Toplitzky v. Hooten (In Re Toplitzky)

227 B.R. 300, 98 Daily Journal DAR 12443, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8846, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1539, 1998 WL 838910
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 13, 1998
DocketBAP No. CC-97-1920-JBS, Bankruptcy No. RS97-11859 MG
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 227 B.R. 300 (Toplitzky v. Hooten (In Re Toplitzky)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Toplitzky v. Hooten (In Re Toplitzky), 227 B.R. 300, 98 Daily Journal DAR 12443, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8846, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1539, 1998 WL 838910 (bap9 1998).

Opinion

OPINION

JONES, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtor Bernard Toplitzky appeals from the bankruptcy court’s order denying his motion to avoid a creditor’s lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). 2 The bankruptcy court denied the motion on the condition that the creditor pay the Debtor the amount of Debt- or’s claimed exemption. The bankruptcy court reasoned the lien could remain because the Debtor’s exemption was not impaired once the Debtor had received the full value of his exemption. We REVERSE and REMAND.

I. FACTS

The relevant facts are undisputed. On February 26, 1996, John P. Hooten, as trustee of the Hooten family trust (creditor), obtained a pre-petition state court judgment against the Debtor in the amount of $133,-345.00. The creditor then recorded a lien against the Debtor’s residence. On January 30, 1997, the Debtor filed for Chapter 7 protection.

On his schedules the Debtor listed his residential property as having a fair market value of $206,000.00, subject to a first mortgage in the amount of $205,943.00. The property was also encumbered by two judicial liens. The senior judicial lien was in the name of Henry Boglino for $112,260. The creditor in this appeal held the junior judicial lien.

Although the record is not precise as to timing, it appears that on or about June 26, 1997, the bankruptcy court avoided the senior judicial lien pursuant to § 522(f). It is unclear whether the senior judicial lien holder filed any opposition to the Debtor’s motion to avoid lien. Subsequently, the bankruptcy *302 court heard arguments on the Debtor’s motion to avoid the creditor’s lien.

The Debtor argued that the lien impaired the equity exemption he claimed under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 703.140(b)(1), which allows an exemption of up to $15,000.00 in value of a debtor’s interest in real property used as a residence. The creditor objected to the motion, offering to pay the Debtor his claimed equity in the residence. The creditor noted that the Debt- or’s schedules reflected only $57 in equity in his residence. The creditor reasoned that by paying the Debtor the amount of his claimed exemption the Debtor’s exemption is not impaired in any way as he is receiving the full value of his exemption.

The bankruptcy court accepted the creditor’s argument and ruled that the exemption would not be impaired and the lien could not be avoided if the Debtor was paid the exemption he claimed in the property. The court held that, because the Debtor chose to exempt his property under CCP § 703.140 which allows an exemption of up to $15,000 “in value,” and because the Debtor had claimed that his exemption was only worth $57, he could not avoid the creditor’s lien if the creditor paid the Debtor the value of his exemption.

The creditor proffered a check for $57.00 and the court allowed the lien to remain intact. The Debtor appeals from that decision.

II.ISSUE

Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying the Debtor’s Motion to Avoid Lien.

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The bankruptcy court’s application of California exemption law is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo. Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 628 (9th Cir. BAP 1997); In re Morgan, 149 B.R. 147, 150 (9th Cir. BAP 1993). Likewise, we review construction of the Bankruptcy Code de novo. In re Beltran, 177 B.R. 905 (9th Cir. BAP 1995).

IV.DISCUSSION

In 1984, the California Legislature opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemption statutes. CCP §§ 703.130-140 (West 1987). 3 Consequently, substantive issues regarding extent to which a debtor is entitled to an exemption are governed by California law. In re Canino, 185 B.R. 584, 590 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). However, once it is determined that a debtor is entitled to a certain exemption, questions concerning impairment and lien avoidance under § 522(f) are controlled by federal law. In re Herman, 120 B.R. 127, 129 (9th Cir. BAP 1990).

In the present case there is no dispute that the Debtor is entitled to claim an exemption under CCP § 703.140(b)(1). CCP § 703.140(b)(1) provides that a debtor may exempt “[t]he debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,-000) in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence ...” 4 The Debtor listed his residence on Ms schedules as having a fail' market value of $206,000 subject to a first deed trust in the amount of $205,943. Consequently, the Debtor listed his exemption pursuant to CCP § 703.140(b)(1) at $57, the difference between the fair market value and the first deed of trust.

Debtor then filed a motion to avoid the creditor’s lien as impairing his exemption. The creditor objected. The creditor in the present case reads the language $15,000 “in value” to have a meaning distinct from the homestead exemption which the creditor claims protects the property itself. As support for this proposition the creditor noted that a debtor who has claimed a homestead exemption pursuant to CCP § 704.730 cannot be forced to sell his residence unless the purchase price is sufficient to pay all liens and give the debtor the full amount of his *303 homestead exemption. However, if a debtor chooses to utilize CCP § 703.140, as the present debtor did, the home may be sold and the debtor is only entitled to recover the dollar amount of his exemption after the sale is concluded. This distinction, argues the creditor, demonstrates that the California statutes have two distinct purposes. CCP § 703.140 is designed to merely protect the “value” of the debtor’s exemption, whereas the homestead exemption of CCP § 704.730 is designed to protect the property itself. We are unpersuaded.

The flaw in the creditor’s argument lies in the fact that lien avoidance under § 522(f) does not rely on such technical distinctions. Section 522(f) does not refer to real property or “value.” Rather § 522(f) speaks to the Debtor’s “interest” in property. That interest is not limited to physical or monetary interests. Consequently, under § 522(f) the question is simply whether a hen impairs an exemption to which the Debtor is entitled.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) provides a formula for determining whether a hen impairs an exemption to which the Debtor is entitled. That section provides:

For the purposes of this subsection, a hen shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of—
(i) the hen;
(ii) all other hens on the property; and
(hi) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no hens on the property;
exceeds the value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any hens.

11 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Culver, LLC v. Chiu (In Re Chiu)
266 B.R. 743 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Krasnoff v. Marshack (In Re General Carriers Corp.)
258 B.R. 181 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
227 B.R. 300, 98 Daily Journal DAR 12443, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8846, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1539, 1998 WL 838910, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toplitzky-v-hooten-in-re-toplitzky-bap9-1998.