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6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MICHAEL W. TORRELL, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05406-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 12 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (DKT. NO. 16) AND 13 TODD LOVELL, MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (DKT. NO. 33) 14 Defendant. 15
16 I INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has submitted a motion for a 18 temporary restraining order (TRO) and a motion for injunctive relief. (See Dkt. Nos. 16, 33.) 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief as MOOT. 20 II BACKGROUND 21 A. Procedural Background 22 Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on May 9, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1.) The 23 Court granted Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. No. 6) and subsequently dismissed his complaint with 24 1 leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 11.) Plaintiff then filed an 2 amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12) and moved for a TRO (Dkt. No. 16). The Court once more 3 reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and determined that, if construed liberally, 4 it appeared to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 20.) Accordingly, the Court directed the Clerk of the 5 Court to issue summons for Plaintiff to serve on Defendants and informed Plaintiff that he
6 needed to serve summons, the complaint, and the motion for TRO on Defendants before the 7 Court could review the TRO motion. (Id.) Plaintiff successfully served Defendant Lovell and 8 Lovell’s counsel made an appearance on the record (Dkt. No. 24), but it appeared Plaintiff did 9 not serve any other Defendants. 10 On June 26, 2025, the Court issued a minute order informing Plaintiff that before the 11 Court could review his motion, he was required to serve summons, the complaint, and the motion 12 for the temporary restraining order on all Defendants. (Dkt. No. 25.) On July 10, 2025, the 13 Court issued a minute order reiterating this. (Dkt. No. 30.) Plaintiff then moved for injunctive 14 relief (Dkt. No. 33) and the Court once more issued a minute order about service of process that
15 also ordered Lovell to respond to the motion for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 34.) Plaintiff then 16 moved to amend his complaint (Dkt. No. 37) and moved for service by a marshal (Dkt. No. 38). 17 The Court granted Plaintiff’s motions. (Dkt. No. 39.) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 18 alleges deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment claims; First Amendment 19 Retaliation; violation of substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth 20 Amendment; and a Monell claim. (Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) On August 1, 2025, Lovell responded to 21 Plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief. (Dkt. No. 42.) 22 B. Factual Background 23 24 1 On January 12, 2023, Plaintiff pled guilty to one count of tampering with a witness, two 2 counts of felony violation of court order, and one count of gross misdemeanor violation of court 3 order domestic violence in Clallam County Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 43 at 2.) Plaintiff was 4 sentenced to twenty-two months in prison and twelve months of community custody. (Id.) 5 Plaintiff was released from custody and supervised on community custody starting on June 1,
6 2024. (Id. at 3.) During his community supervision, Plaintiff was sanctioned multiple times for 7 failing to report, using controlled substances, absconding from supervision, contacting a 8 prohibited person, failing to abide by the rules of electronic monitoring, and failing to abide by 9 verbal directives. (Id.) His sanctions and the days he was unavailable for supervision were 10 tolled from the twelve months of community custody time. (Id.) Additionally, “[d]uring his 11 community supervision, [the Department of Corrections] modified Torell’s community 12 supervision conditions to include having no contact with his wife, Julie Torell, and being 13 monitored by a GPS monitoring device because of Torell’s absconding, risk to re-offend, and 14 risk to community safety.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s community supervision termination date
15 therefore changed multiple times. (Id.) 16 On June 6, 2025, a tolling review was conducted to determine the termination date of 17 Plaintiff’s community supervision. (Id.) The review indicated the termination date was July 27, 18 2025. (Id.) On July 28, 2025, Defendant Lovell removed the GPS monitoring bracelet from 19 Plaintiff’s ankle. (Id.) As of July 28, 2025, Plaintiff is no longer on community supervision. 20 (Id.) He is no longer prohibited from contacting his wife or required to be on GPS monitoring. 21 (Id. at 5.) 22 23 24 1 III DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief are sparse and assert substantively the same 3 argument. They were both filed prior to the termination of his community custody. Plaintiff 4 argued that the Department of Corrections “failed to remove a GPS monitoring device from [his] 5 body, effectively subjecting him to extrajudicial surveillance and harassment.” (Dkt. No. 33 at
6 1) (see also Dkt. No. 16 at 2) (“Plaintiff’s community custody [ended] . . . yet Defendant 7 continues unlawful supervision, tracking via GPS, and retaliatory actions outside the scope of his 8 authority.”) The TRO motion also took issue with the fact that Defendants “[d]enied marital 9 contact with Plaintiff’s spouse, Julie Torell.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff 10 requested: the removal of the GPS device (Dkt. Nos. 33 at 2, 16 at 4); an injunction preventing 11 Lovell or any DOC official acting on his direction from contacting, monitoring, arresting, 12 detaining or otherwise interacting Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 16 at 3–4); the injunction of “further tolling 13 or manipulation of [Plaintiff’s] release conditions” (Dkt. No. 33 at 2); and a declaration that “all 14 post-July 17 custody” was void (Dkt. No. 33 at 2). Plaintiff stated that he “suffer[ed] daily
15 humiliation, duress, and fear due to the continued physical and psychological control of the GPS 16 ankle monitor.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 2.) 17 Because Plaintiff is no longer being supervised by the Department of Corrections, his 18 motions for equitable relief are moot. Article III of the Constitution empowers the federal courts 19 to decide only “live cases or controversies.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 20 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). “A claim is moot ‘when the issues presented are no longer live 21 or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 22 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)). “An 23 inmate’s release from prison while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims for 24 1 injunctive relief relating to the prison’s policies.” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 2 1995). The same principle applies to claims for declaratory relief. Alvarez, 667 F.3d at 1064. 3 “The reason is that the released inmate is no longer subject to the prison conditions or policies he 4 challenges.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s motions are moot because Plaintiff has been removed from 5 community supervision and is no longer subject to the policies he challenged. Additionally,
6 Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any of his claims could feasibly succeed on the merits. 7 See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7
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6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MICHAEL W. TORRELL, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05406-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 12 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (DKT. NO. 16) AND 13 TODD LOVELL, MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (DKT. NO. 33) 14 Defendant. 15
16 I INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has submitted a motion for a 18 temporary restraining order (TRO) and a motion for injunctive relief. (See Dkt. Nos. 16, 33.) 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief as MOOT. 20 II BACKGROUND 21 A. Procedural Background 22 Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on May 9, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1.) The 23 Court granted Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. No. 6) and subsequently dismissed his complaint with 24 1 leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 11.) Plaintiff then filed an 2 amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12) and moved for a TRO (Dkt. No. 16). The Court once more 3 reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and determined that, if construed liberally, 4 it appeared to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 20.) Accordingly, the Court directed the Clerk of the 5 Court to issue summons for Plaintiff to serve on Defendants and informed Plaintiff that he
6 needed to serve summons, the complaint, and the motion for TRO on Defendants before the 7 Court could review the TRO motion. (Id.) Plaintiff successfully served Defendant Lovell and 8 Lovell’s counsel made an appearance on the record (Dkt. No. 24), but it appeared Plaintiff did 9 not serve any other Defendants. 10 On June 26, 2025, the Court issued a minute order informing Plaintiff that before the 11 Court could review his motion, he was required to serve summons, the complaint, and the motion 12 for the temporary restraining order on all Defendants. (Dkt. No. 25.) On July 10, 2025, the 13 Court issued a minute order reiterating this. (Dkt. No. 30.) Plaintiff then moved for injunctive 14 relief (Dkt. No. 33) and the Court once more issued a minute order about service of process that
15 also ordered Lovell to respond to the motion for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 34.) Plaintiff then 16 moved to amend his complaint (Dkt. No. 37) and moved for service by a marshal (Dkt. No. 38). 17 The Court granted Plaintiff’s motions. (Dkt. No. 39.) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 18 alleges deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment claims; First Amendment 19 Retaliation; violation of substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth 20 Amendment; and a Monell claim. (Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) On August 1, 2025, Lovell responded to 21 Plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief. (Dkt. No. 42.) 22 B. Factual Background 23 24 1 On January 12, 2023, Plaintiff pled guilty to one count of tampering with a witness, two 2 counts of felony violation of court order, and one count of gross misdemeanor violation of court 3 order domestic violence in Clallam County Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 43 at 2.) Plaintiff was 4 sentenced to twenty-two months in prison and twelve months of community custody. (Id.) 5 Plaintiff was released from custody and supervised on community custody starting on June 1,
6 2024. (Id. at 3.) During his community supervision, Plaintiff was sanctioned multiple times for 7 failing to report, using controlled substances, absconding from supervision, contacting a 8 prohibited person, failing to abide by the rules of electronic monitoring, and failing to abide by 9 verbal directives. (Id.) His sanctions and the days he was unavailable for supervision were 10 tolled from the twelve months of community custody time. (Id.) Additionally, “[d]uring his 11 community supervision, [the Department of Corrections] modified Torell’s community 12 supervision conditions to include having no contact with his wife, Julie Torell, and being 13 monitored by a GPS monitoring device because of Torell’s absconding, risk to re-offend, and 14 risk to community safety.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s community supervision termination date
15 therefore changed multiple times. (Id.) 16 On June 6, 2025, a tolling review was conducted to determine the termination date of 17 Plaintiff’s community supervision. (Id.) The review indicated the termination date was July 27, 18 2025. (Id.) On July 28, 2025, Defendant Lovell removed the GPS monitoring bracelet from 19 Plaintiff’s ankle. (Id.) As of July 28, 2025, Plaintiff is no longer on community supervision. 20 (Id.) He is no longer prohibited from contacting his wife or required to be on GPS monitoring. 21 (Id. at 5.) 22 23 24 1 III DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief are sparse and assert substantively the same 3 argument. They were both filed prior to the termination of his community custody. Plaintiff 4 argued that the Department of Corrections “failed to remove a GPS monitoring device from [his] 5 body, effectively subjecting him to extrajudicial surveillance and harassment.” (Dkt. No. 33 at
6 1) (see also Dkt. No. 16 at 2) (“Plaintiff’s community custody [ended] . . . yet Defendant 7 continues unlawful supervision, tracking via GPS, and retaliatory actions outside the scope of his 8 authority.”) The TRO motion also took issue with the fact that Defendants “[d]enied marital 9 contact with Plaintiff’s spouse, Julie Torell.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff 10 requested: the removal of the GPS device (Dkt. Nos. 33 at 2, 16 at 4); an injunction preventing 11 Lovell or any DOC official acting on his direction from contacting, monitoring, arresting, 12 detaining or otherwise interacting Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 16 at 3–4); the injunction of “further tolling 13 or manipulation of [Plaintiff’s] release conditions” (Dkt. No. 33 at 2); and a declaration that “all 14 post-July 17 custody” was void (Dkt. No. 33 at 2). Plaintiff stated that he “suffer[ed] daily
15 humiliation, duress, and fear due to the continued physical and psychological control of the GPS 16 ankle monitor.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 2.) 17 Because Plaintiff is no longer being supervised by the Department of Corrections, his 18 motions for equitable relief are moot. Article III of the Constitution empowers the federal courts 19 to decide only “live cases or controversies.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 20 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). “A claim is moot ‘when the issues presented are no longer live 21 or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 22 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)). “An 23 inmate’s release from prison while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims for 24 1 injunctive relief relating to the prison’s policies.” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 2 1995). The same principle applies to claims for declaratory relief. Alvarez, 667 F.3d at 1064. 3 “The reason is that the released inmate is no longer subject to the prison conditions or policies he 4 challenges.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s motions are moot because Plaintiff has been removed from 5 community supervision and is no longer subject to the policies he challenged. Additionally,
6 Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any of his claims could feasibly succeed on the merits. 7 See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff “must 8 establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits”). 9 IV CONCLUSION 10 Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO (Dkt. No. 16) and motion for injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 33) 11 are both DENIED as moot. 12 Dated this 6th day of August, 2025. 13 a 14 David G. Estudillo 15 United States District Judge
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