NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1170
TOREY LEMONT DAVIS, petitioner.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In 2024, the petitioner filed a petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 210, § 12, to change her name to align with her gender
identity. After a trial, a judge of the Probate and Family
Court denied the petition. The petitioner contends that the
judge abused her discretion in concluding that the public
interest outweighed the petitioner's own interest in changing
her name. We affirm.
The petitioner is currently serving five years of
supervised probation after serving almost two years in prison,
following guilty pleas on charges that included two counts of
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual
disability, G. L. c. 265, § 13F, intimidation of a witness,
G. L. c. 268, § 13B, assault and battery on a person with a
disability, G. L. c. 265, § 13K (a 1/2), and violation of an abuse prevention order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7. After she filed the
petition to change her name, an order entered requiring notice
by publication. Following publication in a local newspaper, an
affidavit of objection was filed by the person whom the
petitioner had indecently assaulted because the objector has an
active abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A
order) against the petitioner entered in the District Court.
The objection was withdrawn after the petitioner's requested
name was added to the 209A order and that order was made
permanent.
In 2025, a trial was held in the Probate and Family Court.
The petitioner testified that she "wanted to change [her] name
so it will comport more with [her] gender." She has been using
her requested name for years, and everyone she knows uses it.
She testified that she needs a legal name change because her
current name causes her difficulty in changing employment,
maintaining banking and tax records, and dealing with medical
and insurance providers. She "constantly [has] to explain and
re-explain to people" which causes her "constant anxiety." The
petitioner testified that she has criminal records in
Massachusetts, Texas, and Connecticut. To her knowledge, both
her legal and requested name are reflected in the 209A order,
are listed with the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), and
2 appear in any other criminal databases in which she might
appear.1
General Laws c. 210, § 12, allows a petitioner to secure an
"official record which definitely and specifically establishes
[their] change of name." Verrill, petitioner, 40 Mass. App. Ct.
34, 35-36 (1996) (Verill), quoting Buyarsky, petitioner, 322
Mass. 335, 338 (1948). Although "the right to change one's name
through the legal process is not absolute," Jaynes, petitioner,
88 Mass. App. Ct. 745, 746 (2015) (Jaynes), a change of name
"shall be granted unless such change is inconsistent with public
interests," G. L. c. 210, § 12. Where a petitioner is involved
with the criminal justice system, "the public interests at stake
are heightened." Jaynes, supra at 747. Consistent with that
principle, a judge may consider the "significant confusion" that
the name change could cause in the maintenance of records and
investigatory functions of law enforcement agencies. Id.,
quoting Verrill, supra at 37.
The petitioner contends that the judge erred in concluding
that these public interests outweighed the petitioner's interest
1 An attorney for the petitioner testified that she sent six notices of the petitioner's request for a name change to various law enforcement agencies. Although the return receipts for most of those notices were entered in evidence, the judge noted that the petitioner "did not provide a copy of any of the relevant mailings, and the evidence submitted is insufficient for the Court to determine the contents of the mailings to the various law enforcement agencies."
3 in changing her name. We review a judge's discretionary
decision for abuse of discretion, see Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct.
at 747, and will affirm it unless the judge "made a clear error
of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision,
. . . such that the decision falls outside the range of
reasonable alternatives" (quotation omitted), L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).
The judge acted well within her discretion here. In a
thoughtful decision, she found that the petitioner had a
"sincere and understandably important reason for seeking a . . .
legal name in alignment with her gender identity." The judge
acknowledged that a legal name change would "enable the
Petitioner to update all her medical and banking records" and
"mitigate the distress of being misidentified, including
instances of deadnaming." The judge further identified the
"protection of transgender individuals from dysphoria,
misgendering, and other negative experiences" as "unquestionably
important and a significant consideration." At the same time,
the judge found that the record "paints a more complicated
picture" due to the petitioner's "extensive and serious criminal
history." The petitioner's criminal history spans thirty years
and includes eighteen convictions in Massachusetts. She also
has convictions in other states that are tied to her legal name
and other aliases, but not her requested name.
4 In light of these circumstances, it was appropriate for the
judge to take into consideration the public interest in
maintaining "accuracy and consistency" in the petitioner's
criminal records. Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 747. The judge
found that the "full scope of local, state and federal criminal
databases that maintain a record on the Petitioner is unclear."
In particular, the judge found that the petitioner's requested
name does not appear in her criminal records in other states,
although the petitioner testified that it does. The petitioner
was "unable to confirm" that her requested name is registered in
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Crime Information
Center. Furthermore, while the petitioner testified that, "to
her knowledge," she is registered with SORB under both names,
the only evidence to corroborate that testimony was "a computer
printout generated on an unknown date by an unknown person,"
which the judge accorded "little weight." The judge ultimately
concluded that granting the requested name change "could create
significant risks of confusion, misidentification, and errors in
the various law enforcement databases and tracking systems."
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1170
TOREY LEMONT DAVIS, petitioner.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In 2024, the petitioner filed a petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 210, § 12, to change her name to align with her gender
identity. After a trial, a judge of the Probate and Family
Court denied the petition. The petitioner contends that the
judge abused her discretion in concluding that the public
interest outweighed the petitioner's own interest in changing
her name. We affirm.
The petitioner is currently serving five years of
supervised probation after serving almost two years in prison,
following guilty pleas on charges that included two counts of
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual
disability, G. L. c. 265, § 13F, intimidation of a witness,
G. L. c. 268, § 13B, assault and battery on a person with a
disability, G. L. c. 265, § 13K (a 1/2), and violation of an abuse prevention order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7. After she filed the
petition to change her name, an order entered requiring notice
by publication. Following publication in a local newspaper, an
affidavit of objection was filed by the person whom the
petitioner had indecently assaulted because the objector has an
active abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A
order) against the petitioner entered in the District Court.
The objection was withdrawn after the petitioner's requested
name was added to the 209A order and that order was made
permanent.
In 2025, a trial was held in the Probate and Family Court.
The petitioner testified that she "wanted to change [her] name
so it will comport more with [her] gender." She has been using
her requested name for years, and everyone she knows uses it.
She testified that she needs a legal name change because her
current name causes her difficulty in changing employment,
maintaining banking and tax records, and dealing with medical
and insurance providers. She "constantly [has] to explain and
re-explain to people" which causes her "constant anxiety." The
petitioner testified that she has criminal records in
Massachusetts, Texas, and Connecticut. To her knowledge, both
her legal and requested name are reflected in the 209A order,
are listed with the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), and
2 appear in any other criminal databases in which she might
appear.1
General Laws c. 210, § 12, allows a petitioner to secure an
"official record which definitely and specifically establishes
[their] change of name." Verrill, petitioner, 40 Mass. App. Ct.
34, 35-36 (1996) (Verill), quoting Buyarsky, petitioner, 322
Mass. 335, 338 (1948). Although "the right to change one's name
through the legal process is not absolute," Jaynes, petitioner,
88 Mass. App. Ct. 745, 746 (2015) (Jaynes), a change of name
"shall be granted unless such change is inconsistent with public
interests," G. L. c. 210, § 12. Where a petitioner is involved
with the criminal justice system, "the public interests at stake
are heightened." Jaynes, supra at 747. Consistent with that
principle, a judge may consider the "significant confusion" that
the name change could cause in the maintenance of records and
investigatory functions of law enforcement agencies. Id.,
quoting Verrill, supra at 37.
The petitioner contends that the judge erred in concluding
that these public interests outweighed the petitioner's interest
1 An attorney for the petitioner testified that she sent six notices of the petitioner's request for a name change to various law enforcement agencies. Although the return receipts for most of those notices were entered in evidence, the judge noted that the petitioner "did not provide a copy of any of the relevant mailings, and the evidence submitted is insufficient for the Court to determine the contents of the mailings to the various law enforcement agencies."
3 in changing her name. We review a judge's discretionary
decision for abuse of discretion, see Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct.
at 747, and will affirm it unless the judge "made a clear error
of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision,
. . . such that the decision falls outside the range of
reasonable alternatives" (quotation omitted), L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).
The judge acted well within her discretion here. In a
thoughtful decision, she found that the petitioner had a
"sincere and understandably important reason for seeking a . . .
legal name in alignment with her gender identity." The judge
acknowledged that a legal name change would "enable the
Petitioner to update all her medical and banking records" and
"mitigate the distress of being misidentified, including
instances of deadnaming." The judge further identified the
"protection of transgender individuals from dysphoria,
misgendering, and other negative experiences" as "unquestionably
important and a significant consideration." At the same time,
the judge found that the record "paints a more complicated
picture" due to the petitioner's "extensive and serious criminal
history." The petitioner's criminal history spans thirty years
and includes eighteen convictions in Massachusetts. She also
has convictions in other states that are tied to her legal name
and other aliases, but not her requested name.
4 In light of these circumstances, it was appropriate for the
judge to take into consideration the public interest in
maintaining "accuracy and consistency" in the petitioner's
criminal records. Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 747. The judge
found that the "full scope of local, state and federal criminal
databases that maintain a record on the Petitioner is unclear."
In particular, the judge found that the petitioner's requested
name does not appear in her criminal records in other states,
although the petitioner testified that it does. The petitioner
was "unable to confirm" that her requested name is registered in
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Crime Information
Center. Furthermore, while the petitioner testified that, "to
her knowledge," she is registered with SORB under both names,
the only evidence to corroborate that testimony was "a computer
printout generated on an unknown date by an unknown person,"
which the judge accorded "little weight." The judge ultimately
concluded that granting the requested name change "could create
significant risks of confusion, misidentification, and errors in
the various law enforcement databases and tracking systems."
The judge's ruling was consistent with our decisions in Jaynes
and Verrill, and we do not discern "a clear error of judgment"
(citation omitted). L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.
Nor are we persuaded by the petitioner's assertion that the
judge imposed on her a duty to make a "reasonable effort to
5 notify the relevant law enforcement agencies . . . of her common
law name or her name change petition." Rather, the judge took
into consideration that multiple law enforcement agencies had
not been notified of the petitioner's requested name, even
though she had gone by that name for the last five years.
Additionally, the petitioner did not list her requested name as
an alias in connection with the 209A order, despite having used
it the entire time the order had been in place. As discussed,
it was within the judge's discretion under G. L. c. 210, § 12,
to assess whether the proposed change would create confusion or
impair the petitioner's traceability within the criminal justice
system. See Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 747; Verrill, 40 Mass.
App. Ct. at 37.
Decree denying petition for name change affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman, Hershfang & Toone, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: May 12, 2026.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.