for Court to Expedite its Ruling on the Companion Motions/Requests 24 Filed Simultaneously with Petitioner[’s] Pro Se[] Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas 25 Corpus” (ECF No. 13); and (6) “Request to Quash Respondents’ (DAG’s) Notice of 26 Lodgment & Proof of Service Ther[e]of” (ECF No. 18). For the reasons set forth below, 27 Petitioner’s motions are DENIED. 28 /// 1 I. REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 2 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing. (ECF No. 5.) 3 Petitioner “requests that the Court order and conduct a full evidentiary hearing on all 4 issues/grounds as raised in the [Petition] inasmuch as the triad of State Courts failed or 5 refused to do so.” (Id. at 1.) Petitioner argues that “[t]he habeas issues/grounds etc. were 6 fairly presented to those lower courts to no avail.” (Id.) 7 Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that a court determines 8 whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted in a habeas proceeding after the respondent 9 files an answer to the petition. Rule 8(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (“If the petition is not 10 dismissed, the judge must review the answer, any transcripts and records of state-court 11 proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an evidentiary 12 hearing is warranted.”). Here, Respondents have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition 13 (ECF No. 14) and have not yet answered the Petition on the merits. Petitioner’s request 14 for an evidentiary hearing is therefore premature. See, e.g., Lopez v. Williams, Case No. 15 2:18-cv-00480-JCM-NJK, 2019 WL 2476733, at *4 (D. Nev. June 13, 2019) (“As the 16 respondents have not yet answered the petition on the merits, petitioner’s request for an 17 evidentiary hearing is premature.”). If the Court denies Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, 18 then Petitioner may submit another request for an evidentiary hearing after Respondents 19 have answered the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner’s premature Request for Evidentiary 20 Hearing is DENIED without prejudice. 21 II. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 22 Also before the Court is Petitioner’s Request for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF 23 No. 2.) Petitioner argues that the Court should appoint him counsel because he “is gravely 24 and severely mentally-disabled” and “is a Keyhea mental health patient.” (Id. at 1.) 25 A. Legal Standard 26 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus 27 actions by state prisoners. McCleskly v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991). Petitioners do 28 not have an absolute right to counsel for habeas corpus actions. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 1 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, by statute, district courts have discretion 2 to appoint counsel in habeas proceedings for “any person financially unable to obtain 3 adequate representation” when “the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. 4 § 3006A(a)(2)(B); see also Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986) 5 (“Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not entitled to appointed 6 counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is 7 necessary to prevent due process violations.”). Whether or not to appoint counsel is a 8 matter left to the court’s discretion, unless an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Knaubert, 9 791 F.2d at 729–30 (explaining that the interests of justice require appointment of counsel 10 when the court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition). 11 The court’s discretion to appoint counsel may be exercised only under “exceptional 12 circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of 13 exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the 14 merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 15 complexity of the legal issues involved. Neither of these factors is dispositive and both 16 must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 17 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Weygandt v. 18 Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 19 B. Discussion 20 As stated above, Petitioner argues that the Court should appoint him counsel because 21 he “is gravely and severely mentally-disabled” and “is a Keyhea mental health patient.” 22 (ECF No. 2 at 1.) To his motion, Petitioner attached the declaration of Charles Windham, 23 an inmate who is assisting Petitioner in this action. (Id. at 5.) Windham states that the 24 Court should appoint counsel for Petitioner because: (1) “Petitioner is an indigent layman 25 at law”; (2) “he is gravely mentally-disabled per Kehea v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1982)”; (3) “his 26 defense counsel refused to submit a (direct appeal) . . . on his behalf resulting in NO 27 APPEAL REVIEW whatsoever”; (4) “his grounds for relief have merit”; and (5) “the San 28 Diego Police/Jail/Public Defenders & Superior/State Courts appear to be ‘hiding’ PCR 1 documents/‘discovery’/evidence, etc., helpful/beneficial to [Petitioner]’s PCR efforts, inter 2 alia.” (Id.) Windham provides that he attempted to secure counsel for Petitioner by 3 mailing “a 2-page correspondence” to “multiple habeas attorneys,” “California Schools of 4 Law,” and “several Post-Conviction Relief/Innocence Projects,” but he did not receive a 5 reply or received a declination of representation. (Id.) Windham further states that he has 6 “observed” Petitioner, and Petitioner “has shown [him] . . . continuing evidence of his 7 severe mental illness(es).” (Id. at 6.) 8 1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 9 A review of the record before the Court supports the conclusion that the interests of 10 justice do not require the appointment of counsel for Petitioner at this time. Although 11 Petitioner is indigent,1 he has not made a supported argument that his Petition is likely to 12 succeed. Petitioner merely concludes that “his grounds for relief have merit.” Moreover, 13 Respondents have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely. (ECF No. 13.) 14 Whether the Court will even rule on the merits of the Petition is significantly cast in doubt 15 by Respondents’ motion. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the 16 merits of his Petition. 17 2. Ability to Litigate Claims Pro Se 18 As to Petitioner’s ability to litigate his claims pro se, there is some indication at this 19 stage that Petitioner may be incapable of proceeding without the assistance of counsel. 20 Petitioner claims that he is “gravely and severely mentally-disabled,”2 which is 21 corroborated by inmate Windham’s declaration. Other documents in the record, but not 22 attached to Petitioner’s motion, also support Petitioner’s claim that he is mentally ill. To 23 his Petition, Petitioner attached an order by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) granting 24

25 1 On October 28, 2019, the Honorable Larry Alan Burns granted Petitioner’s Motion 26 to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, finding that “Petitioner has $0.00 on account at the 27 California correctional institution in which he is presently confined.” (ECF No. 9 at 1.) 2 It clear from the medical records Petitioner attached to his Petition that by “mentally- 28 1 a renewed Petition for Order Authorizing Involuntary Administration of Psychiatric 2 Medication (“Medication Order”) dated August 20, 2019. (ECF No. 1-5 at 4.) In the 3 Medication Order, the ALJ found that Petitioner was “[g]ravely [d]isabled[] and lack[ed] 4 the capacity to consent to or refuse treatment with psychiatric medications.” (Id. at 5.) In 5 granting the Medication Order, the ALJ permitted Mule Creek State Prison to 6 “involuntarily administer[]” Petitioner with “psychiatric medication” for one year, from 7 August 20, 2019, to August 20, 2020. (Id. at 6.) Thus, it appears Petitioner is currently 8 and involuntarily receiving psychiatric medication from Mule Creek State Prison. 9 Also attached to the Petition is a Declaration In Support of Renewal of Involuntary 10 Medication executed by psychiatrist Dr. Kulwant Singh on July 9, 2019. (Id. at 12–16.) 11 Dr. Singh states that the “current working diagnosis” of Petitioner on July 9, 2019 was 12 “Schizoaffective disorder Bipolar type,” which is a “serious mental illness requiring 13 psychiatric medication.” (Id. at 12.) After completing a “renewal questionnaire” with 14 Petitioner, Dr. Singh noted that Petitioner “was very [bizarre], vague, [and] [did] not make 15 sense,” and “[h]e could not [v]erbalize a viable plan for his basic needs.” (Id.) However, 16 Dr. Singh opined that Petitioner was currently receiving medication that would “decrease 17 his [b]izarre behavior, decrease his [p]aranoia and delusional thought, . . . stabilize his 18 mood, make him less depressed and less suicidal[,] and . . . improve his [insight and 19 judgment].” (Id. at 13.) Based on the foregoing documents, the Court finds that there is 20 some indication in the record that Petitioner may be incompetent. 21 The Ninth Circuit in Allen v. Calderon held that where a petitioner submits 22 “substantial evidence” of his incompetence, the district court should hold a competency 23 hearing to determine whether the petitioner is “competent under an appropriate standard 24 for habeas petitioners.” 408 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2005). The Allen court further 25 determined that, should the district court conclude such a hearing is advisable, “counsel 26 should be appointed for the limited purpose of representing the petitioner at the competency 27 hearing as required by Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.” Id. at 1153. 28 /// 1 Although the court in Allen did not specify what constitutes “substantial evidence,” 2 it did offer some guidance. In Allen, the petitioner submitted his own declaration and the 3 declaration of another inmate explaining that the petitioner was mentally ill and did not 4 understand the court’s orders. Id. at 1152. The petitioner also included a letter from his 5 treating psychiatrist at the prison setting forth the petitioner’s diagnosis of chronic 6 undifferentiated schizophrenia and stating that the petitioner was taking two psychotropic 7 medications. Id. The Allen court found that these submissions established that the 8 petitioner “suffer[ed] from a mental illness, the mental illness prevent[ed] him from being 9 able to understand and respond to the court’s order, and he was still suffering from the 10 illness during the relevant time period.” Id. Because the petitioner had provided 11 substantial evidence of his incompetence, the Ninth Circuit held that district court abused 12 its discretion by not holding a competency hearing before dismissing the petition. Id. at 13 1153–54. 14 Here, Petitioner has provided a declaration from Windham, a “legal assistant” 15 inmate, stating that Petitioner is “gravely mentally-disabled,” the ALJ’s Medication Order, 16 and Dr. Singh’s Declaration in Support of Renewal of Involuntary Medication. The Court, 17 however, does not find that these documents are substantial evidence that Petitioner is 18 presently incompetent. Windham’s declaration says nothing about Petitioner’s present 19 ability articulate his claims, respond to the issues raised, or comprehend Court orders, and 20 provides that Petitioner has a high school education. (ECF No. 2 at 6.) And although Dr. 21 Singh’s declaration shows that Petitioner’s working diagnosis on July 19, 2019, was 22 schizoaffective disorder, it also shows that Petitioner is receiving medication for his 23 illness—albeit involuntarily—that Dr. Singh opined would improve his symptoms. (ECF 24 No. 1-5 at 13.) There are no medical records before the Court showing that, despite being 25 medicated, Petitioner’s illness is currently affecting his ability to litigate his case.3 See 26

27 3 The Court acknowledges that some of Petitioner’s responses to the questions Dr. 28 1 Allen, 408 F.3d at 1152 (stating that the petitioner’s submissions showed that “he was still 2 suffering from the illness during the relevant time period”). For these reasons, the Court 3 finds that this case is distinguishable from Allen, as there is no evidence of Petitioner’s 4 current incompetence.4 Therefore, a competency hearing with appointed counsel not 5 warranted at this time. See, e.g., Meeks v. Nunez, No. 13cv973-GPC(BGS), 2017 WL 6 476425, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (“Despite filing an ‘Inmate Request for Assistance 7 from the Court’ asserting a mental impairment of ‘Schizoaffective Disorder’ signed by a 8 forensic psychologist, Plaintiff . . . has not submitted any documents such as a treating 9 physician’s notes, to demonstrate the effects of his diagnosis on the prosecution of this 10 case.”); McElroy v. Cox, Civil No. 08-1221 JM (AJB), 2009 WL 4895360, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 11 Dec. 11, 2009) (finding that although the pro se prisoner in a § 1983 case provided evidence 12 similar to the evidence in Allen, “there [was] no nexus between his mental disorder and his 13 ability to articulate his claims,” and the “medical records indicate[d] that he function[ed] 14 well when properly medicated”). 15 /// 16

17 example, Dr. Singh noted that when he asked Petitioner to “describe behaviors or acts 18 which led to this involuntary medication order bring put in place,” Petitioner responded, “I 19 like the color of your shirt.” (ECF No. 1-5 at 14.) Further, in his declaration, Dr. Singh stated that the “behaviors or acts that required [the] involuntary medication” of Petitioner 20 were Petitioner’s “[d]elusional” and “paranoid” thoughts that someone was “poisoning 21 [his] food” and that the “FBI [was] after [him].” (Id. at 12.) But, again, Dr. Singh also stated that medication “will decrease [Petitioner’s] [b]izarre behavior, decrease his 22 [p]aranoia and delusional thought, . . . stabilize his mood, make[] him less depressed and 23 less suicidal[,] and . . . improve his [insight and judgment].” (Id. at 13.) 4 Additionally, nothing about the way this case has been prosecuted to date indicates 24 that Petitioner is incompetent, although this may be because of the assistance Petitioner is 25 receiving from other inmates. With the assistance of inmate Windham, Petitioner has been zealously prosecuting this action, as he has filed the Petition and several motions before 26 the Court. (See ECF Nos. 2; 3; 4; 5; 13; 16; 18.) See West v. Dizon, No. 2:12–cv–1293 27 DAD P, 2014 WL 114659, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014) (denying the pro se inmate plaintiff’s request for counsel based on his mental disabilities and noting that the plaintiff 28 1 Because Petitioner has not shown that his Petition is likely to succeed, nor that he is 2 presently unable to litigate his claims pro se, and because the Court has not ordered an 3 evidentiary hearing, the interests of justice do not warrant the appointment of counsel at 4 this time. Petitioner’s Request for Appointment of Counsel is therefore DENIED without 5 prejudice. 6 III. REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 7 Also before the Court is Petitioner’s Request for Provision of Missing/Withheld 8 State Court Discovery (“Request for Discovery”). (ECF No. 3.) Petitioner requests that 9 the Court “enter an order commanding Xavier Becerra . . . to provide this Petitioner Pro 10 Se, in a reasonable amount of time, ALL missing/withheld ‘DISCOVERY’ in [P]etitioner’s 11 state court matter.” (Id. at 1.) Petitioner argues that he “will require . . . these 12 documents/evidence in order to properly raise his issues/grounds for relief and its 13 supporting evidence accordingly.” (Id.) 14 Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that a court may, for good 15 cause, allow discovery in habeas proceedings and may limit the extent of discovery. Rule 16 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Rule 6(b) requires a party requesting discovery to provide 17 reasons for the request and to specify any requested documents. Rule 6(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. 18 § 2254. However, “[a] habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is 19 not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracey v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 20 904 (1997); see also Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A habeas 21 petitioner does not enjoy the presumptive entitlement to discovery of a traditional civil 22 litigant.” (citing Bracey, 520 U.S. at 904)). “[D]iscovery is only available in the discretion 23 of the court and for good cause shown.” Rich, 187 F.3d at 1068. 24 Here, Petitioner has not shown good cause to conduct discovery. Petitioner has not 25 specified what documents he believes exist but are “missing” or being “withheld.” (ECF 26 No. 3 at 1.) Nor has Petitioner identified what type of evidence he is seeking through 27 discovery that he needs to “properly raise his issues/grounds for relief.” (Id.) To the extent 28 Petitioner “is merely looking for documents that ‘will aid in the adjudication, facilitation, 1 and expediti[on]” of these proceedings, this does rise to the level of good cause. Larvey v. 2 Singh, No. 11cv1418–WQH (BLM), 2011 WL 5975934, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2011); 3 see also Rich, 187 F.3d at 1067 (“Habeas is an important safeguard whose goal is to correct 4 real and obvious wrongs. It was never meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas 5 petitioners to ‘explore their case in search of its existence.’” (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 6 F.2d 688, 689 (5th Cir. 1970))). Accordingly, Petitioner’s Request for Discovery is 7 DENIED. 8 IV. REQUEST FOR EXPANSION OF THE RECORD 9 Also before the Court is Petitioner’s Request for Expansion of the Record. (ECF 10 No. 4.) Petitioner requests that the Court “expand the record in this case to include 11 available additional evidence that support’s [P]etitioner’s issues/grounds for relief.” (Id. 12 at 1.) Rule 7(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that “[i]f the petition is not 13 dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional 14 materials relating to the petition.” Rule 7(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The purpose of Rule 15 7 “is to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, 16 without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing.” Advisory Committee 17 Notes, Rule 7, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. “An expanded record may also be helpful when an 18 evidentiary hearing is ordered.” Id. 19 Here, the Court has yet to determine whether the Petition will survive Respondents’ 20 Motion to Dismiss, let alone rule on the merits of the Petition, and has not ordered an 21 evidentiary hearing. Moreover, Petitioner does not identify what documents should be 22 included in the record that are not already. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Request for 23 Expansion of the Record is DENIED. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 V. REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULINGS 2 Also before the Court is Petitioner’s “In-Camera Request for Court to Expedite Its 3 Rulings on the Companion Motions/Requests Filed Simultaneously With Petitioner Pro 4 Se’s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (“Request to Expedite”).5 (ECF No. 13.) 5 Petitioner states that “[e]xpedited rulings here will greatly assist the petitioner in this case 6 matter, particularly favorable ones, and move the case along expediently, inter alia.” (Id.) 7 To the extent Petitioner has requested an “expedited” ruling on his Request for 8 Appointment of Counsel so he may have the benefit of counsel in responding to 9 Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s request is DENIED as moot. The Court has 10 determined that Petitioner is not entitled to appointed counsel at this time. Petitioner’s 11 request for expedited rulings on his other requests is DENIED. 12 VI. REQUEST TO QUASH NOTICE OF LODGMENT AND PROOF OF 13 SERVICE 14 Finally before the Court is Petitioner’s “Request to Quash Respondents’ (DAG’s) 15 Notice of Lodgment & Proof of Service Ther[e]of.” (ECF No. 18.) Petitioner argues that 16 the Court must “quash” Respondents’ Notice of Lodgment of Petitioner’s state court 17 records (ECF No. 15) because he “was NOT served with ‘paper’ copies of the twelve” 18 lodgments. (ECF No. 18 at 1.) Petitioner states that he did not receive a copy of 19 Respondents’ lodgments and only received the “2-page” notice of the lodgments. (Id. at 20 2.) Petitioner argues that he needs the lodgments “in order to verify the Dates & Gap 21 Times/Days espoused by the DAG (in terms of ‘in-between’ ‘gap’ habeas filings in this 22 matter by the [P]etitioner in the State Court triad[]).” (Id. at 3.) 23 While on direct appeal, an indigent criminal defendant has an absolute right to trial 24 transcripts. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). However, the United States Supreme 25 Court has held that there is no absolute constitutional right to a free copy of the record on 26

27 5 Petitioner labels his request as “in-camera,” but the request has been publicly filed 28 1 collateral review. United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (interpreting 28 2 U.S.C. § 753(f) and applying to § 2255 habeas petition); United States v. Van Poyck, 980 3 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 n. 2 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing United States v. Lewis, 605 F.2d 379 (8th 4 Cir. 1979)). To obtain free copies of trial records, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate 5 that he is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis, and the court must certify that the petition 6 is “not frivolous” and the transcript is “needed to decide the issue.” Id. at 321; see 28 7 U.S.C. § 753(f). Courts have likewise applied this principle to habeas petitions brought 8 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Martin v. Hartley, No. EDCV 08–0581–R (MLG), 2008 WL 9 4723623, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that the reasoning in MacCollom dealing with 10 § 2255 petitions is applicable to § 2254 petitions as well (citing Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d 11 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1992)); see also Dunsmore v. Beard, No. 13CV1193–GPC(PCL), 2014 12 WL 7205659, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) (same). 13 Petitioner’s request to “quash” Respondents’ Notice of Lodgment and the attached 14 Proof of Service is DENIED. To the extent Petitioner is requesting that the Court order 15 Respondents to send him a copy of the lodgments, his request is also DENIED. Petitioner 16 is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6), but he has not demonstrated that his Petition 17 has merit. Petitioner argues that he needs the lodgments “to verify the Dates and Gap 18 Times/Days” between his habeas filings in state court, but this is not an argument that the 19 lodgments are “needed to decide the issue[s]” Petitioner raises in his Petition. See, e.g., 20 Ansari v. Plummer, No. C-92-4330-DLJ, 1994 WL 72170, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1994) 21 (noting that the petitioner did not need transcripts “to oppose [the] respondent’s motion to 22 dismiss on procedural grounds”). Moreover, Petitioner should, at a minimum, possess 23 copies of Lodgments 5–11,6 which are the state court petitions he filed and the responses 24 25 26 6 Lodgments 5–11 consist of: (5) Habeas Petition filed in the San Diego County 27 Superior Court; (6) San Diego County Superior Court Order Denying Habeas Relief; (7) Amended Habeas Petition filed in the San Diego Superior Court; (8) San Diego Superior 28 1 || from the state courts that would have been sent to him. Petitioner argues only that he did 2 ||not receive a copy of these documents from Respondents, not that he no longer has the 3 ||documents in his possession. Petitioner should also already possess Lodgments 1-4 and 4 || 12’ as well, but in case Petitioner does not, the Court will send Petitioner a copy of these 5 || five lodgments. 6 Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail Petitioner a copy of ECF 7 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, 15-4, and 15-12 along with this Order. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: February 24, 2020 - bandit 10 n. Jill L. Burkhardt ited States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5 of Appeal; (10) California Court of Appeal Order Denying Habeas Relief; and (11) Habeas 6 Petition filed in the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 15 at 1-2.) 27 \\7 Lodgments 1-4 and 12 consist of: (1) Probation Report; (2) Guilty Plea Form; (3) 28 Minute Order from Change of Plea Proceeding; (4) Minute Order from Sentencing; and (12) Docket from California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 15 at 1-2.)