Torres v. Covello

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJune 6, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-01048
StatusUnknown

This text of Torres v. Covello (Torres v. Covello) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torres v. Covello, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDUARDO JOSE TORRES, Case No.: 25cv1048-LL-LR

12 Petitioner, ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF No. 6], AND 14 PATRICK COVELLO, Warden,

15 Respondent. (2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 16 17 18 Eduardo Jose Torres (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, is proceeding 19 with a federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 22, 2025, the Court 20 dismissed the original petition without prejudice because Petitioner had failed to satisfy the 21 filing fee requirement, failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas relief and failed to 22 allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. See ECF No. 3. After an extension of time, the 23 Court gave Petitioner until August 4, 2025 to have his case reopened by (1) either paying 24 the filing fee or providing adequate proof of his inability to pay and (2) filing an Amended 25 Petition which cures the deficiencies outlined in the Order. ECF No. 5 at 5. 26 Petitioner has now filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and an 27 Amended Petition. ECF Nos. 6, 7. For the reasons discussed below, the IFP motion is 28 denied and the petition is dismissed without prejudice. 1 IFP MOTION 2 Petitioner’s request to proceed IFP is denied because Petitioner has not provided the 3 Court with sufficient information to determine Petitioner’s financial status. A request to 4 proceed in forma pauperis made by a state prisoner must include a signed certificate from 5 the warden or other appropriate officer showing the amount of money or securities 6 Petitioner has on account in the institution. Rules Governing § 2254, Rule 3(a)(2), 7 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Local Rule 3.2. Here, Petitioner has not submitted a copy of his 8 trust account statement and, while Petitioner has included a Prison Certificate, it is 9 unsigned. See ECF No. 6 at 4. Thus, he has failed to provide the Court with the required 10 support for his request. Accordingly, the IFP motion is DENIED. 11 FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY SPECIFY GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 12 In addition, Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that the 13 petition “shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds . . . 14 specified [in the petition].” Rules Governing § 2254, Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. See 15 also Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970) (trial court’s dismissal of 16 federal habeas proceeding affirmed where petitioner made conclusory allegations instead 17 of factual allegations showing that he was entitled to relief). While courts should liberally 18 interpret pro se pleadings, a federal court may not entertain a petition that contains only 19 allegations which are conclusory. Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977) 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). Facts must be stated, in the petition, with sufficient 21 detail to enable the Court to determine, from the face of the petition, whether further habeas 22 corpus review is warranted. Adams v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990). 23 Moreover, the allegations should be sufficiently specific to permit the respondent to assert 24 appropriate objections and defenses. Harris v. Allen, 739 F. Supp. 564, 565 (W.D. Okla. 25 1989). 26 Here, Petitioner has violated Rule 2(c). While he states three generalized grounds 27 for relief––“ineffective assistance of counsel,” “innocence,” and “cannabis induced 28 psychosis”––Petitioner fails to provide any specific factual allegations in support of these 1 grounds. See ECF No. 7 at 7–9. Petitioner’s conclusory claims without any specific facts 2 in support of relief prevents Respondent from being able to assert appropriate objections 3 and defenses. Thus, the Amended Petition must be dismissed. Rules Governing § 2254, 4 Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 5 FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES 6 Further, the Amended Petition is also subject to dismissal for failure to allege 7 exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their 8 state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust 9 state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133– 10 34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the 11 California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised 12 in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133– 13 34. Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state 14 court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court 15 in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: “If state courts are to be given the 16 opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be 17 alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 18 Constitution.” Id. at 365–66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner 19 wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due 20 process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only 21 in federal court, but in state court.” Id. at 366 (emphasis added). 22 Nowhere in the Amended Petition does Petitioner allege he raised his claims in the 23 California Supreme Court. In fact, he specifically indicates he did not seek such review. 24 See ECF No. 7 at 6–9. If Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme Court 25 he must so specify. “The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the 26 petitioner.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); see Breard v. Pruett, 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); 2 Oyler v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 300 (10th Cir. 1994); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 3 (6th Cir. 1994). 4 Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective 5 Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a 6 petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 7 State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: 8 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 9

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Related

Blackledge v. Allison
431 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Granberry v. Greer
481 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Artuz v. Bennett
531 U.S. 4 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Harris v. Allen
739 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1989)
Matthews v. Evatt
105 F.3d 907 (Fourth Circuit, 1997)
Breard v. Pruett
134 F.3d 615 (Fourth Circuit, 1998)

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