NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OLGA OFELIA TORRES AGUILAR, No. 24-6084 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-08077-FWS-MRW v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 21, 2025** Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.
Olga Ofelia Torres Aguilar (“Torres”) appeals the district court’s order
affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). appeal, Torres argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the impact
of her conversion disorder1 when determining the severity of her impairment and
assessing her residual functional capacity (“RFC”), by discounting her testimony,
and by discounting the opinion of her psychotherapist.
This Court maintains jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review district court orders affirming an ALJ’s denial of social security
benefits de novo, and we will only disturb the denial if the decision contains legal
error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266,
1277 (9th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence a reasonable
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and “must be more than a
mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance ….” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Where evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir.
1 Conversion disorder is a mental health condition where a person experiences physical, neurological symptoms that cannot be explained by a recognized physical condition. Functional Neurologic Disorder/Conversion Disorder, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/conversion- disorder/symptomscauses/syc-20355197. While the physical manifestation of symptoms vary, conversion disorder often manifests as affecting movement, ability to walk, swallow, see or hear. Id. The symptoms are not intentionally produced or controlled. Id.
2 24-6084 2022). Accordingly, a reviewing federal court “may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115
(9th Cir. 2021). “Overall, the standard of review is highly deferential” to the ALJ.
Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1002 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We
affirm the district court.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Torres’
conversion disorder was non-severe and had a limited impact on her RFC. An
impairment is not severe if the evidence establishes that it does not significantly
limit the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.922. The ALJ considered all
of Torres’ psychological symptoms across all four functional areas assessed for
mental impairments, 20 C.F.R. 416.920a(c)(3) (i.e., remembering or applying
information; interacting with others; ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace; and ability to adapt and manage herself), and their cumulative effect on
Torres’ functioning. In conducting this analysis, the ALJ relied on Torres’ own
hearing testimony, the opinion of a consultative psychiatric examiner, and
assessments from state agency psychiatric consultants. This evidence showed that
Torres could perform basic household chores, prepare meals, drive, spend time
with friends and family, and handle self-care and personal hygiene. Accordingly,
the ALJ found that Torres had no limitations in the four functional areas assessed.
Torres did not meet her burden of establishing that her impairment had more than a
3 24-6084 minimal impact on her ability to work, therefore the ALJ did not err in determining
that her conversion disorder was a non-severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.922;
see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a
claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. “First, the
ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical
evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d
1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f the claimant
meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject
the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d
at 1281). When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the
claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may weigh the medical evidence as
undercutting such testimony. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498. “[T]he ALJ may consider,
among other factors, ‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,’ ‘inadequately
explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment,’
and ‘the claimant’s daily activities.’” Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Smolen,
80 F.3d at 1284).
Here, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
4 24-6084 discounting Torres’ allegations. The ALJ relied on the opinions of state agency
consulting physicians, who found the claimant could engage in a range of work-
related activities. The ALJ also cited notes from a treating physician who
conducted a neurological examination of Torres in June 2019 and noted that Torres
displayed a significant lack of effort during her strength examination. He also
noted that while “there is a strong functional component with conversion disorder
… [i]t is also possible that the patient has a real problem but is exaggerating her
symptoms.” While the ALJ likely should have provided a more detailed
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OLGA OFELIA TORRES AGUILAR, No. 24-6084 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-08077-FWS-MRW v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 21, 2025** Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.
Olga Ofelia Torres Aguilar (“Torres”) appeals the district court’s order
affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). appeal, Torres argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the impact
of her conversion disorder1 when determining the severity of her impairment and
assessing her residual functional capacity (“RFC”), by discounting her testimony,
and by discounting the opinion of her psychotherapist.
This Court maintains jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review district court orders affirming an ALJ’s denial of social security
benefits de novo, and we will only disturb the denial if the decision contains legal
error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266,
1277 (9th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence a reasonable
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and “must be more than a
mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance ….” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Where evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir.
1 Conversion disorder is a mental health condition where a person experiences physical, neurological symptoms that cannot be explained by a recognized physical condition. Functional Neurologic Disorder/Conversion Disorder, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/conversion- disorder/symptomscauses/syc-20355197. While the physical manifestation of symptoms vary, conversion disorder often manifests as affecting movement, ability to walk, swallow, see or hear. Id. The symptoms are not intentionally produced or controlled. Id.
2 24-6084 2022). Accordingly, a reviewing federal court “may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115
(9th Cir. 2021). “Overall, the standard of review is highly deferential” to the ALJ.
Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1002 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We
affirm the district court.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Torres’
conversion disorder was non-severe and had a limited impact on her RFC. An
impairment is not severe if the evidence establishes that it does not significantly
limit the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.922. The ALJ considered all
of Torres’ psychological symptoms across all four functional areas assessed for
mental impairments, 20 C.F.R. 416.920a(c)(3) (i.e., remembering or applying
information; interacting with others; ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace; and ability to adapt and manage herself), and their cumulative effect on
Torres’ functioning. In conducting this analysis, the ALJ relied on Torres’ own
hearing testimony, the opinion of a consultative psychiatric examiner, and
assessments from state agency psychiatric consultants. This evidence showed that
Torres could perform basic household chores, prepare meals, drive, spend time
with friends and family, and handle self-care and personal hygiene. Accordingly,
the ALJ found that Torres had no limitations in the four functional areas assessed.
Torres did not meet her burden of establishing that her impairment had more than a
3 24-6084 minimal impact on her ability to work, therefore the ALJ did not err in determining
that her conversion disorder was a non-severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.922;
see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a
claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. “First, the
ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical
evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d
1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f the claimant
meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject
the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d
at 1281). When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the
claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may weigh the medical evidence as
undercutting such testimony. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498. “[T]he ALJ may consider,
among other factors, ‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,’ ‘inadequately
explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment,’
and ‘the claimant’s daily activities.’” Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Smolen,
80 F.3d at 1284).
Here, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
4 24-6084 discounting Torres’ allegations. The ALJ relied on the opinions of state agency
consulting physicians, who found the claimant could engage in a range of work-
related activities. The ALJ also cited notes from a treating physician who
conducted a neurological examination of Torres in June 2019 and noted that Torres
displayed a significant lack of effort during her strength examination. He also
noted that while “there is a strong functional component with conversion disorder
… [i]t is also possible that the patient has a real problem but is exaggerating her
symptoms.” While the ALJ likely should have provided a more detailed
explanation for refusing to accept Torres’ reasons for failing to follow treatment
recommendations, see Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at
*9 (Oct. 25, 2017), the record as a whole provides substantial evidence to support
discounting Torres’ testimony.
3. Under the regulations as they existed when Torres’ application was
considered by the ALJ, a psychotherapist was not considered an “acceptable
medical source.” Rather, they were “other sources” not entitled to the same
deference as acceptable medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). An ALJ could
discount the opinion of an “other source” if the ALJ provided germane reasons.
Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, Torres’
psychotherapist was a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist (“LMFT”) and
considered an “other source.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). The LMFT provided
5 24-6084 a one-page assessment, which consisted solely of conclusory determinations
contradicted by the other medical assessments. The ALJ found that the LMFT’s
assessment was inconsistent with all the other medical findings and was
unsupported by notes or treatment information. These constitute germane reasons
for discounting the psychotherapist’s assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3); see
also Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that an ALJ
may discredit a physician’s opinion that is “conclusory, brief, and unsupported by
the record as a whole or by objective medical findings”) (simplified).
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by giving little weight to the LMFT’s opinion.
AFFIRMED.
6 24-6084