Torey DeVol Miller v. Thomas Oilfield Services, LLC

District Court, W.D. Texas·Decided July 22, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-00425·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

TOREY DEVOL MILLER, § Plaintiff § § v. § THO MAS OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC, § Case No. 1:24-CV-00425-RP Defendant §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO: THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Before the Court are Defendant Thomas Oilfield Services, LLC’s Opposed Motion to Transfer Venue to the Midland Division of the Western District of Texas, filed May 27, 2024 (Dkt. 8); Plaintiff Torey DeVol Miller’s Response, filed June 10, 2024 (Dkt. 9); and Defendant’s Reply, filed June 17, 2024 (Dkt. 10). By Text Order issued June 18, 2024, the District Court referred the motion and related filings to this Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. I. Background Plaintiff Torey DeVol Miller, a resident of Dallas County, Texas, brings this employment discrimination suit against his former employer, Defendant Thomas Oilfield Services, LLC (“Thomas”), a Texas oilfield rental service company. Miller alleges that he was terminated because of his race (Black), his disability (diabetes), and his age (51). Thomas, which is headquartered in Longview, Texas, operates a service facility in Midland, Texas (“Midland Facility”). Complaint, Dkt. 1 ¶ 3. Thomas also has an “Accounting and HR Office” in Cedar Park, Texas. Id. ¶ 10. Miller began working for Thomas as a “Field Technician” out of its Midland Facility in February 2002. Id. ¶ 12. On April 2, 2023, Miller and two co-workers, Randy Silva and “Andrew,” were finishing work on oil rigs “in remote areas about an hour or more away from Pecos, Texas.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 34. Miller alleges that around 8:15 p.m. he told Silva to help clean up the work site, but Silva became distracted with the oil tanks located near the rigs. Miller alleges that he told Silva to

“leave the tanks alone” and grab the equipment “so we can go.” Id. ¶ 45. Miller alleges that Silva then screamed at him and “pushed Miller aggressively.” Id. ¶ 55. Miller alleges that he “was left with no choice but to defend himself from Silva’s aggression” and that he and Silver “fell to the ground tussling.” Id. ¶¶ 56-57. Miller contends that “Silva reached for a pole lying on the ground to hit Miller with it,” but “Miller put Silva in a headlock before Silva could strike him with a pole,” causing Silva to pass out. Id. ¶¶ 60-62. Miller contends that he then “poured water onto Silva trying to revive him.” Id. ¶ 65. After Silva woke up, Miller called his supervisor Casey Barrier,1 who told Miller to take Silva to the nearest hospital, Reeves County Hospital ER in Pecos. Id. ¶ 67; Barrier Decl., Dkt. 8-1 at 3. Silva received follow-up treatment in Midland. Dkt. 8 at 2. Miller alleges that on April 10, 2023, Thomas’s Human Resources Manager, Krista Vera,2 and

Director of Operations, Hank Guillotte, called him and told him that he was fired, effective immediately. Dkt. 1 ¶ 73. Miller complains that the decision to fire him was “harsher than what the Company has done to other similarly situated employees.” Id. ¶ 76. On April 22, 2024, Miller filed this suit in the Austin Division, alleging that he was terminated because of his race, age, and disability, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age

1 Barrier lives in Midland and works at the Midland Facility. Barrier Decl., Dkt. 8-1 at 2. 2 Thomas admits that Vera was working from its Cedar Park Office when she made the call. Defendant’s Original Answer, Dkt. 6 ¶ 10. Discrimination in Employment Act. Dkt. 1. Thomas generally denies Miller’s allegations and contends that Miller was fired because he assaulted Silva by beating him unconscious. Dkt. 8 at 1. Thomas now moves to transfer venue to the Midland Division of the Western District of Texas for the convenience of the parties and witnesses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. Miller opposes the motion.

II. Legal Standard “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A party seeking a transfer under Section 1404(a) “must show good cause” by “clearly demonstrating that a transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 433 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Volkswagen II”). “When the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id. When a defendant is haled into court, some inconvenience is expected and acceptable. Assuming that jurisdiction exists and venue is proper, the fact that litigating would be more convenient for the defendant elsewhere is not enough to justify transfer. In other words, the standard is not met by showing one forum is more likely than not to be more convenient, but instead the party must adduce evidence and arguments that clearly establish good cause for transfer based on convenience and justice. Id.; see also In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502, 508 (5th Cir. 2024) (“[T]o establish ‘good cause,’ a movant must show (1) that the marginal gain in convenience will be significant, and (2) that its evidence makes it plainly obvious—i.e., clearly demonstrated—that those marginal gains will actually materialize in the transferee venue.”). The transfer analysis proceeds in two parts. First, the court asks whether the case “might have been brought” in the destination venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). If the answer is yes, then the court must consider the following factors to determine whether the movant has shown good cause for the transfer—that the destination venue is “clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. The private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.

The public interest factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law. Id. (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has cautioned that these factors “are not necessarily exhaustive or exclusive” and “none . . . can be said to be of dispositive weight.” Id.

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