Torres v. C R Bard Incorporated
This text of Torres v. C R Bard Incorporated (Torres v. C R Bard Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 ERIC W. SWANIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6840 2 CHRISTIAN T. SPAULDING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 14277 3 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 5 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002 Email: swanise@gtlaw.com 6 CHRISTOPHER J. NEUMANN CASEY SHPALL, ESQ.* 7 GREGORY R. TAN, ESQ.* *Admitted Pro Hac Vice 8 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1144 15th Street, Suite 3300 9 Denver, Colorado 80202 Telephone: (303) 572-6500 10 Email: neumannc@gtlaw.com shpallc@gtlaw.com 11 tang@gtlaw.com 12 C ounsel for Defendants 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14
FOR THE DISTRI CT OF NEVADA 15 CAESAR L. TORRES, Case No. 2:19-cv-01582-KJD-BNW
16 Plaintiff, STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO STAY 17 v. 18 C. R. BARD, INCORPORATED and BARD 19 PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INCORPORATED,
20 Defendants. 21 22 Plaintiff Caesar L. Torres (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral 23 Vascular, Inc. (“Defendants”) (Plaintiff and Defendants are collectively referred to herein as the 24 “Parties”) pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 26 and this Court’s inherent powers, respectfully request that 25 this Court enter an Order temporarily staying discovery and all pretrial deadlines imposed by the 26 Court, the Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for ninety (90) days to permit the 27 parties to finalize their settlement of all claims. 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff claims injuries related to the purported implantation of an Inferior Vena Cava 3 (“IVC”) filter allegedly manufactured by Defendants. (ECF No. 1). The Parties have conducted 4 various discovery, including depositions of the plaintiff and medical providers, medical records 5 collection, and initial and supplemental disclosures, but have reached an agreement in principle to 6 resolve all claims. As such, the Parties hereby jointly move this Court to enter a stay of all discovery 7 and pretrial deadlines in this case for a period of ninety (90) days. 8 II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 9 A. This Court Has Authority to Grant the Requested Stay 10 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b) and 26, and this Court’s inherent authority 11 and discretion to manage its own docket, this Court has the authority to grant the requested stay. Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 6(b) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time the court may, for good 13 cause, extend the time…”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (“A party or any person from whom discovery is 14 sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending…The Court may, 15 for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 16 oppression, or undue burden or expense.”). Therefore, this Court has broad discretion to stay 17 proceedings as incidental to its power to control its own docket – particularly where, as here, a stay 18 would promote judicial economy and efficiency. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); 19 Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 446 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Clinton v. 20 Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997)). 21 A stipulation to stay proceedings, like the Parties seek here, is an appropriate exercise of this 22 Court’s jurisdiction. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (explaining a court’s 23 power to stay proceedings is incidental to its inherent power to control the disposition of the cases 24 on its docket to save the time and effort of the court, counsel, and the parties.) 25 The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort 26 for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 27 balance. 28 Id. (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931)); see also, CMAX, Inc. 1 v. Hall, 300 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (district courts possess “inherent power to control the 2 disposition of the cases on its docket in a manner which will promote economy of time and effort for 3 itself, for counsel, and for litigants”); Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (In 4 re Pittsburgh Corning Corp.), No. 11-1406, 11-1452, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86193, at *11 (W.D. 5 Mo. June 21, 201) (noting a court’s power to stay proceedings is incidental to its power to control 6 the disposition of the cases on its docket). 7 Furthermore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (26(c) and 26(d) also vest the Court with 8 authority to limit the scope of discovery or control its sequence and may grant a stay to allow parties 9 to negotiate a settlement. Britton, 523 U.S. at 598. 10 B. Good Cause Exists to Grant the Requested Stay 11 As noted herein, the Parties have reached a settlement in principle and are currently working 12 to finalize all necessary documentation regarding the same. As such, the Parties do not seek the stay 13 requested herein in bad faith but instead seek to stay all proceedings in the interest of efficiency and 14 judicial economy. Granting the stay here will unquestionably save the time and effort of this Court, 15 counsel, and the parties, and provide counsel with an opportunity to finalize the settlement of this 16 case without any additional litigation expense. 17 Facilitating the Parties’ efforts to resolve this dispute entirely through settlement is reasonable 18 and constitutes good cause for granting the requested stay. The Parties agree that the relief sought 19 herein is necessary to handle and resolve this case in the most economical fashion, and that the relief 20 sought in this stipulation is not for delay, but in the interest of efficiency. 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Parties respectfully request that this Court enter a stay of al 3 || activity in this case, for a period of ninety (90) days. If Plaintiffs have not filed dismissal paper 4 || within ninety (90) days from the stay being granted, the Parties request the opportunity to file a join 5 || status report regarding the status of the settlement. 6 IT IS SO STIPULATED. 7 Dated this 10™ day of February 2022. 8 WETHERALL GROUP, LTD. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 9 By: _/s/ Peter C. Wetherall By: _/s/ Eric W. Swanis 10 PETER C. WETHERALL, ESQ. ERIC W. SWANIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4414 Nevada Bar No. 6840 ll 9345 W. Sunset Road, Suite 100 CHRISTIAN T. SPAULDING, ESQ. Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 ND □□ hi Suite 600 therall therall riffith Peak Drive, Suite 12 pwetherall@wetherallgroup.com Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 13 Counsel for Plaintiffs Email: swanise@gtlaw.com CHRISTOPHER J. NEUMANN 14 CASEY SHPALL, ESQ.* GREGORY R. TAN, ESQ.* 15 *Admitted Pro Hac Vice GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 16 1144 15" Street, Suite 3300 Denver, Colorado 80202 17 Email: neumannc@gtlaw.com shpalle@gtlaw.com 18 tang@gtlaw.com 19 Counsel for Defendants 20 71 ORDER 22 IT IS ORDERED that ECF No. 52 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a 23 joint status report is due by 5/11/2022.
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